TEHRAN – Haitham Ali Tabatabai, a senior commander of Hezbollah in Lebanon, was assassinated and martyred on November 23 during an Israeli airstrike on southern Dahieh in Beirut, along with several of his comrades.

Tabatabai ranked among Hezbollah’s most distinguished field commanders. He was part of the second generation of the movement’s founders, led the elite Radwan Unit, and served as the architect of the “Golan File.” His record spanned battles in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Israel described Tabatabai as Hezbollah’s “chief of military staff.” This senior commander had survived numerous assassination attempts and had been on the U.S. terrorist list since 2016.

His stature within the resistance’s command structure made this assassination one of Lebanon’s most consequential security events.

Yet the significance extends beyond the killing of a prominent commander; the core message lies in the timing, location, and method of the operation.

The regime’s aggressive strike deep into southern Dahieh and direct targeting of a key Hezbollah commander once again revealed a fundamental reality: Tel Aviv has never interpreted ceasefire as tranquility or an end to war.

For Israel, ceasefire periods—whether in Gaza or Lebanon—form part of a proven cycle of intelligence and field operations whose effectiveness has been demonstrated for years.

Field data analysis indicates that following the Gaza war and after clashes in Lebanon, the regime pursued an extensive constellation of intelligence activities.

The relative reduction in combat intensity, the psychological atmosphere of partial calm, and the curtailment of offensive measures can create the impression of diminished threat.

However, Israeli intelligence services, this very situation provides the optimal environment for updating target banks, tracking movement patterns, monitoring protective cover, and refining operational coordinates. The assassination of Haitham Ali Tabatabai is precisely the product of such a process.

The operational pattern demonstrates that during ceasefires, the regime sustains a form of “low-noise warfare” comprising continuous reconnaissance flights, communications interception, human intelligence collection through local networks, and analysis of command structure shifts.

Consequently, Tel Aviv views ceasefire not as the cessation of war but as a change in phase and method of confrontation. Expecting the regime to adhere to a ceasefire therefore constitutes an obvious miscalculation.

The recent operation offers clear lessons for regional security and military structures.

First, experience shows that Israel achieves its greatest intelligence gains during ceasefire periods.

Second, reliance on apparent battlefield silence can reduce threat perception, sustain routine protective patterns, or simplify security measures—a trajectory that effectively serves the regime.

Third, close U.S.-Israeli cooperation in managing ceasefire periods indicates these intervals are designed under special political and security cover and cannot be considered neutral or impartial processes.

Under such conditions, continuous vigilance by security and military institutions becomes a strategic imperative.

This vigilance does not necessitate permanent escalation but requires maintaining stable monitoring levels, periodically reviewing protective protocols, strengthening communications security, and paying particular attention to the regime’s battlefield behavior patterns.

The ceasefire’s apparent contradiction—external silence alongside internal intelligence dynamism—is precisely what Israel exploits and must be structurally and permanently monitored and managed.

Source: Sedaye Iran, the online newspaper of the Institute of the Islamic Revolution of Iran — November 24, 2025