As expected, the longstanding U.S.-Iran games of strategy have now acquired a new theater, Afghanistan.

What appeared after September 11 as a genuine convergence of interests between Washington and Tehran, vis--vis Taleban and narco-terrorism from Afghanistan, portending rapprochement in the near future, has dissipated by the rapid progress of the war, and the inability of both sides to telescope their shared interests to broader agreements regarding regional security.

A post-Cold War Pax Americana, reminding many a downtrodden in the Third World of Pax Romana invoking the desire for Spartacus-like heroics, is wrought with difficulties and problems for the United States. For one thing, Mr. Bush may warn Iran of backlashes by "the coalition" if it fails to cooperate with the anti-terrorist campaign, yet it would be naive on his part, and his foreign policy makers, to overlook the convergence of interests among Iran, China, and Russia against American hegemony, nowadays solidified by the U.S. basebuilding in Afghanistan apparently on an indefinite basis. The triple alliance against American military intervention is likely to receive a new blood by this news, considered anathema to the national interests of these countries.

Only a short-sighted, triumphalist America can remain oblivious to this ominous possibility, poisoned by the thundering victory against the Taleban, which was hardly surprising given the popular discontent with their rule and the profound asymmetry of power.

But now, with the U.S. acting as king-maker in Kabul, the dangers of a runaway U.S. intervention is paramount, risking a local and regional backlash throwing the U.S. in the quagmire of a protracted guerrilla warfare. This kind of backlash is for the moment contained by the sheer exhaustion of warring factions in Afghanistan, but the war culture of the country is itself an inducement to this unwanted scenario, notwithstanding the likely counter-trend of anti-American nexus above-mentioned.

Iran's national security calculus dictates certain policies and postures by the leaders. It dictates a foreign-free regional environment, indeed no different than the U.S. government which vociferously opposed a few hundred Soviet advisers in neighboring Cuba during the 1980s. For the U.S. leaders to ignore such apt analogies and demand from Iran sheepish obedience to their dictates of power is akin to a yearning for the glory days of Roman empire enslaving the rest of the world.

The New World Order is bound to turn into a messy and anarchic disorder if the United States fails to recognize the illusion of a Pax Americana in today's global village marked with complex interdependence. Unfortunately, often illusions, myths and misconceptions feed decision-makers, as wars and conflicts are often based on misconceptions of the other side's intentions, and we are now confronted with a situation that a triumphant superpower may shoot itself in the knee by ignoring the limits of its own power and the attendant insensitivity to the national security concerns of others. Arrogance of power can indeed create so many foreign policy blindspots.

To overcome this problem, Washington must revise its current drift of hegemonic policy in the Middle East, otherwise it must prepare itself for an endemic anti-American momentum generated by its own victory in Afghanistan. To do so would dictate a greater deal of sensitivity to the worries and concerns of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran. Even Russia cannot be taken for granted, and the longer the U.S. stay in Afghanistan and encroachment in Central Asia, the weaker will be the so-called Atlanticist Russians opposed by the Eurasianist-nationalist politicians dreading the U.S. presence.

Crafting a prudent Iran policy in Washington is now needed, one that seeks to telescope the partial U.S.-Iran cooperation against narco-terrorism via the UN's Six Plus Two to broader cooperation based on mutual understanding of each other's national interests and the zone of shared interests, such as with respect to the flow of Caspian oil.