SOUTH LEBANON — Lebanon today stands at the intersection of three converging tracks: the collapse of the ceasefire supervisory “Mechanism,” mounting geopolitical pressure through the India–“Middle East” –Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and deep uncertainty surrounding parliamentary elections.

These parallel dynamics are unfolding against the backdrop of regional tension linked to U.S.–Iran negotiations and escalating Israeli military activity.

The 17th meeting of the ceasefire supervisory committee in Naqoura marked a symbolic rupture. For the first time, Israeli representatives boycotted the session. The absence coincided with that of Lebanon’s delegation head, Ambassador Simon Karam.

Despite the boycott, the Lebanese delegation presented a comprehensive report detailing Israeli violations, including attacks against the Lebanese Army, reiterating demands for full withdrawal, reconstruction, and prisoner release. Yet the Israeli absence signalled more than procedural disruption—it suggested a deliberate sidelining of the Mechanism.

Experts maintain that Washington no longer views the Mechanism as effective, particularly as it seeks to marginalize France and promote a Syrian-style model of direct negotiations.

Proposals reportedly range from trilateral talks in Cyprus to meetings hosted at a U.S. military base, evoking the model of the Camp David Accords.

Lebanon’s earlier steps—weapon confinement north of the Litani River and approval of the “American paper”—are described by Hezbollah as unilateral concessions.

The trajectory increasingly resembles the political climate preceding the May 17 Agreement, later overturned in 1984.

Hence, the mechanism appears to be undergoing a slow institutional death, pending a U.S.-imposed alternative.

IMEC: Economic integration or strategic reordering?

Parallel to diplomatic shifts, Lebanese officials are expressing readiness to engage with IMEC, launched during the 2023 G20 Summit as a Western counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The corridor links India to Europe through Persian Gulf monarchies, Jordan, and Israel’s Haifa port.

For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, IMEC represents a geopolitical transformation—turning the occupation entity into a central logistical hub between Asia and Europe.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun frames it as a logistical opportunity for economic revival. Yet structural realities raise concerns. With Haifa positioned as the primary gateway, Beirut and Tripoli risk becoming secondary nodes.

French proposals aim to integrate Lebanese and Syrian ports into alternative maritime and land corridors, potentially involving global shipping giant CMA CGM in upgrading Tripoli and related infrastructure.

Still, IMEC’s architecture consolidates Israeli centrality in trade, energy, and digital connectivity.

Observers argue that Lebanon risks investing scarce resources in a project that structurally marginalizes its own ports while embedding Israel more deeply in regional supply chains.

An open promotion of ‘peace’ with the Israeli enemy

For years, discussion of normalization remained politically sensitive. Recently, however, that barrier has been partially broken.

Kataeb Party leader Samy Gemayel organized a conference titled “Making Peace: A Path Toward Lebanon’s Stability,” marking one of the clearest public forums advocating structured debate on peace with Lebanon’s “surroundings”—widely understood to mean Israel.

The conference, funded by the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, featured Lebanese political and media figures known for their criticism of Hezbollah, alongside recorded interventions from foreign personalities.

It notably bypassed explicit reference to the Arab Peace Initiative as Lebanon’s official framework, opening space for discussion of alternative models, including potential alignment with the Abraham Accords.

While framed as translating papal calls for peace into political dialogue, critics argue the timing is deeply contentious: Israeli strikes continue, prisoners remain detained, and border tensions persist.

The move has also generated internal debate within Kataeb itself, with some questioning the political timing rather than the principle. The shift is significant: normalization is no longer confined to diplomatic backchannels—it is entering organized political discourse.

Elections, escalation, and external bargaining

Meanwhile, parliamentary elections remain suspended between constitutional deadlines and geopolitical uncertainty.

U.S. Ambassador Michael Issa reportedly warned that both holding and postponing elections carry “a price,” underscoring Washington’s interest in preserving the current governing formula around President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.

With more than 30 candidacies already filed, including Speaker Nabih Berri, the legal and political debate intensifies—particularly regarding expatriate voting and the suspended “16th district.”

Observers describe an emerging internal and external “bazaar” of trade-offs, where each institutional outcome carries political cost.

These manoeuvres unfold amid escalating Israeli airstrikes, including more than 25 raids in the Bekaa in a single day.

Reporting by Yedioth Ahronoth suggests Israeli concern over Hezbollah’s potential involvement should Iran be attacked.

Former MP Walid Jumblatt has warned of grave developments by mid-March, citing Western signals of possible regional escalation regardless of U.S.–Iran negotiations.

Beirut between structural choices

Lebanon now faces interconnected turning points: the erosion of the Mechanism, potential direct negotiations, IMEC’s geopolitical architecture, open debate on normalization, electoral uncertainty, and mounting regional escalation.

Each file influences the others. Whether through imposed negotiations, economic corridors that reshape regional centrality, or organized political advocacy for peace, Lebanon’s sovereignty, strategic posture, and internal balance are being renegotiated—formally or informally.

Obviously, the upcoming months may not simply determine policy outcomes; they may redefine Lebanon’s place in a rapidly reconfigured West Asia.