TEHRAN – Questions are mounting over whether the Zionist regime can achieve militarily what it failed to accomplish before the 2024 ceasefire.

In a widely circulated speech in late November 2024, Benjamin Netanyahu declared a decisive victory over Hezbollah. He claimed the Israeli regime had pushed the Lebanese resistance “decades backward,” killed its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and destroyed much of its infrastructure. The assessment, based on the regime’s intelligence, was widely accepted by Hebrew media and much of the public at the time.

However, developments during the war, particularly on the 12th day when sensitive Zionist interests were bombed, revealed a major gap between official assessments and realities on the battlefield. The discrepancy has raised serious questions inside the regime about the ability of the political and military leadership to accurately assess and confront the threat posed by Hezbollah.

During the war, Hezbollah surprised Israeli occupation forces (IOF) with its operational performance. One of the most notable aspects was the movement’s sustained missile campaign. Throughout the war, Hezbollah units launched continuous missile barrages into all the regime’s occupied territory, demonstrating a high degree of planning and tactical flexibility.

Another development was Hezbollah’s use of the precision-guided Fateh-106 missile. The weapon carries a warhead weighing up to 370 kilograms and represents a significant advancement in Hezbollah’s missile capabilities. 

According to the Israeli regime’s estimates, Hezbollah possesses hundreds of such missiles, signaling that it could strike targets deep inside the occupied territory.

Hezbollah fighters also engaged IOF troops directly along the front lines. Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force confronted advancing IOF units inside southern Lebanon, leading to heavy IOF casualties. The encounters reflected a level of training, coordination, and battlefield organization that the regime’s officials had not anticipated.
The course of the fighting exposed fundamental miscalculations by the occupation regime’s political and military leadership. Despite the regime’s calls on residents to return to settlements last year, the area has remained under persistent threat from Hezbollah attacks. 

Zionist officials had assured settlers that Hezbollah was no longer capable of posing a significant danger.

Similarly, Hezbollah forces were not pushed away from southern Lebanon as the regime had officially claimed. Targeted strikes against senior Hezbollah leaders also failed to cripple the organization’s command-and-control structure. Vacancies in its leadership were filled quickly, allowing operations to continue with minimal disruption.
The ceasefire period itself led to unexpected consequences. Rather than weakening Hezbollah, the lull allowed the group to rebuild, refine its tactics, and strengthen its military and security capabilities.

The regime's military pundits and political analysts have faced public criticism, with many accusing them of simply repeating military briefings rather than offering independent analysis. The result has been a broader crisis of confidence in the regime’s leadership. Public trust in the military establishment has eroded, while media credibility has also suffered. At the same time, decision-makers now face growing pressure from the public and media to adopt stronger measures against Hezbollah.

Leaks from within the Israeli military have revealed disagreements between military intelligence, Northern Command, and the Home Front Command over who bears responsibility for failing to launch a pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah despite warnings of a possible attack.

Such disputes have reinforced a perception among segments of the Israeli public that the leadership may be unable to guarantee security, further increasing pressure on senior officials to adopt a more decisive approach toward Hezbollah.

Although the regime had previously treated the Lebanese front as a secondary theater, it has now become a central arena in the war. Reports have circulated about possible plans by the regime to expand ground operations and establish a security buffer zone in southern Lebanon to prevent anti-tank missiles and short-range missiles from reaching northern settlers.

Other scenarios involve an escalation of air strikes targeting key sites in Lebanon, including sensitive locations such as Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport and other state infrastructure.

Yet, these potential moves will create a dilemma for the regime. Such actions could contradict earlier efforts to isolate Hezbollah from the Lebanese state and generate internal political pressure within Lebanon against the resistance. That strategy had aimed to weaken Hezbollah’s legitimacy and eventually pave the way for the disarmament of its military wing.

Public skepticism within the regime has also cast doubt on whether new military plans would achieve different results. Many are asking what new approach the IOF could realistically adopt and whether it would meaningfully improve security along the northern front.

For its part, Hezbollah’s decision to confront the joint U.S.-Israeli war against Iran appears to be aimed at reshaping the rules of engagement with the Zionist regime. The resistance movement has sought to counter the regime’s assumptions that it had been severely weakened and unable to respond to military actions against Lebanon. 

By escalating its operations, Hezbollah appears determined to reestablish a balance of deterrence. At the same time, the resistance movement has sent a message to the Lebanese public that it remains the only force capable of defending the country. 

This has been reinforced by the lack of action from other Lebanese institutions, including the army and government, to assume responsibility for national security after the ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024.
As the American-Israeli war on Iran has entered its third week, it has become clear that the conflict with Hezbollah can not be reduced to earlier regime assumptions. The resistance movement’s unexpected performance and its operational flexibility have complicated efforts to predict the course of the confrontation.

For now, the central question remains unresolved: can the occupation regime achieve what it failed to accomplish before the 2024 ceasefire, or will Hezbollah continue redefining the rules of deterrence in the conflict’s northern front? The current trajectory suggests that the confrontation in Lebanon is unlikely to end quickly and that the next military, political, or diplomatic move could prove decisive in shaping the future of this complex conflict.