MADRID – In the logic of strategic deterrence, success is not necessarily measured by the annihilation of an adversary, but by the ability to irrevocably alter their cost calculations and redefine the boundaries of what is acceptable.

Conventional analyses of the so-called Twelve-Day War have focused almost exclusively on the technical dimension of the confrontation: the launch of more than 300 drones and missiles and their alleged interception by Israeli defenses and their allies. However, this reading—repeated persistently in Western media—overlooks the true nature of the episode: a carefully calibrated demonstration of Iranian strategic capability, designed to alter the regional power equation.

Far from representing a tactical failure, the Iranian offensive validated a fundamental principle on the battlefield: the penetration threshold of Tehran’s precision arsenal has critically and verifiably surpassed the myth of Israeli invulnerability.

That attack was not an isolated episode of violence, but the culmination of a doctrine of asymmetric deterrence honed over decades, and the tangible expression of technological sovereignty that challenges the Western monopoly over advanced weapons systems.

Post-conflict reports—including one from the influential Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA)—have begun to reveal, fragmentarily and sometimes inconsistently, data that paint a picture very different from that of an impenetrable defense.

These selective disclosures point to a significant technical and tactical evolution on Iran’s part, which, according to the institute’s own figures, increased the effectiveness of its attacks dramatically in just 48 hours. This was not a story of indiscriminate bombing, but of a precision campaign in constant refinement: a technological contest that exposed systemic vulnerabilities in the world’s most advanced missile defense shields and calls for a comprehensive reassessment of regional power balances.

The underlying lesson is clear: Iran has demonstrated the ability to impose unsustainable operational and strategic costs, gradually transforming the nature of confrontation.

The doctrine of asymmetric deterrence

Iran’s national security strategy has been built, since the war with Iraq in the 1980s, on a central principle: to compensate for its conventional disadvantage in air power and traditional armed forces through a long-range ballistic and cruise missile arsenal, combined with a network of regional allies. This is not a temporary political choice, but a strategic necessity forged through experience in conflict and years of Western sanctions.

The doctrine seeks the capacity to inflict unacceptable costs in the event of direct confrontation. For years, this capacity was largely theoretical, invoked in political and military discourse as a deterrent. The so-called Twelve-Day War turned it into a tangible, measurable, and verifiable operational reality.

The attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus acted as a trigger for a response Tehran deemed inevitable. Failing to respond would have undermined decades of investment and effort to consolidate its deterrence credibility. Yet the Iranian reaction was not an impulsive act of vengeance, but the controlled execution of a protocol designed to validate the doctrine before the international community.

Operation “True Promise I” was, in this sense, a calibrated demonstration of force, whose main objective was to reaffirm the principle of deterrence. Each missile wave and each drone launched formed part of a planned sequence to send an unequivocal message: Iran’s red lines exist, and its capacity to defend them has reached a level of technical and operational development that is difficult to reverse.

Evolution on the battlefield

The sequence of attacks, reconstructed from reports like JINSA’s, reveals a pattern of accelerated learning and tactical flexibility that has gone largely unnoticed in superficial analyses. Far from being a static barrage, the Iranian campaign demonstrated real-time adaptation that surprised Israeli defenses. According to the data, while in the early days a strike with 25 ballistic missiles hit four locations, two days later a salvo of 22 missiles struck ten distinct targets. This increase in per-missile impact rates was the result of deliberate tactical refinement and effective operational intelligence.

This improvement reflects the application of several combined strategies demonstrating a high degree of military professionalism.
Iran quickly identified weak points and bottlenecks in Israel’s integrated defense architecture, which includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems. By adjusting trajectories, synchronizing arrival times, and varying attack patterns to saturate defenses at critical moments, Iranian planners demonstrated a deep understanding of their adversary’s mechanics. According to JINSA, in the final phase, Tehran shortened intervals between waves, limiting the interceptors’ reassignment capacity and exploiting reload times.

The use of advanced ballistic missiles, such as the Emad family and notably the Kheibar-Shekan, was decisive. The latter, a solid-fuel missile with reduced preparation time and believed to have a separable maneuvering warhead and advanced decoys, complicated Arrow systems’ ability to intercept traditional warheads in space. Impacts attributed by Israel to “technical failures” in critical installations like Ashdod or Haifa could reflect effective electronic countermeasures or inherent missile evasion capabilities rather than random errors.

Last but not least, each interceptor fired by Israel—an Arrow costing $2–3 million, and a David’s Sling around $1 million—represents a substantial expenditure compared with Shahed-136 drones or domestically produced Iranian missiles, which cost only a fraction. Iran’s strategy does not aim to destroy all enemy defenses but to impose financial and logistical pressure over a prolonged conflict. The Twelve-Day War demonstrated that even technologically sophisticated defenses are difficult to sustain against an opponent capable of producing low-cost saturation weapons.

Israel’s official narrative about its missile defense effectiveness is, at best, partial and limited in strategic context. Even a highly capable defense loses relevance if some missiles consistently reach critical infrastructure, demonstrating the penetration capability of Iran’s arsenal. The fact that Iranian missiles reached strategic air bases like Nevatim, disrupted electricity supply to thousands, and caused significant material damage underscores Tehran’s operational credibility.

This reality has immediate implications for Western strategic planning. The German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt’s public call for a “digital Iron Dome” after the conflict, along with the announcement of a German-Israeli cyber research center, tacitly acknowledges that existing physical defenses are insufficient.

The adversary is no longer only the projectiles, but the algorithms guiding them, satellite guidance systems, artificial intelligence for route planning, and electronic countermeasures affecting defenders. Iran has forced its rivals into a new domain of conflict, where its offensive capabilities have created a strategic window of vulnerability.

The expanded geopolitical framework

Iran’s demonstration of precision and capability extends beyond the military sphere, entering a broader geopolitical context with far-reaching implications.

First, it consolidates Iran as an autonomous military-technical power. Tehran has shown it can develop, produce, and deploy long-range systems challenging the traditional technological monopoly of major powers. This strengthens its negotiating position and makes its missile program a relevant strategic asset in any future regional security discussions. Sanctions, however severe, have not stopped this development, reflecting a level of scientific and industrial resilience that must be acknowledged.

Second, the message reaches regional capitals from Riyadh to Abu Dhabi. Iran has demonstrated a defensive and deterrent capacity—built over decades of domestic development—that reduces reliance on external support. This capability, more than a tool of confrontation, can serve as a framework for risk management and the promotion of more balanced regional relations. By establishing its own response and preventive capacity, Tehran can contribute to recalibrating relationships through practical security agreements and mutual trust mechanisms. While many regional militaries still rely heavily on foreign platforms and logistical support, Iran’s autonomy underscores the importance of realistic dialogue on stability, cooperation, and crisis management in the Persian Gulf.

The Twelve-Day War did not resolve underlying tensions but left a significantly altered regional strategic map. The operational capability of Iranian missiles demonstrates a combination of precision, credibility, and technological autonomy that reflects Iran’s sustained military advancement. The conflict redefined aspects of strategic dynamics in West Asia, inaugurating a more complex, technological, and uncertain phase, in which Tehran’s autonomy and deterrence capacity have become a relevant factor for regional stability and power balance.