BEIRUT — Over the past two days, Israeli media outlets have been saturated with unusually candid leaks and commentaries about a potential war with Lebanon—leaks that betray more anxiety than confidence. 

Far from the traditional rhetoric of deterrence and superiority, the emerging discourse reflects deep concern within Israel’s security and political establishment over the absence of guarantees for success, the risk of uncontrolled escalation, and the possibility that a limited confrontation could spiral into a regional crisis involving Iran.

Military sources quoted by Maariv warned bluntly that “things could slip out of control,” stressing that even a limited escalation might reignite the northern front.

Hezbollah’s missile arsenal, they noted, remains capable of once again forcing the evacuation of northern settlements—an outcome Israel has yet to recover from psychologically, socially, or economically. 

This unease was echoed by Channel N12, which reported that a source within the Saudi royal family conveyed Riyadh’s opposition to any new military campaign against Lebanon, drawing “red lines” against a prolonged or expansive war. 

According to the report, Saudi Arabia views such a conflict as a direct threat to regional stability, particularly if it violates Lebanese sovereignty or targets civilians and state institutions.

Adding to this chorus of caution, former head of Israeli military intelligence Tamir Hayman acknowledged that two of the three factors that previously pushed Israel toward the brink of war have changed.

Iran, he argued, appears to have recovered from the brief “twelve-day war” and resumed substantial financial support to Hezbollah—reportedly up to one billion dollars.

While Hayman speculated that Iran’s internal economic priorities might eventually limit this support, he conceded that the current balance does not favor Israeli adventurism.

The second factor, he noted, is the fading of decisive American and Lebanese governmental involvement after earlier confrontations, opening the door to a new diplomatic phase rather than a military one.

Despite Israeli claims of tactical success south of the Litani River—where they argue Hezbollah’s Radwan Unit lacks maneuverability—serious concerns persist north of it.

Israeli analysts increasingly ask not whether Israel can strike Lebanon, but what it would do differently in any future war, and more importantly, what would come “the day after.” 

Even within Israel’s own discourse, the Lebanese government and army are now described as the only actors with both the interest and capacity to influence post-war realities—an implicit admission of Israel’s limited leverage.

Meanwhile, Amos Harel of Haaretz questioned whether U.S. President Donald Trump would accept Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s narrative that Beirut is incapable of meeting its commitments regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament. 

Harel warned that even a broad air campaign would pose internal risks to Israel, as the return of displaced settlers to the Galilee remains incomplete. 

Any renewed escalation could reproduce mass internal displacement, reinforcing a sense of vulnerability on the home front.

Yet, he argued, keeping the Lebanese front “permanently combustible” aligns with Netanyahu’s broader strategy of leaving no arena conclusively resolved.

This strategic ambiguity intersects with raw electoral calculations!

After 14 months of avoiding northern settlements, Netanyahu abruptly announced plans to hold a special cabinet session in Kiryat Shmona—a city still reeling from war damage and neglect.

The move, widely seen as election-driven ahead of anticipated summer polls, followed mounting pressure from residents furious over broken promises. 

Reports indicate that while a comprehensive “rescue package” is being prepared, state audits have already exposed severe governmental negligence, budgetary mismanagement, and the diversion of reconstruction funds for political purposes.

The social and economic toll is stark. Up to 30 percent of Kiryat Shmona’s residents have not returned, nearly 40 percent of businesses remain closed, and entire communities have been fractured by prolonged displacement. 

Despite ceasefire arrangements at the end of 2024, fear of renewed conflict continues to deter returnees and investors alike.

Even recent measures—such as officially classifying Kiryat Shmona as “eligible for personal weapons”—highlight not confidence, but institutionalized insecurity.

Taken together, these leaks, debates, and gestures reveal a deeper truth: Israel is grappling with the consequences of a long, silent war of attrition with Hezbollah—one that has hollowed out its northern front socially, economically, and psychologically.

The question haunting Israeli decision-makers is no longer how to start a war, but whether they can afford one they may not be able to finish.