BEIRUT — The announcement by the army of the de facto authority in Damascus on Saturday, January 17, 2026, that it had fully taken control of the city of Deir Hafir in eastern Aleppo countryside marks a significant turning point in the evolving Syrian conflict. 

Official statements framed the move as an effort to “restore stability,” secure the city from mines and war remnants, and prepare for the return of civilians and state institutions. Yet behind this language of sovereignty and order lies a far more complex and volatile political reality.

The entry of Syrian army units into areas vacated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) followed an announcement by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi that his forces would withdraw from contact zones west of the Euphrates as a gesture of goodwill. 

Abdi cited mediation by “friendly countries” and a commitment to the March 10 agreement, which outlines steps toward integration and de-escalation.

In response, Damascus welcomed the withdrawal, halted shelling, and declared readiness to deploy forces to assert state control.

On the surface, this sequence suggests coordination and restraint. In reality, it reflects a fragile balance shaped by external pressures and internal fault lines—most notably the unresolved relationship between the central authority in Damascus and the Syrian Kurdish component. 
This tension erupted particularly in the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, where confrontations between Kurdish forces and the so-called transitional Syrian government sparked widespread outrage.

These clashes did not remain a local matter.

Kurdish communities across Turkey and several European countries mobilized in large demonstrations, while Kurdish political figures in Iraq, Turkey, and Europe issued statements of solidarity with residents of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, accusing Damascus-aligned forces of systematic violations against civilians, framing the confrontation as part of a broader pattern of repression.

Crucially, these developments coincided with reports of Zionist-Syrian talks held in Paris under American mediation. 

Reportedly, the talks resulted in an agreement to establish a communications cell for coordinating security, intelligence, and even “commercial” matters—effectively signaling a path toward normalization. The timing is unlikely to be coincidental. 

As clashes intensified in Aleppo, Damascus appeared simultaneously engaged in indirect negotiations with the Israeli enemy, raising questions about trade-offs being made under international pressure.

The regional context further amplifies these concerns. At nearly the same time, Trump abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, projecting an image of coercive power and signaling Washington’s readiness to apply forceful pressure on governments that resist the American agenda.

Whether directly connected or not, these parallel events reinforce a broader pattern: the use of instability, intimidation, and political leverage to extract concessions from states under strain.

The Israeli enemy, backed by the United States, is poised to exploit internal Syrian divisions—particularly clashes between Damascus and the SDF—to intensify pressure on both Syria and Lebanon.

The goal is clear: force further concessions that undermine national sovereignty while avoiding accountability for continued occupation.
Notably, statements attributed to Syrian officials, as reported by Reuters, emphasized demands for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied after December 8, 2024, rather than focusing on lands seized in 1967—the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This shift raises serious concerns about the dilution of Syria’s longstanding national claims.

Equally revealing was the U.S. State Department’s statement on the Zionist-Syrian talks, which omitted any reference to Syria’s borders with the Israeli enemy or the occupied territories.

Meanwhile, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly confirmed that discussions centered on security coordination and economic cooperation, underscoring the asymmetry of priorities.

On the ground, the de facto authority in Damascus faces severe constraints. Unlike previous confrontations—such as those involving Druze communities in Suwayda or Alawites along the coast—it cannot rely on mobilizing Arab tribes against the Kurds, particularly east of the Euphrates. 

The Syrian Kurdish component enjoys direct backing from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, making large-scale military action politically costly and potentially disastrous.

Political observers note that Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh are geographically isolated from the main SDF-controlled areas, densely populated, and characterized by informal urban structures. 

These factors make them vulnerable to being used as bargaining chips by both sides.

In the near term, no clear solution appears on the horizon. Instead, these neighborhoods are likely to remain pressure points in a broader struggle over control, legitimacy, and Syria’s future.

What is unfolding in northern Syria, therefore, is not merely a local security operation. It is a convergence of regional rivalries, international negotiations, and unresolved internal contradictions—each reinforcing the other, and together pushing Syria toward an increasingly perilous crossroads.