TEHRAN – In an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times, Silvia Boltuc, an Italian geopolitical analyst and Managing Director of Special Eurasia, analyzes how a foreign-operated corridor could reshape Iran’s strategic environment in the South Caucasus.

She stresses that Tehran’s consistent defense of internationally recognized borders is directly challenged by proposals for an extraterritorial passage through Armenia. According to Boltuc, such a move would not only undermine Armenian sovereignty but also risk increasing U.S. and NATO influence along Iran’s northern frontier.

At the same time, she notes that Armenia serves as Iran’s sole gateway to the Eurasian Economic Union, making the preservation of this partnership vital. For Iran, she argues, the stakes extend beyond trade to its broader geopolitical role

Below is the full text of the interview:

How do you assess the significance of the so-called Trump Route or Zangezur Corridor in the broader framework of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement?

First and foremost, referring to it as the “Zangezur Corridor” would amount to endorsing terminology coined by Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as their vision of it as an extraterritorial passage. Armenia has made it clear that it will never accept such a designation.

With regard to the so-called Trump Route, I view it as secondary to the peace agreement itself. A peace process cannot be conditioned on a logistical issue. Moreover, the establishment of a corridor first requires mutual recognition of territorial integrity. Yet Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of including in its Constitution a clause referring to the reunification of the Republic of Armenia with the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh. In reality, no such clause exists. What exists is a chain of references: the preamble of the Armenian Constitution refers to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from the Soviet Union. That declaration, in turn, cites earlier resolutions adopted by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which had called for unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In September of last year, as clearly explained by the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during the Yerevan Dialogues 2025, Armenia’s Constitutional Court carried out a legal review and concluded that only the explicit text of the Constitution carries legal force. According to the Court, the indirect references through the 1990 Declaration and earlier Soviet-era decisions cannot be interpreted as territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

It is worth noting that Azerbaijan’s Constitution also contains a historical reference—describing the country as the successor of the short-lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of the late 1910s, rather than Soviet Azerbaijan. That earlier republic had laid claim to extensive territories that are now internationally recognized as part of Armenia and Georgia. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has become increasingly assertive in describing 60% of Armenia’s sovereign territory as “Western Azerbaijan.”

Under these circumstances, discussions about corridors are premature—just as premature as consider the peace deal as concluded. It should be remembered that the peace agreement has only been preliminarily signed, and Baku will not formally endorse the document until Armenia amends its Constitution. Given both logistical and domestic political constraints in Armenia, such a change is highly unlikely to occur in the near future, if it occurs at all. Not to mention the uncertainty regarding whether the upcoming 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections will result in a change of the ruling party. The opposition might be less inclined to grant concessions to Azerbaijan than Civil Contract has been.

In your view, does the corridor primarily serve economic connectivity, or is it more about geopolitical realignments in the South Caucasus?

Armenia’s proposed initiative, the Crossroads of Peace, which also envisioned integration with Iran along the Persian Gulf–Black Sea axis, was primarily an economic project. Precisely because it offered no geopolitical advantage, Azerbaijan chose not to accept it.

The economic value of the so-called Trump Route would have been significant only if it had managed to cut transportation times by half. Yet a glance at the regional maps makes it clear that bypassing Armenia does not impose such prohibitive costs on the overall network of connections. In fact, the greater economic impact was borne by Armenia itself, left isolated and squeezed between two closed borders. The issue, therefore, is far more geopolitical than economic.

Moreover, for Armenian goods to reach European markets (with Iran and Russia already covering the other direction), what was really needed was the normalization of relations with Turkey. By contrast, it is Azerbaijani goods that depend far more on access to the Nakhichevan exclave and to Turkey to reach Europe. The very fact that Ankara tied the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations to the broader dynamics of Armenian–Azerbaijani negotiations illustrates a pan-Turkic strategy—one that, with the involvement of a second NATO actor, namely the United States under Trump, might be reinforced.

At the same time, this development would establish a U.S. presence in the Caucasus, consistent with NATO’s current strategic concept, which among other objectives seeks to contain Russia. In this specific context, it would also serve Washington’s own policy of containing Iran.

Iran has consistently emphasized the importance of respecting internationally recognized borders. How might the development of the corridor affect Tehran’s strategic outlook in the region?

With regard specifically to borders, these do not change as a result of a transport corridor. What can change, however, is jurisdiction—particularly if Armenia were to concede an extraterritorial corridor. It is also worth noting that Russia has withdrawn its border guards, leaving the Armenian personnel fully responsible for managing the frontier with Iran.

A fundamental change to borders, with significant consequences for Iran, would occur only if Azerbaijan launched a military offensive. Looking at Azerbaijan’s modus operandi, military action is typically preceded by a state-driven narrative designed to prepare the public, presenting a supposed problem that requires resolution. In the months leading up to the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, for example, Baku actively propagated claims—through media and academic channels—of alleged systematic environmental destruction of the enclave by Armenians. The subsequent offensive was then justified as an “anti-terrorist operation.” Following the removal of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, the narrative shifted toward Armenia’s Syunik region. Increasingly assertive rhetoric from Baku now describes this area as “Western Azerbaijan,” and reports of border incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan have risen. How can a corridor running through Armenian territory, which Baku itself labels as “Western Azerbaijan,” be considered secure? Unless the United States were to guarantee the advantages gained through such a corridor, the risk of an Azerbaijani offensive—with the support of a NATO ally, Turkey—remains entirely plausible.

In such a scenario, Iran’s ability to cooperate with other regional actors would be undermined by Ankara’s pan-Turkic agenda, jeopardizing Tehran’s efforts toward Eurasian integration and leaving only the Central Asian route as an alternative. Armenia, notably, is the only member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that shares a border with Iran. Thanks in part to the free trade agreement signed between Tehran and the EAEU, Yerevan serves as Iran’s gateway to a common market of over 180 million people and a combined GDP exceeding $2.4 trillion. Underlining this strategic dimension, Iran recently opened an 18,000-square-meter trading house in Yerevan. Moreover, as Iran’s Minister of Transport has stated, Armenia is expected to serve as Iran’s link to Georgia, supporting the Persian Gulf–Black Sea route.

The Trump Route would not interrupt Iran’s connection to Russia through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which already runs across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. However, it would deepen Iran’s isolation by strengthening the Turkish corridor between China and Europe. The push behind the Middle Corridor—an alternative route that bypasses Iran—would gain renewed momentum, further weakening the North-South axis.

Iran’s strategic location and vast reserves make it a formidable competitor for Turkey and Azerbaijan, both of which have every interest in discouraging its participation in regional corridors. The current inability of Iran to export, due to sanctions, could change dramatically under the shifting and volatile geopolitics of the present moment. For Turkey, consolidating its role as the principal transit state—with Azerbaijan and the Turkic states of Central Asia as energy providers—remains of paramount importance.

How do you see the corridor shaping Iran’s relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Excluding the worst-case scenario—namely, the transfer of control over the link to Baku—Trump’s proposed road should not in itself fundamentally alter Azerbaijan’s relations. At most, it would reduce Baku’s reliance on alternative routes through Iran. On the other hand, it would almost certainly generate friction with Armenia.

Although Yerevan seeks to reassure Tehran, the elevation of Armenia’s ties with certain powers hostile to Iran—such as the United States and the United Kingdom—to the level of strategic partnership, combined with the presence of U.S. companies along Iran’s Caucasus frontier, will inevitably arouse suspicion and could lead to significant diplomatic incidents. If these partnerships extend to intelligence-sharing, it is only a matter of time before demands concerning Iran are placed on the table.

It is important to recall that the Caucasus has, for centuries, been part of the natural sphere of influence of what was once Persia and is now the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires fought over regional dominance, and that competition has now resurfaced in new forms. The U.S. presence represents a novel and destabilizing factor in this balance. Added to this is Armenia’s ongoing integration with the European Union, an entity that has consistently aligned with sanctions against Iran.

Some Iranian officials have voiced concerns about possible foreign military or political influence in the corridor. How realistic are these concerns in practice?

This represents the central pivot of the regional geopolitical shift associated with the creation of the so-called Trump Route. The presence and management of the corridor by U.S. companies will, over the long term, facilitate the extension of NATO and American influence into the Caucasus. A 99-year U.S. presence, as agreed with Armenia, provides ample time to deploy intelligence operatives and military observers along Iran’s border. The U.S. Embassy in Yerevan is, in terms of surface area, the most prominent in the Caucasus and among the largest worldwide. Interestingly, the largest American embassy in the world is in Baghdad, Iraq—another country bordering Iran.

At the same time, U.S. forces are expanding their footprint in Iraqi Kurdistan, though in practice this reflects a repositioning from western Iraqi bases—namely Ain al-Asad and Victory—toward Erbil. If we also take into account the recent joint exercises between Armenia and the United States, Eagle Partner 2025—which must also be understood in the context of Armenia’s efforts to strengthen its defence and compensate for its military imbalance with Azerbaijan—it is unsurprising that Iran views these developments with suspicion.

It should not be overlooked that both Europe and the United States have effectively lost Georgia, and that Azerbaijan does not fall under U.S. or European influence. Armenia has therefore emerged as the West’s principal gateway into the Caucasus. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Tehran will reinforce its strategic orientation eastward.

Armenia has reassured Tehran that the corridor would remain under Armenian jurisdiction. In your assessment, how significant is this assurance for Iran?

Armenian law explicitly prohibits the leasing of land for such purposes, which in principle means that Yerevan will avoid agreeing to any extraterritorial link. The critical issue, however, is that Armenia possesses very limited geopolitical leverage due to its landlocked position, the insecurity of investments stemming from its fragile balance with Azerbaijan, and the absence of advantages such as being a producer of oil or gas. What Armenia can offer to elevate its standing and to capitalize on its potential—understandably a national priority—is its geographical location. Unfortunately, part of that potential, in the eyes of the West, derives from Armenia’s proximity to Iran and Russia, as well as from being the only South Caucasus country currently accessible to Western engagement.

Looking at the dramatic deterioration of relations between Yerevan and Moscow—once its privileged diplomatic partner—a shift in Armenia’s alliances cannot be ruled out. It is worth emphasizing, however, that Armenian authorities have always placed the highest value on relations with Iran and have expressed deep gratitude toward Tehran, one of the few states that has consistently and firmly affirmed the inviolability of Armenian sovereignty. Nevertheless, like other post-Soviet countries, Armenia may face pressure to align itself with Western policies in exchange for financial support and assistance. Navigating a multi-vector foreign policy will not be easy for Yerevan when dealing with actors such as the European Union and the United States, whose geopolitical weight far exceeds its own.

Looking ahead, what steps could Iran take to ensure that its interests are safeguarded while also contributing to regional peace and stability?

Iran’s strategy should be dual-track. On one side, defensive: protect borders, secure trade and transport access, and ensure early warning against military threats. On the other side, influence-based: use economic, diplomatic, and soft-power instruments to maintain leverage over Armenia, Armenia’s neighbours, and regional trade corridors.

By positioning itself as an indispensable partner for Armenia, a stabilizing actor in the South Caucasus, and a connector to central Asia, Iran can both safeguard its interests and contribute to regional peace—while countering potential U.S., NATO, and Turkish encroachments.

Maximize the diversification of transport and trade corridors, with particular emphasis on routes toward Central Asia, the region least affected by NATO influence, is critical. Simultaneously, leverage the normalization of relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia and strengthen cooperation with the Gulf states. The more allies a country has, the greater its support in international forums, and the more likely its partners’ interests will outweigh incentives to provoke diplomatic incidents or participate in anti-Iranian policies.

Support initiatives that increase Armenia’s dependence on Iran for trade, logistics, and energy security. Simultaneously, engage pragmatically with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Avoid direct confrontation, instead using calibrated diplomacy to maintain influence over border regions and trade flows. U.S. and European efforts to deepen ties with Armenia can be mitigated through discreet engagement, confidence-building, and strategic economic partnerships without direct confrontation.

Enhance border monitoring. Establish rapid-response protocols to manage incidents at Armenia-Iran and Azerbaijan-Iran borders. Worst-case scenario, prepare contingency plans for both asymmetric threats and conventional military developments in the South Caucasus.

Promote Eurasian integration, positioning Iran as a key connector between the Middle East, South Caucasus, and central Asia. Support Armenia’s integration into regional trade frameworks to expand Iran’s economic influence. Invest in strategic infrastructure, expanding transport nodes, warehousing, and trade hubs (e.g., Iranian trading house in Yerevan) to solidify long-term influence and demonstrate the tangible benefits of cooperation to Armenia and other regional actors. Publicly and privately reaffirm support for Armenia’s sovereignty and regional stability, to reinforce Iran’s legitimacy as a stabilizing actor.

Use energy diplomacy. Although sanctions, Iran may offer energy swaps agreement or be a transit node.