TEHRAN – Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, relative stability in southern Lebanon rested on a three-part formula.

This included the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), deployment of the Lebanese Army backed by Hezbollah’s armed resistance alongside regional and international understandings aimed at preventing a slide into all-out confrontation. 

But with UNIFIL’s mandate set to expire on December 31, 2026, reports have emerged suggesting that the U.S., along with some Lebanese parties, wants to turn the “Framework Agreement” into a UN Security Council resolution that would replace Resolution 1701. 

The “Framework Agreement” is a U.S.-brokered deal signed by Lebanese authorities and the occupying Israeli regime in June 2026. It sets out a phased process: the Lebanese army takes control of two “pilot zones” in the south, Hezbollah is disarmed, and Israeli occupation forces withdraw gradually. Implementation has stalled, with Hezbollah rejecting the deal and the occupying regime refusing to withdraw.

Could the agreement become the new security framework governing southern Lebanon?

The U.S. position: Emphasis on “verification”

Following his meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said: “The goal is to have a credible party on the ground capable of verifying the parties’ compliance (with the provisions of the framework agreement) in the pilot areas.”

He added that this “does not necessarily require a military mission like that of UNIFIL, but could be civilian”.

Rubio’s approach indicates the Americans are now seeking a ‘credible party’ tasked with ‘verification’ of the Framework Agreement’s implementation, knowing that it practically imposes obligations on the Lebanese state without imposing parallel obligations on the occupying Israeli regime. 

The shift from Resolution 1701 to the Framework Agreement as the governing reference would therefore entail more than simply changing the international mechanism. It would shift the focus from monitoring a cessation of hostilities between two parties (under Resolution 1701) to an asymmetrical compliance regime where Lebanon alone is the subject of verification, and the international presence becomes a monitoring tool aimed at one side. 

France: The penholder

In practice, France has been sidelined and marginalized by the Americans in Lebanon. It was not invited to participate in the more recent Lebanese-Zionist understandings under American sponsorship, even though it had co-brokered the November 2024 ceasefire. 

Yet France is still considered the penholder for Beirut at the Security Council: the party traditionally tasked with preparing and drafting resolutions related to Lebanon. Historically, Paris has not used this role to break with existing legal frameworks. Rather, it has sought to develop and adapt them to evolving realities, while taking the American position into account above all. 

That is what it attempted in the draft it presented on August 5, 2006, which was later adopted as Resolution 1701.

France’s current approach appears to favor preserving the legitimacy of Resolution 1701 and building on it, rather than abolishing or replacing it altogether. 

What about Russia and China?

Russia and China can exercise their veto power at any time. International politics, however, is driven by calculations of interest rather than considerations of sovereignty, legality, or morality.

In previous cases where Lebanon itself had agreed to a proposed settlement, Russia and China have preferred to negotiate the wording of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions or abstain from voting rather than block their adoption through a veto.

One example, among others, is their decision to refrain from using their vetoes during discussions on turning the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement on Gaza into a UN Security Council resolution and establishing a “Board of Peace in Gaza.” This was despite their objections to the agreement’s vague provisions and those they considered detrimental to the Palestinians. 

Russia and China chose to register their political and legal objections while allowing the resolution to pass.

Could the Framework Agreement become a UN Resolution?

From a legal standpoint, there is nothing to prevent the Security Council from adopting a new resolution based on the Framework Agreement or providing it with international backing. 

However, the idea of completely abolishing Resolution 1701 and replacing it with the Framework Agreement does not correspond to the Council’s established practice when adopting resolutions.

International precedents suggest that the Security Council generally prefers to build on existing legal frameworks rather than dismantle them and start from scratch. It typically does so by adopting resolutions whose preambles reaffirm all previous resolutions relating to the issue in question. 

In Lebanon’s case, this would mean continuing to refer to earlier resolutions, including, among others, Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701.

The most likely scenario is the emergence of a hybrid arrangement in which Resolution 1701 remains the source of international legal legitimacy, while the Framework Agreement becomes the operational framework, laying the groundwork for a new international monitoring and verification mechanism that could be military, civilian or a combination of both. 

This would mark a shift from a UN force whose traditional mandate is rooted in peacekeeping (UNIFIL) to a mechanism tasked with monitoring the implementation of Lebanon’s security commitments. The nature and powers of this mechanism, however, will be decisive in determining whether it represents an extension of Resolution 1701 or a fundamental departure from it.

Nevertheless, the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution does not automatically guarantee its implementation on the ground or ensure that all its provisions will be enforced. 

Lebanon’s experience with Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, is a case in point. The resolution emerged from the international balance of power at the time, amid sensitive regional circumstances following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet its adoption did not, in itself, translate into full implementation.

The developments that followed the assassination of President Rafik Hariri led to Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, fulfilling one of the resolution’s key provisions. 

Other provisions, however, most notably the disarmament of Hezbollah and other organizations, remained unimplemented in practice for many years, owing to the absence of a domestic and regional balance of power permitting the enforcement.

Lebanon’s experience demonstrates that international power dynamics at a given moment can pave the way for a biased political process (the Framework Agreement) and provide it with legal backing. 

But they cannot, on their own, override realities on the ground of U.S.-Israeli aggression against Lebanon or replace the local and regional balance of power that ultimately determines the limits and stages of implementation.