TEHRAN – “Terrorist attacks inside Turkey very likely are related to Turkish foreign policy,” a former CIA official says. 

Paul Pillar, now a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and at the Brookings Institution, tells Tehran Times, “Whereas Turkey earlier had condoned the passage of militants across the border with Syria, now it is cracking down and trying better to control the border.” 

Also in a U-turn Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced on Wednesday that Ankara is seeking re-establish good relations with Syria. Yildirim said good ties with Syria were needed "for the fight against terrorism" in the region.

Following is the text of the interview with Paul Pillar:

Q: What made the ruling AKP party in Turkey to drop some of its preconditions to reconcile with Israel? Will it affect the security or economy Of Turkey?

A: Although the rupture of relations was inevitable after the fatal incident at sea six years ago, the same general reasons that had existed earlier for Turkey and Israel to have cooperative relations still exist.  So with the passage of time and the cooling of emotions after the incident that caused the rupture, it probably also was inevitable that these two states would get back together.  Underlying their cooperation is the fact that they are two of the three major non-Arab states (Iran being the third) in a region that is predominantly Arab.  A more immediate incentive for renewed cooperation is the prospect of increased exploitation of natural gas deposits in the Mediterranean.  The main direct effect of this development on Turkey will be the positive economic effect involving the gas.

Q: Why did Turkey reconcile with Russia too? Will it affect Turkish security and AKP’s policy in Syria?

A: With regard to the reconciliations with both Israel and Russia, a Turkish motivation has been to bolster its foreign relations generally and to avoid becoming any more isolated than it already was becoming.  Probably the most specific Turkish concerns motivating the reconciliation with Russia involve the war in Syria and dangers of events there spinning out of control.  The very event that had become a crisis in Russian-Turkish relations--the brief overflight of Turkish territory by a Russian warplane and the shooting down of that plane by Turkey--was a demonstration of how fragile the situation there is.  Restoring more normal relations with Russia can increase Turkey's security by enabling the two sides to manage any future incidents before they become a full-blown crisis.  The Turks also would need at least the tacit cooperation of Russia if Turkey were to take a more active military role in Syria.  The reconciliation thus may have opened the door to just such a Turkish intervention.  

Q: Why did Turkey’s zero problem foreign policy practically changed into mere tensions with its neighbors?

A: Some of the reasons have been at least partly outside Turkey's control.  The forceful interception by Israel of the ship with activists going to Gaza, for example, is not something that Ankara intended or had planned for.  And with a conflict as complicated as the one in next-door Syria, it would be hard for Turkey not to antagonize somebody. But other reasons are related to some inconsistent policies on the part of the Turkish government.  This is especially true of the approach toward ISIS and other Sunni militants fighting in Syria.

Q: What will be the effect of these changes on Turkey itself? Are the terrorist attacks inside Turkey linked to Ankara’s foreign policy?

A: Terrorist attacks inside Turkey very likely are related to Turkish foreign policy.  Whereas Turkey earlier had condoned the passage of militants across the border with Syria, now it is cracking down and trying better to control the border.  This sort of move from near-support to open opposition is the kind of policy that is especially likely to stimulate terrorists to attack, and that includes ISIS.  As for other effects inside Turkey, it will be interesting to watch how foreign relations may have an effect on the domestic Turkish political scene.  Erdogan still has ambitions regarding the creation of a strong executive presidency.  He probably saw the shoring up of Turkey's foreign relations as a necessary step in further pursuing his domestic goals.

JH/PA