TEHRAN – Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner, a distinguished scholar of international relations and political science at the University of Vienna, brings decades of expertise on global security, transatlantic relations, nuclear non-proliferation, and West Asian geopolitics. 

With a rich academic background that includes prestigious Fulbright Fellowships at Stanford University and Johns Hopkins University, as well as leadership roles at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs and the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, Dr. Gärtner has emerged as a leading voice in analyzing complex international challenges. His award-winning publications, including his acclaimed work on “China and Eurasia,” offer deep insights into the shifting dynamics of global power.

The Tehran Times conducted an interview with the professor to discuss the latest controversies regarding Europe’s handling of Iran’s nuclear issue, including recent remarks by French President Emanuel Macron who accused Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of lacking agency. In an interview with Israeli media, the French leader said Europe had rejected a “reasonable” offer from the diplomat which was designed to prevent the return of anti-Iran UN sanctions because he lacks “support” within the “structure”. 

While Macron’s remarks were soon refuted by Araghchi himself, as well as analysts and other Iranian officials, we asked Dr. Gärtner how common it is for world leader to dismiss a legal and official representative of a foreign country based on claims similar to those of the French president. He also discussed the geopolitical stakes surrounding Iran’s diplomatic initiatives, the interplay of regional and global powers, and the broader implications for peace and security in West Asia.

Below is the full text of the interview:

1. Emmanuel Macron gave a high-profile interview to an Israeli outlet right before a pivotal UNSC meeting on September 19th. From your view, what was the intended message of this media choice, and how does it align with France’s diplomatic posture in the region? Was this symbolic, strategic, or purely rhetorical?

In this interview—given before the UN Security Council meeting on September 19—President Macron announced that UN sanctions would be reimposed on Iran. Macron’s main intention, however, was to warn Israel about the risk of losing its reputation and credibility due to the war in Gaza. He also prepared the ground for France’s possible recognition of Palestine as a state, underlining that Israel must accept the two-state solution. This message was directed at all states in the [Persian] Gulf region.

2. Iran remained fully compliant with its nuclear commitments until 2019, maintaining adherence for a complete year after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Even after that period, Tehran continued to keep diplomatic channels open. How do you assess Iran’s approach during this time, and how would you evaluate the role and effectiveness of European countries in responding to Iran’s stance and in sustaining diplomatic engagement?

The JCPOA is one of the most carefully negotiated arms-control agreements in history. President Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 was one of the greatest blunders in international politics of the post-Cold War era. It should not be forgotten, however, that there was an attempt to revive the JCPOA in 2021–22. After President Biden gave the green light, the EU-3 launched negotiations in Vienna in April 2021. By the end of June, 80 percent of the issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief had already been agreed. Iran should have built on these negotiations and accepted the proposal tabled by the European Commission in the fall of 2022.

3. President Macron dismissed Iran’s recent diplomatic proposal on the grounds that the foreign ministry lacks full political backing. Given that Abbas Araghchi explicitly stated the plan had the endorsement of all key institutions, including the Supreme National Security Council, how do you interpret this contradiction in France’s reasoning?

President Macron was probably referring to conflicting signals from Iran regarding the interpretation of its agreement with the IAEA in Cairo. It was not entirely clear whether Iran would allow inspectors access to all relevant sites (Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan) and to its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. It must be said, however, that any foreign statesman has to accept the statements of a country’s official representatives, whether or not they agree with them.

4. In your view, what leverage does Iran still hold in the multilateral diplomatic arena? Can Tehran still use backchannels or regional alliances (e.g., BRICS, SCO) to counterbalance European-led initiatives at the UN?

As the UN Security Council vote demonstrated, Iran cannot rely on outside powers to counterbalance the E-3 initiative. The resolution passed with nine votes in favor of maintaining multilateral sanctions, which harmed Iran; not even a veto was needed. Iran must act on its own to avoid renewed multilateral sanctions. 

The best way forward is to cooperate with the E-3. Their requests can be met without Iran losing face: more effective cooperation with the IAEA beyond the Cairo agreement is possible; Iran should clarify the whereabouts of its highly enriched uranium, which it would have to give up under any future agreement anyway, since it is prohibited under the JCPOA; and Iran should signal its willingness to resume talks with the United States. Of course, negotiations require both sides. It should also be noted that the E-3 dropped their demand for zero enrichment. It is only fair, however, that Iran demands no new military strikes during the negotiations.

5. Is there a risk that these sanctions set a dangerous precedent, where multilateral diplomacy can be overridden by political motivations of a few actors? If so, what does that mean for future nuclear negotiations—whether with Iran or others?

Sanctions can only be lifted through negotiations—whether multilateral or bilateral. Political motivations are always involved in international relations, but there is no alternative. If diplomacy fails, the Iranian people and economy will bear the costs.

6. During the 12-Day War, Israeli and U.S. strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. How do international laws, including the Vienna Convention, view these attacks? Are they violations of Iran’s rights and protection of civilian infrastructure? And why is Iran’s right to self-defense often overlooked in international discussions?

The use of force against a sovereign state clearly violates the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. UN General Assembly resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors decisions also prohibit the use of force against nuclear facilities. The UN Security Council and the IAEA should have condemned the attacks. Civilian targets must be avoided under international humanitarian law. This holds true even in cases of self-defense.

7. What role do you see for international law and UN procedures in resolving such deeply politicized conflicts? Can the Security Council still act as an impartial arbiter, or has it become a forum for geopolitical rivalry?

The fact that states—especially major powers—violate international law does not mean that international law should be abandoned. Such violations are not the fault of the law itself. Without international law, unrestrained brute force in an anarchic world would be the only option left. The veto in the Security Council remains an obstacle, but without it, the major powers might abandon the UN altogether. After all, the United States was the only country to vote against the recent resolution on humanitarian aid to Gaza.

8. With the Security Council divided on Iran, how do you foresee the evolving alignments between key players like China, Russia, Europe, and the U.S.? Will this push Iran closer into a strategic partnership with Beijing and Moscow?

Iran should by all means avoid being pushed into close alignment with Russia and China against the United States and Europe. All major powers pursue their own interests and abandon smaller states when it suits them. China and Russia, after all, remained silent during the attacks on Iran, and Russia also maintains close ties with Israel.