MADRID – On June 23, 2025, as tensions between Iran and Israel reached their highest point in years, several Iranian ballistic missiles struck the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This was no ordinary target: it is the main hub for U.S. military operations in West Asia and a key symbol of American power projection in the region. 

Iran informed the U.S. about the attack 12 hours before it was to happen, according to information previously disclosed by the Tehran Times. The official American response was swift and predictable: both Washington and Doha downplayed the incident, claiming there were no casualties or significant damage. However, reality soon overrode the narrative. Satellite images published days later confirmed the destruction of a geodesic dome that housed critical communication systems of the U.S. Central Command.

Far from being anecdotal, this episode marks a strategic turning point. Iran has shown it can strike critical infrastructure under American protection, redrawing the contours of deterrence in the Persian Gulf. The missile ceases to be merely a weapon of war; it becomes a tool of sovereignty and strategic assertion.

Between official denial and satellite evidence

The U.S. version was clear and firm from the outset: “No casualties, no damage,” repeated Pentagon spokespeople. But satellite evidence, analyzed by international media and independent agencies, told a different story. Images taken between June 23 and 25 showed the disappearance of a $15 million communications dome, debris, and collateral damage to surrounding structures. Although the base remained operational, the loss of a key component for electronic warfare cast doubt on the effectiveness of U.S. missile defenses—and on the credibility of the official account.

Washington’s refusal to acknowledge the strike follows a dual logic: maintaining control over the media narrative and avoiding the perception of vulnerability before an actor—Iran—that, despite sanctions and isolation, has reached a notable level of technological sophistication.

Al Udeid: A symbol of hegemony in question

Located about 30 kilometers from Doha, Al Udeid is more than just a military base. It serves as the forward headquarters of CENTCOM and is the nerve center for coordinating operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Its symbolism goes beyond the military: it is the cornerstone of the security architecture the United States has built in the region since the First Persian Gulf War.

The fact that Iran managed to strike such a site—and that U.S. forces reportedly evacuated aircraft and sensitive personnel beforehand—does not diminish the significance of the attack. On the contrary, it indicates that Tehran sent a precise warning and that Washington took it seriously. Deterrence, long monopolized by the U.S. and Israel, is no longer a one-way street.

The missile as national strategy: Evolution and autonomy

The strike on Al Udeid was not an isolated act but the result of a deliberate evolution. For over two decades, Iran has systematically invested in ballistic missile development as an asymmetric response to the air and nuclear superiority of its adversaries. Faced with Western restrictions, Tehran adopted a doctrine of defensive self-sufficiency based on three pillars:

Diversification: Short-, medium-, and long-range missiles like Shahab-3, Ghadr, Qiam, and Sejjil, capable of reaching Israel, U.S. bases, and parts of southern Europe.

Mobility: Mobile launch systems that are hard to detect and neutralize.

Precision: Advanced guidance systems that have reduced the margin of error to levels that even Western analysts now acknowledge.

Unlike other regional missile programs, Iran’s development is overwhelmingly domestic. This technical and logistical autonomy has allowed the country to bypass embargoes and threats, turning the missile into the backbone of its defense doctrine.

Following Israel’s offensive against nuclear, military, and civilian sites inside Iran, Tehran responded with a large-scale launch of over a hundred ballistic missiles and suicide drones targeting Israeli military positions. For the first time, Iran’s ballistic arsenal was used en masse in open conflict.

Despite the Iron Dome and other Israeli defenses, several missiles penetrated and struck Tel Aviv, Haifa, and military bases. The missile attacks not only caused physical damage but also had a strategic impact: saturating defenses, prompting emergency deployments, and creating unprecedented internal pressure on Israeli authorities.

The Al Udeid strike was the culmination of a graduated strategy: to hit Israel, neutralize its offensive capacity, and send a direct message to the United States. The ceasefire that followed days later cannot be understood without factoring in the missile component as a deterrent force.

Sovereignty and independence: The Iranian perspective

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign and defense policy has been rooted in the principle of non-negotiable sovereignty. In a hostile environment—surrounded by foreign bases and under sanctions—the development of ballistic missiles has not been framed as a belligerent impulse, but as a survival strategy.

Tehran maintains that its only guarantee in the face of threats like the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign or Israeli targeted strikes is its ability to respond. Effective deterrence, it argues, is only possible when there is certainty that any aggression will come at a high cost.

The attack on Al Udeid follows this logic: it was calibrated, precise, and deliberately non-lethal. Its aim was not to trigger a regional war but to underscore that Iran has both the capacity—and the resolve—to defend its vital interests. The missile, in this vision, is not a threat; it is a political argument.