Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi on 4–5 December 2025 should be viewed as one of the defining geopolitical moments in Eurasia over the past decade—an event that transcends the traditional contours of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship and is best understood as part of a broader realignment in the regional balance of power.

At this juncture, India occupies a pivotal position within a triangle of competing pressures: rising expectations from Washington to align with the U.S.-led framework of constraining Russia; the structural imperatives of energy security and domestic economic stability; and the management of a long-term rivalry with China that spans from the high-altitude frontiers of Ladakh to the dense lattice of technological and industrial supply chains. Hosting Putin at such a moment was a deliberate assertion that New Delhi rejects any subordinate role and that strategic autonomy remains the foundational doctrine of Indian foreign policy.

To understand the full significance of this visit, one must consider the emerging frictions in India–U.S. relations. The return of protectionist economic policies in Washington—combined with unprecedented pressure on New Delhi to reduce its energy engagement with Russia—has convinced Indian policymakers that the energy security and economic welfare of 1.4 billion citizens cannot be made contingent upon the shifting priorities of successive U.S. administrations. India, which sourced approximately 36 percent of its energy imports from Russia in the 2024–2025 fiscal year, recognizes that severing this affordable and reliable supply line would impose structural disadvantages vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. Simultaneously, Washington’s recalibration of Pakistan’s regional role—particularly the renewed operational space granted to Islamabad in the Afghan theater—has heightened concerns within India’s strategic community. Drawing on the legacy of non-alignment, senior security and policy elites warn that excessive dependence on the United States not only erodes India’s positional advantages but risks undermining the very essence of its strategic autonomy for the first time in three decades.

Within this context, India’s calibrated approach toward China assumes clear strategic significance. Border de-escalation, the reopening of communication channels, and the symbolic image of Modi, Putin, and Xi together at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit all point to a new phase of pragmatic realism in New Delhi’s foreign policy. India has signaled that despite its structural rivalry with Beijing, it will not be drawn into a U.S.-led anti-China coalition. Its deep economic interdependence with China—from sourcing nearly 80 percent of its surveillance equipment to extensive technological trade—underscores the reality that “containing” China is impossible without simultaneously “managing” it. India’s emerging posture is a sophisticated blend of competition, engagement, and selective economic pragmatism—an approach that frees New Delhi from the rigid dichotomies of Cold War-style alignments.

For Russia, the visit carries an equally clear message. Facing acute economic and strategic constraints amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, Moscow views India as a geopolitical anchor essential for diversifying its partnerships and mitigating excessive dependence on China. For Russia, New Delhi is far more than an energy client; it is a strategic partner capable of stabilizing Russian energy revenue, limiting the reach of Western sanctions, and reopening Eurasian channels of connectivity. Defense cooperation—accounting for nearly 60 percent of India’s weapons inventory—remains a shared, irreplaceable strategic pillar for both sides.

Against this broader backdrop, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has acquired renewed strategic salience. The corridor is no longer merely a transit route but a critical geoeconomic artery allowing India and Russia to secure a connection between the Indian Ocean and Eurasia without traversing pathways dominated by either Western or Chinese influence. Although physical implementation has progressed slowly, the sustained political commitment of both capitals suggests that the corridor is evolving into a “meaning-making instrument” in the emerging Eurasian order—one that helps shape regional roles rather than simply facilitate trade.

Putin’s visit also marks the beginning of a wider regional recalibration across South and Central Asia, with Afghanistan once again emerging as a focal point in the strategic competition among India, Pakistan, and Russia. Concerned about the resurgence of proxy networks and transnational militant threats, New Delhi is re-engaging Afghanistan with renewed urgency—a development Islamabad views as a strategic challenge, potentially destabilizing the already fragile border equilibrium. The implications for Iran are direct and serious: potential refugee flows, increased instability on its eastern frontiers, and intensified competition among regional actors create a far more complex strategic landscape for Tehran.

Yet this very reconfiguration presents a rare opportunity for Iran. Should New Delhi and Moscow choose to reduce reliance on Pakistan-centric routes, Iran’s geostrategic position—from the port of Chabahar to its natural connectivity with Central Asia and Russia—could elevate Tehran into the geoeconomic backbone of an emerging Delhi–Moscow–Tehran triangle. If managed with strategic foresight, this scenario could provide Iran not only with significant economic gains but also with new forms of security leverage. Moreover, trilateral cooperation among India, Russia, and Iran in countering ISIS–K offers a platform for developing shared intelligence and operational mechanisms.

Taken together, Putin’s visit to New Delhi represents a pivotal moment in the trajectory of Indian foreign policy. India signaled its intent to act not as a subordinate partner but as an autonomous and balancing power within the evolving multipolar order. Russia leverages this partnership to cushion the pressure of Western sanctions; China welcomes the emergence of a soft-balancing dynamic that prevents a complete Indian pivot toward Washington; and the United States must now contend with a strategic reality in which India is a partner—but not a compliant one. For Iran, the implications remain contingent: if Tehran defines its role proactively and moves decisively, it could become one of the principal beneficiaries of this regional reordering; if not, these same shifts may generate serious challenges along its eastern security horizon.
This geopolitical moment marks an inflection point in the emergence of a new Eurasian power equation—one in which India positions itself not merely as a regional actor, but as one of the architects of the order to come.

*(The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Tehran Times' editorial stance.)