MADRID – The international scene in the Persian Gulf often appears as a board defined by historical inertia, deep rivalries, and shifting alliances. The recent call by Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi for the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to adopt a proactive and consistent policy of engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran is more than diplomatic courtesy: it reflects two decades of geopolitical realism. 

For regional actors, strategies aimed at isolating Iran have proven as costly as they are illusory; the Islamic Republic has emerged as an indispensable pillar in the region’s strategic balance, resisting external pressures and projecting influence across multiple spheres, rendering traditional bloc politics increasingly obsolete.

Within this context, the Manama Dialogue —a forum sponsored by Western powers and countries aligned with the United States and Israel— embodies the transition from old doctrines to a new horizon. Al-Busaidi’s words resonated as a patient refutation of decades of exclusion: “The GCC has been a mere spectator; Iran remained isolated.” Between the lines lies an acknowledgment that containment and decoupling policies have failed to alter the Persian Gulf’s geopolitical reality. The war in Gaza, the role of the “Axis of Resistance,” and the structural logic of alliances all indicate that Iran is too resilient and capable to be neutralized by traditional pressure mechanisms.

Iran, for its part, shows no signs of retreat. Economic and military pressure, financial sanctions, and diplomatic marginalization have only reinforced the government’s sense of self-assertion. Over the last decade, Tehran has pursued a strategy of resilient diplomacy: maintaining its role in geopolitical terms, consolidating alliances with substate actors, and directing its influence toward energy security, maritime control, and both soft and hard power projection. Every attempt at isolation seems to have sharpened its capacity for sophisticated response.

Omani consistency: A channel and counterbalance

Oman’s credibility in leading this transition rests on a unique diplomatic legacy. Muscat has not only kept communication channels open with Iran when others preferred confrontation; it has also architected mechanisms for channeling tensions that enabled historic achievements such as nuclear negotiations with the United States —four rounds held on Omani soil— mediation in hostage crises, management of frozen funds, and the facilitation of strategic energy agreements.

This consistency is no accident. While Western powers responded to internal volatility and ally pressure with sanctions and threats, Oman accumulated successes through pragmatic diplomacy, understanding that durable solutions rely not on ultimatums but on mutual recognition and gradual trust-building. For Tehran, Muscat is the ideal interlocutor: a country unbound by U.S. fluctuations or Persian Gulf security logic, privileging autonomy and stability through discreet and persistent engagement.

Oman’s role in transmitting messages to Washington and channeling diplomatic responses illustrates a simple principle: trust is not born of fleeting gestures, but of coherence and neutrality. Within this framework, Iran has been able to negotiate, adjust positions, and explore alternatives to conflict without this implying structural weakness.

The immediate counterweight is the strategy of the United Arab Emirates, which, since the Abraham Accords, has bet on normalization with Israel to boost its economic and geopolitical projection. However, Israel’s offensive in Gaza has transformed that alliance into a strategic liability: it has damaged Abu Dhabi’s image in the Arab sphere and reduced its room for maneuver as a potential regional mediator.

Compounding this decline is growing international scrutiny of the Emirati role in the Sudanese conflict. Various reports indicate that its support —direct or indirect— to factions involved in the ongoing campaign of mass violence in Sudan has undermined its credibility and tied its foreign policy to a scenario widely perceived as complicity in war crimes.

For Iran, Israeli military presence and security cooperation with Netanyahu’s cabinet neutralize any possibility of genuine dialogue. In this context, the Omani channel is far from accessory: it is the crucial link on which the new Persian Gulf realism rests.

Abu Dhabi’s projection is now frustrated by a dual constraint: its association with a partner involved in a campaign condemned internationally and its inability to maintain a credible narrative positioning itself as a bridge between the West and Iran. Consequently, its alignment policy has not expanded, but rather restricted, its strategic options.

Oman’s proposal —to create a comprehensive mechanism for dialogue with all regional countries, including Iran— represents a pragmatic synthesis of Persian Gulf indivisible security. Stability in the Strait of Hormuz and protection of vital energy supply chains cannot be achieved by excluding Tehran, a permanent coastal actor. The approach finds resonance in the recent Saudi-Iranian detente, facilitated by China and guided by Riyadh’s strategic vision, which recognizes that confrontation with Iran is inconsistent with the economic and political objectives of its own Vision 2030.

Iran, for its part, acts fully in line with this regional logic. Far from a shift, its official discourse reflects continuity in a strategic vision that prioritizes cooperation and balance among Persian Gulf actors. Tehran has emphasized the need for comprehensive cooperation with all regional partners, promoting a new phase and underscoring the urgency of strengthening Islamic ties through economy, security, and shared culture. This active diplomacy is not a tactical adjustment, but the reaffirmation of a coherent foreign policy oriented toward autonomy, the defense of regional sovereignty vis-a-vis extraregional actors, and the development of new trade corridors with Qatar and Kuwait.

The challenges of multilateral diplomacy

Oman’s insistence on dialogue responds less to ideological affinity than to the sober calculation of national and regional interests. Stability requires channels for crisis containment and continuous communication, especially in high-tension contexts where alternatives are escalation or confrontation. What is at stake is the prosperity of Persian Gulf populations and the ability of their governments to ensure predictability in energy architecture: any conflict spiral benefits only external actors, who have long converted security dependence into an enduring business.

Iran, for its part, rejects any Western intervention in regional affairs, denouncing both unfounded GCC accusations over strategic Persian Gulf islands and European pressures on its nuclear program and missile defenses. From Tehran’s perspective, the Western approach remains divisive, instrumentalizing conflicts while promoting a “de-escalation” line that ignores both legitimate vulnerabilities and the Iranian nation’s right to self-assertion.

In this landscape, the question is no longer whether Iran should be part of the security architecture, but how to structure a model in which difference, competition, and confrontation are managed without resorting systematically to exclusion or polarization.

The era of isolating Iran as a strategy has ended. GCC countries have understood —or should— that the essential catalyst for any new phase must be stable cooperation and mutual recognition. Institutional mechanisms, multilateral forums, and regional summits now incorporate Iran as a legitimate and necessary actor, enhancing collective security rationality and dismantling the “great rival” myths that have characterized Western narratives for more than four decades.

Through patient and silent mediation, Oman offers the most sustainable model: the Muscat channel has proven to be the natural space for crisis containment and negotiating compromises. Both Iran and the West have learned that indirect diplomacy, exercised on the basis of mutual respect, can unlock solutions systematically sabotaged by military maximalism and sanctions logic.

Gradual integration of Iran into the Persian Gulf’s economic circuit, joint energy projects, balanced management of maritime routes, and strict compliance with security agreements multiply collective resilience. In this sense, Muscat and Tehran consolidate a far less ideological, more technocratic and calculated vision, prioritizing survival over risk and prosperity over exclusion.

Yet the situation is far from simple. The international context remains marked by contradictory pressures: the war in Gaza, tense relations with Israel, the global geoeconomic contest, and volatility in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz shape the margins of maneuver. 

Iranian diplomacy operates as a balance between tradition and cautious openness, combining ideological resilience with calls for regional engagement. The approach promoted by Oman emerges as the only viable path to peace, security, and development in the Persian Gulf.

Reshaping the region requires breaking the cycle of confrontations and threats. Gradual integration of Iran, facilitated by Omani mediation and prudent regional containment, points toward a clear path. Challenges remain, but the opportunity to transform the Persian Gulf into a community of shared security and prosperity has never been so tangible.