By Sajad Abedi

A strategic strategy for cyber-bullying in international level

January 19, 2018

Since the principle of self-restraint addresses a wide range of threats, it used in the military and strategic fields. But the implementation of deterrence in cyberspace is only proposed if the risks that are objectively possible have a direct impact on the security and survival of a government; therefore, each state is required to make it possible in any way to overcome the existing challenges.

The challenges of an attack, the estimation of the impact and reconstruction of the incident and the purpose of an attack, in the framework of public networking and actors, distinguish the cyberspace from other areas where deterrence is formed. Intrusions in cyberspace, although possible and possible, cannot be limited to existing measures, but unique concepts have to be developed and presented.

The same is true of cyberspace dominance and power. According to Daniel T. Coel, power here is "the ability to use cyberspace to gain points and impact on events in other operating environments, using power equipment". The important thing is that on the eve of entering the cyberspace is a low level that, unlike other classical domains (land, sea, air, and space), any country, organization, social group or individual can penetrate it and play an unbelievable role. In the classical context, the conflict often ends with erosion and the reserves of one side, while most hostile acts in cyberspace are almost unprofitable. The result is that, according to Joseph S. Nay Jr, power in cyberspace is inherently widespread and the expression of different actors is divided.

In fact, some challenges in the field of cybercrime are similar to those of other forms of deterrence. For example, the problem of identifying cyber attacks is reminiscent of the challenges of deterrence of nuclear terrorism. Identifying the effects of a cyber attack is much more similar to identifying the effects of biological weapons. Also, the invisibility of computerized weapons is very similar in many respects to the biological weapons challenge.

Therefore, methodological deterrents in this area can be used to define some of the cyber-deterrent elements: against the threat of terrorism, the concepts of "deterrence through denial" and "indirect distraction" and against biological threats can be understood as the concept of “Symmetric Inhibition”
When cyber deterrence is chosen to respond appropriately, it is preferable to abandon exercise of physical power against cybercrime. This is especially important because actors whose retaliation measures are very diverse (from governments to personalities).

It may be inappropriate in response to individual actions, criminal groups or terrorist organizations, or even in some cases inadequate. By relying on this, one can avoid a new attack or retaliatory attacks that go on to progress.

If we assume that the development of the Internet and digital and communications equipment globally, especially at the heart of offices and private sector companies, is growing with the same trend, we conclude that the full symmetry of the equipment used and the effects of the case the view are conceptually possible.

Geo-strategic texture and technical texture can facilitate the allocation of hostile acts to responsible actors: for example, in a cybercrime attack on Estonia, although the official Russian services did not directly operate to neutralize its servers, but it seems that Russia has played a significant role in the attack. Of course, it cannot be said that this is the only decisive factor in identifying an actor, because in some cases attackers may act and try to accuse a third-party actor. It may even be possible for a government to take responsibility for its rival cyber attacks to increase its containment position.

Today, the concepts of "cyber security", "cyber defense" and "cyber-bullying" have replaced the notion of "information dominance." Of course, there have been no official US publications that describe the use of US cybercrime doctrine, but this concept has been introduced or revived in many recent White House documents.

It seems that in the present era, the need to develop a deterrent in cyberspace has been well understood. Apparently, with the development of informatics and communications technologies and the generalization of the use of the Internet in everyday humanitarian work, it has come to a conclusion that the issue of defense in the cyberspace - in the cyberspace - is witnessing the increasing asymmetry between the positions of attack and defense - to complete all options possibly possible defense. If we take into account that coping strategies can bring important and dangerous results (although not necessarily) to the intended target, the issue of the threshold for the initiation of a cyber criminal response is raised legally.
 

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