TEHRAN- In the wake of Israel’s renewed attacks following the Gaza ceasefire, Palestinian writer and analyst Hassan Lafi examines the underlying political and strategic motivations driving Tel Aviv’s escalation. 

In an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times, Lafi argues that Israel’s military operations reflect deep internal tensions within the Netanyahu government and its growing isolation on the international stage. He explains how Israel’s right-wing forces view the ceasefire as a setback and use renewed strikes to regain domestic legitimacy and reshape the truce on their own terms. 

Lafi also assesses Washington’s position, suggesting that the United States remains an implicit partner in Israel’s military agenda even as it seeks broader regional stability. He warns that recent Israeli attacks on Lebanon could signal a wider attempt to destabilize the region under the guise of “freedom of military action.”

The following is the text of the interview:

After the ceasefire in Gaza was announced, Israel launched a new series of strikes against civilians. In your view, what drives Tel Aviv to resume attacks despite the declared commitment to calm?

Israel agreed to the ceasefire reluctantly. The dominant view within the government was to continue the occupation of Gaza and to displace its population, but under U.S. pressure and growing international isolation, the prime minister was forced to accept the agreement.

For that reason, many Israelis see the agreement as falling short of the demands of the hard-right. By resuming the bombing, they aim to alter the terms of the deal in their favor by creating a reality that allows them to claim a so-called freedom of military action against Gaza—what Israeli media call “the Lebanese model.”

At the same time, this sends internal messages to the broad Israeli constituency that believes the agreement does not deliver the decisive victory Netanyahu had pursued throughout two years of war.

To what extent do these attacks carry a domestic political message tied to Netanyahu’s weakness and internal crises?

There is a link between these attacks and Israel’s internal situation. This link appears in two ways:

First, the hard-right base (the core electoral force within the religious-Zionist and right-wing camp) wanted the occupation of Gaza and settlement there after displacing most Palestinians. They regard the agreement as American tutelage imposed on the government and a sign of weakness in Netanyahu’s political will.

The strikes ease right-wing opposition and send a message that Netanyahu is managing affairs effectively and can change the agreement’s terms to suit Israeli interests.

Second, the families of Israeli captives. The recovery of prisoners’ bodies and the return of captives is a central, popular issue. There are logistical and security obstacles that mediators recognize, but Netanyahu also seeks to reduce pressure from this large constituency that opposed him during the war for not securing releases earlier.

Thus, strikes framed around the issue of captives’ bodies gain domestic legitimacy and appeal to a public segment that had been critical of Netanyahu and demanded an end to the war—especially given that Israel is widely expected to enter an election year.

The United States has always been a partner of Israel in its killing and its war against the Palestinian people, but the balance of power sometimes forces Palestinians to deal with the U.S. as a mediator.

How can the Palestinian resistance deal with this kind of “fragile truce” that Israel breaks whenever it wants?

The resistance in Gaza understands that the ceasefire is a major achievement because it preserved Palestinian lives and blocked the Israeli displacement plan. They treat these bombings as Israeli violations that must be exposed and used to hold mediators and the international community—who welcomed and supported the ceasefire—accountable.

At the same time, continuing to reveal the occupation (regime)’s crimes help maintain international isolation pressure on Israel as a rogue state that does not want stability in the region.

On the military side, the resistance shows long patience and strategic endurance in facing these Israeli breaches. It seeks to create deterrence equations—not necessarily originating from Gaza alone—to prevent Israeli escalation against Palestinian lives.

Do you think Israel uses the truce as cover to reposition and prepare for a new round of fighting?

Israel wants to continue the war but in a new form: after the release of living Israeli captives and the shift from all-out war to limited, targeted operations—this time with American legitimacy and international silence.

However, a return to full-scale war faces opposition from the international community and the United States, which are currently unwilling to accept that option.

How do you assess the United States’ position on these assaults? Is Washington still really capable of pressuring Israel, or is it an implicit partner in the escalation?

The United States has always been a partner of Israel in its killing and its war against the Palestinian people, but the balance of power sometimes forces Palestinians to deal with the U.S. as a mediator.

That said, the Trump administration has become convinced that the war must be stopped entirely—not for the sake of the Palestinian people, but to protect America’s greater interests globally and regionally and to protect Israel from itself.

At the same time, the Trump administration would not object to allowing Israel a freer military hand in Gaza so long as it does not undermine the comprehensive ceasefire agreement and remains under U.S. control.

We witnessed a new Israeli attack on Lebanon on October 30. How do you explain this escalation at this particular moment?

Lebanon will be at the forefront of events in the coming months, especially since Israel’s bet on internal Lebanese forces—whether parties or the state—to disarm Hezbollah has failed.

Therefore, if Israel continues to apply its doctrine of freedom of military action in Lebanon after the ceasefire, ground military operations will increase and could escalate into major military operations short of full-scale war, particularly south of the Litani River.

Here one must pay attention to the electoral calculus in Israel.

Is Israel trying to expand the circle of confrontation to confuse the situation and impose new equations in the region?

Reordering the region is not something Israel can play with unless the United States approves and it serves Washington’s main vision for reshaping the Middle East. As the U.S. president has said on many occasions, the Gaza agreement aims to reorder the Middle East.

Therefore, Israel does not have the freedom to act across the region without American approval; this was evident on the Syrian front and in American intervention related to Turkish interests, and it will be visible on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts. Unless there is an American military plan in which Israel has a defined role, Israel will not be able to act independently to reshuffle the region’s cards.

In your opinion, what messages does Tel Aviv want to convey by striking Lebanon after the Gaza truce?

Israel wants to send several messages. The most important strategic message is that it seeks to emphasize the goal of disarming Hezbollah as a strategic objective—or at least to prevent Hezbollah from rearming in Lebanon.

is also an internal message tied to Israel’s electoral calculations in favor of the ruling coalition. And there is a message to the Americans, attempting to persuade them to intervene forcefully in the Lebanese file as an alternative to a full Israeli war on Lebanon.

However, in my view, the regional, international (and even Israeli) environment does not allow suitable conditions for Israel to launch a full-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

That said, Israel will try to increase the tempo of limited military operations against Lebanon and Hezbollah.