Before examining the causes and consequences of decision‑making in the Iran–U.S. standoff, a fundamental question must first be asked: are decision‑makers’ interpretations and analyses of reality themselves correct?

This is fundamentally an operational question. In his seminal work ‘Perception and Misperception in International Politics’, Robert Jervis reminds us of the need to distinguish between the “psychological environment” – the world as decision‑makers perceive it – and the “operational environment,” in which policies are actually carried out. If policies and decisions are indeed mediated by the goals and interpretations of statesmen, then any serious analysis of why those decisions are made is impossible without examining the perceptual processes that shape them.

One may describe events without probing the mindset of the actors involved, but as long as we seek answers to “why” questions, the analysis of decision‑making becomes indispensable. The central problem confronting the United States in its standoff with the Islamic Republic of Iran lies precisely in this realm: Washington is caught in a vicious cycle of structural misperceptions about Iran. These misperceptions—which Jervis attributes to decision‑makers’ tendency to cling to pre‑existing mental images and to discount contradictory information—have obstructed the development of an accurate and realistic understanding of the other side. The outcome is a condition of chronic hesitation and strategic confusion in Washington, in which policymakers are uncertain which version of reality they are confronting and, as a result, are unable to formulate a coherent and effective strategy.

This misperception is clearly reflected in American analyses of three critical areas. The first concerns assessments of Iran’s defensive and deterrent capabilities. Iran’s performance in the recent 12‑day war—its demonstration of drone and missile capacities, as well as its ability to reorganize militarily despite the assassination of senior commanders—has challenged earlier American perceptual models that portrayed Iran as a weak, isolated actor on the verge of collapse. Yet these new objective realities appear not to have been fully absorbed into the cognitive framework of U.S. policymakers, and the image of a “weak Iran” continues to cast a long shadow over their strategic calculations.

Second, the United States consistently misreads Iran’s internal dynamics. Washington has long operated on the assumption that the majority of Iranian society opposes the Islamic Republic and that, in moments of acute crisis, the country will descend into insurrection and internal collapse. As Jervis cautions, decision‑makers tend to exaggerate information that confirms their pre‑existing beliefs. Accordingly, reports of economic hardship are routinely interpreted as evidence of an imminent drive toward government overthrow, while the complexities of Iranian society, its capacity for national cohesion in the face of external threats, and the system’s popular foundations are largely disregarded. This cognitive error—rooted in media narratives and in reporting from diplomatic missions—rests on flawed political analyses and misleading historical analogies, and has produced dangerously distorted strategic calculations.

Third, the external role of Israel as an influential actor both reinforces and channels these misperceptions. Through sustained diplomatic and intelligence efforts, Israel promotes a narrow narrative of Iran as nothing more than a “destabilizing existential threat.” This framing constrains Washington’s ability to define its own independent and genuine national interests vis‑à‑vis Iran. As a stakeholder seeking to align America’s cognitive map with its own strategic priorities, Israel further obscures the perceptual landscape, preventing U.S. policymakers from developing a clear and balanced understanding of Iran’s realities.

In this context, the negotiations currently underway between Iran and the United States, mediated by Oman, offer a concrete illustration of this perceptual dilemma. As Jervis emphasizes, the transmission and reception of signals under crisis conditions are always prone to misinterpretation: the sender may fail to communicate clearly, while the receiver interprets the signal through the lens of prior assumptions. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has spoken of President Trump’s readiness to meet with any counterpart, including the Leader of Iran. At the same time, however, Trump—invoking the attacks of last June—has warned that “either we reach an agreement, or we will do something very tough, like last time,” while also describing “regime change” in Iran as the “best possible outcome.” These dual signals—professed openness to diplomacy on the one hand, and threats coupled with an explicit endorsement of destabilization on the other—underscore that Washington still lacks a coherent understanding of both its objectives and its interlocutor.

The outcome of this process is a condition of relative paralysis in decision‑making. The United States oscillates between the poles of “maximum pressure” and “negotiation” precisely because it lacks a clear understanding of the nature, capabilities, and objectives of the other side. As Jervis argues, escaping this spiral of failure requires a fundamental correction of perception. Above all, Washington must abandon its entrenched mental model of Iran—a composite of aspirations, manufactured fears, and incomplete analyses—and reconstruct it on the basis of objective realities: Iran’s national power, its structural stability, its defensive capabilities, and the rational calculations of its leadership. Only by correcting this flawed cognitive map can the United States develop a sustainable, predictable, and effective strategy toward Iran. So long as misperception persists, every American action—whether coercive or conciliatory—will rest on a distorted image of reality and will ultimately be doomed to failure.