TEHRAN - In recent weeks, the streets of several Iranian cities have witnessed a pattern that, to an external observer, feels eerily familiar. Episodes of protest, initially driven by economic grievances, have coincided with acts of targeted violence against civil infrastructure and state symbols. International coverage, alert to potential turning points, has relied on a predictable vocabulary: “unrest,” “repression,” “existential crisis,” drawing parallels, often superficial, with other global instability scenarios.

Yet this linear reading consistently overlooks the political logic that shapes Iran’s response. What is unfolding is not a crisis inevitably headed for collapse, but the application of a stability management framework developed over decades. This framework operates simultaneously across economic, social, security, and ideological spheres. Its aim is not to achieve a visible “victory” over dissent but to limit its scope, fragment its manifestations, and neutralize its capacity to coalesce into a systemic threat.

From this perspective, the resilience of the Iranian state lies not solely in its coercive apparatus but in its ability to absorb tensions, redistribute political costs, and maintain the operational core of power. Protests are treated as phenomena to manage rather than signs of imminent collapse. This approach, far from eliminating discontent, seeks to prevent it from developing into a cumulative dynamic capable of overwhelming the system.

The result is a form of contingent stability, less visible than institutional normality in other contexts but remarkably persistent. Understanding this logic does not mean conceding that analyses focused exclusively on protests are irrelevant—they offer an incomplete picture. In Iran, continuity is not passive inertia but an active doctrine that has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to adapt to recurring cycles of internal and external pressure.

Economic dissent: Containment rather than confrontation

The trigger of the latest wave of unrest in Iran is unmistakably material. A rapid currency depreciation, persistent inflation, and trade disruptions, exemplified by the temporary closure of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, acted as immediate catalysts. These pressures overlay long-term structural challenges, including a worsening water crisis and the accumulated economic impact of recent regional confrontations.

The state’s response to this discontent illustrates the first operational principle of its stability approach: the separation of layers. Economic grievances are treated primarily as issues of fiscal and administrative management rather than as automatic expressions of political challenge. This framework allows institutional responses to be calibrated carefully, avoiding the premature elevation of protests over the cost of living into full-scale ideological confrontation.

In official narratives, security forces have been deployed with a notable degree of restraint, intended to limit disturbances without triggering an escalation that could expand their scope. The logic is preventive rather than reactive. Excessive intervention, by this reasoning, risks turning sectoral protests into a nationwide conflict.

This approach is echoed in analyses such as those of Chinese scholar Fan Hongda, who notes that most Iranians are seeking improvements in government efficiency and economic stability rather than widespread upheaval. The implicit assumption of the system is that this desire for normalcy will outweigh radical impulses, limiting the capacity of protests to acquire systemic significance.

An additional layer: The logic of low-intensity conflict

The Iranian situation cannot be fully understood without considering a second, less visible but potentially destabilizing dimension. Alongside economic discontent, authorities contend that a low-intensity campaign is underway, designed to erode the operational capacity of the state. Incidents such as the so-called “Handala Hack,” which reportedly exposed contacts within Iran linked to Israeli intelligence services, alongside public statements from Israeli officials emphasizing the need to “weaken capabilities” rather than instigate direct regime change, suggest a strategy of prolonged attrition.

This logic is reflected in a series of selective attacks against civil infrastructure. Fires at mosques, ambulances, fire stations, and public transport have been presented by authorities as part of a deliberate pattern. The aim is not mass uprising but to overload essential services, create cycles of insecurity, and provoke responses that keep the security apparatus under constant strain.

Security analysts note that the selection of targets and the timing of incidents suggest planning rather than spontaneity. Smuggled satellite communication devices such as Starlink terminals, the discovery of bomb-making manuals among detainees, and the existence of cell-based organizational structures are cited as indicators of external support in funding, logistics, and training.

In this context, the state frames these episodes not as natural extensions of social protest but as organized subversion operating in parallel with economic discontent. This distinction is central to understanding the official response and the priority given to containing strategic threats rather than merely policing public order.

Iran’s response: Counterintelligence and strategic patience

Faced with pressure on two fronts, Tehran has developed a response that prioritizes containment over direct confrontation. The approach relies on operational discretion rather than visible displays of force. Unlike other states that deploy large-scale operations, Iranian authorities emphasize intelligence work, preventive infiltration, and targeted interventions.

The goal is to dismantle networks before they become operational and prevent the emergence of symbolic figures who could rally opposition forces. This strategy, based on timing and measured responses, may appear externally as excessive caution or indecision. Internally, however, it is a deliberate calculation: to control the pace of the crisis and avoid escalation that benefits actors seeking to provoke disproportionate reactions.

Recent examples illustrate this pragmatic approach. Cooperation with Turkish intelligence to intercept Kurdish militants attempting to enter from Iraq, along with the use of Russian electronic warfare capabilities to track and neutralize satellite communications, reflect a security apparatus operating with flexibility and regional reach. Stability, in this view, is maintained not through constant displays of power but through the silent reduction of risks before they materialize.

The decisive factor: Iranian social psychology

At this point, the interaction between internal economic grievances and external violence becomes decisive. One of the less visible but most critical pillars of Iranian resilience, according to official narratives, lies in a careful assessment of the country’s social psychology. The state operates on the assumption that large segments of the population can distinguish between legitimate discontent and threats to the general order, while remaining historically sensitive to foreign interference.

Extreme acts of violence, such as the burning of a mosque in Sabzevar with children inside or the death of a three-year-old in Kermanshah, are not widely interpreted as political resistance. Rather, they are seen as destabilizing terrorism. Far from generating social sympathy, such incidents reinforce the official narrative of a country under external pressure and deliberate attempts at internal decomposition.

This dynamic undermines any effort to present exiled opposition figures as viable alternatives. The externally promoted visibility of individuals like Reza Pahlavi, son of the last monarch, faces a structural obstacle: in a society shaped by memories of foreign interventions, perceived ties to hostile powers sharply limit domestic legitimacy.

The fractured geometry of external pressure

A frequently overlooked element in analyses of pressure on Iran is the lack of full alignment among its principal adversaries. There is a structural divergence between Washington’s interests and those of Tel Aviv that constrains both the reach and coherence of external pressure.

From the U.S. perspective, a collapse of the Iranian state would pose a considerable strategic risk. A power vacuum in the Middle East could trigger uncontrollable instability, affecting regional security and global energy markets. In this context, U.S. interests may lean less toward Iran’s disintegration and more toward maintaining a functional state, albeit adversarial, capable of preserving minimal internal and regional order.

Israel’s calculation differs. Due to geography and a perception of existential threat, a permanently weakened Iran, absorbed in internal tensions and limited in its regional influence, represents the ideal scenario from Israel’s security standpoint. This divergence in objectives reduces cohesion and limits the effectiveness of any prolonged external siege.

The Venezuelan mirage and Iranian singularity

Comparisons to Venezuela, common in some analytical and media circles, are particularly misleading. The conditions that enabled decisive external pressure in Venezuela—an internally unified opposition with international recognition, profound institutional collapse, and broad regional consensus for isolation—do not exist in Iran.

Iran maintains a robust, functional state apparatus capable of managing internal tensions without losing territorial control. Its network of alliances and regional influence, though costly and contested, provides strategic depth that Venezuela never had.

Moreover, accumulated experience of Western interventions in the Middle East has fostered deep societal skepticism toward externally imposed solutions. This less visible but critical factor severely limits the mechanical transfer of external pressure models from one context to another. Iran, with its institutional structure, historical memory, and geopolitical position, is a unique case resistant to oversimplified comparisons.

Conclusion: Stability and structural challenges

The protests in Iran should not be seen as the inevitable onset of state collapse or the emergence of an imminent revolution. They reflect deep-seated economic pressures that have accumulated over recent years, which a state with extensive crisis management experience is handling methodically and gradually. The official response has consisted of measures aimed at containing conflicts, selectively responding to violent incidents, and maintaining institutional cohesion without destabilizing the broader social fabric.

The resulting notion of stability does not equate to the absence of conflict. Rather, it is the capacity to manage and contain opposing forces within society. This requires separating legitimate economic demands from actions that threaten to overwhelm channels of dialogue and negotiation, and responding with prudence rather than indiscriminate confrontation.