TEHRAN – When, at 3:30 AM on Friday, June 13, 2025, Israel and the United States began a bombing campaign against Iran—just days ahead of a sixth round of nuclear negotiations—I had just fallen asleep in my Tehran apartment. A few hours earlier, I had been speaking with a colleague who told me she believed the U.S. was about to attack Iran.

I disagreed. I told her that with so many journalists traveling to Oman to cover the talks scheduled for Sunday, Washington would at least wait until that round concluded.

What I didn't know then, making those remarks, was that diplomacy was neither a true concern nor a practice respected by Washington. That fact became brutally clear early that morning when the windows in my room began to shake. Israel had bombed a residential building in my neighborhood housing an Iranian nuclear scientist, initiating a war that U.S. President Donald Trump later admitted he was "in charge of" from the beginning.

Those 12 days were difficult, to say the least. It was the first time in my life that I experienced war—unlike my parents, who had lived through, and even fought in, the eight-year war of the 1980s. At night, I heard air-defense systems firing; during the day, there were explosions. That my hometown had finally become part of the war the United States had threatened since my childhood was deeply unsettling. It was also profoundly sad.

When I heard that Iran had agreed to a ceasefire requested by the U.S. and Israel, the sounds of air defense stopped almost all at once. A few weeks later, when I spoke with some of the people who had been operating those systems on the sidelines of a memorial ceremony, it became clear that while the noise had faded, the war had not. It continued through economic sanctions, through the exploitation of legitimate protests, and, as one officer told me, was very likely to return to military confrontation like the one we had just experienced. In fact, he said he was certain Washington would attack again, because, in his words, “their issue isn’t Iran’s nuclear capabilities, missiles, or even the Islamic Republic. Their issue is Iran itself.”

This was also the prevailing sentiment among journalists I knew—many of them far older and more experienced than I was. When Iran and the United States began a second round of talks in February, following mediation efforts by regional states, few of us expected much. We did, however, for a brief moment, wonder whether we were being overly cynical—whether the Americans might finally be serious about diplomacy. That, at least, was what a senior Persian Gulf official had conveyed to Iranian counterparts, according to what we heard.

But as the days passed, our skepticism was confirmed. While speaking about how diplomacy is always its "first choice", the Trump administration began enhancing its military presence around Iran. By February 20, it had added two carrier strike groups, 13 warships, 50 fighter jets, and new air-defense batteries to its already expansive assets in West Asia. Some argue that it remains unclear whether this buildup is intended as leverage in negotiations or preparation for direct military action. But either explanation points to the same conclusion: this is not the behavior of a party invested in diplomacy. If the buildup is meant to pressure Iran, it violates basic norms of good faith. If it is meant for war, it suggests diplomacy is already considered expendable

What remains for Iran to do is what it has always done: pursue diplomacy even when the other side cannot be trusted, and prepare to defend itself. But the lengths it would go to defend itself would be different this time. Iranian officials have made it clear that they view any future conflict as a far different one. After a nuclear deal thrown away, years of sanctions, multiple coup attempts, and unprecedented military aggression, no one in Iran would think it possible to make things work with the U.S. should a war break out again in the middle of an active diplomatic process. Iran, as its officials have warned, would no longer care about preventing excessive escalation.

This time, they would be focused on making the Americans back off for good, and to do that, they may have to reap the results of every military and regional project they have pursued over the past decades.

Below are the steps Iran is likely to take in response to the United States in a future war.

Sinking the ‘big, beautiful armadas’ 

The two aircraft carriers Trump has deployed to Iran’s doorstep—the USS Abraham Lincoln, already in the Arabian Sea, and the USS Gerald R. Ford, currently en route—are the assets he boasts of most when discussing potential strikes against Iran.

Together, these two carriers possess over 120 aircraft and are accompanied by 10 to 15 destroyers and approximately three littoral combat ships. It is estimated that around 13,000 sailors are required to operate this vast array of equipment.

As the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, pointed out this week, such carriers are formidable threats to any target. However, the very factors that make them dangerous—their massive size and scale—are exactly what make them vulnerable. “More dangerous than the American warship is the weapon that can send it to the bottom of the sea,” the Leader stated during a meeting on Tuesday.

Iran possesses a diverse arsenal to counter these naval assets, most notably its hypersonic missiles, which are considered impossible for any current defense system to intercept. Even if Iran, for some reason, chose not to deploy its hypersonics, it retains a wide range of other lethal options.

Chief among these are Iran’s anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. Key systems include the Zolfaghar Basir ballistic missile, equipped with an optical seeker for moving sea targets and a 700km range; the Abu Mahdi cruise missile, which features AI-enabled path planning and a sea-skimming, radar-evading seeker with a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers; and the Qader cruise missile, known for its high destructive power and radar-evading capabilities.

Iran’s strategy could involve using its vast arsenal of drones and loitering munitions to first overwhelm the Aegis defense systems on U.S. destroyers and carriers. This would be followed by large missile salvos launched from underground bases along Iran’s extensive southern coastline and its strategic islands in the Persian Gulf, including Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.

Complementing this is the IRGC Navy’s massive fleet of high-speed boats designed for "swarm tactics" in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These vessels are capable of quickly overwhelming much larger warships by attacking simultaneously from multiple directions with rockets and machine guns.

Blocking the Strait of Hormuz

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a move long floated among Iranians but never executed. Critics argue that Iran could have freed itself from U.S. pressure years ago if it had leveraged this strategic checkpoint, as it would send the global economy, including that of the U.S., into a tailspin.

The Hormuz Strait sees some 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum liquids pass daily, accounting for roughly 20% of global consumption. A sudden halt would, analysts predict, push crude oil prices towards $130 per barrel or even higher. This dramatic spike would then cascade through global supply chains, fuel inflation, disrupt financial markets, and severely slow economic growth worldwide—a nightmare scenario for any U.S. administration.

Iran, once again, possesses numerous capabilities to enforce a blockade on the Hormuz Strait. While its arsenal of anti-ship missiles, fast attack craft, and drones could impose a naval siege, the most probable initial move for a blockade would be the deployment of mines. Iran’s low-cost, easily deployed mines, including advanced smart versions like the Nafez-2 and Arvand with acoustic and magnetic sensors, can be laid quickly by various vessels. This would immediately halt or severely disrupt shipping, necessitating a complex, dangerous, and weeks-long international minesweeping operation, all while posing a high risk of severe damage to vessels.

Hitting U.S. bases

That Iran will strike U.S. military bases in the region is a certainty. These installations were Iran’s primary targets during its previous confrontations with the U.S., and Iranian officials have explicitly warned in recent weeks that they will be hit again should war break out.

The U.S. currently maintains a presence at over 19 locations across the region, with an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 troops. Key sites include Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (CENTCOM’s forward HQ), Naval Support Activity in Bahrain (home to the Fifth Fleet), Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan, and Al Dhafra in the UAE, along with others in Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria.

Every one of these bases falls within the reach of Iran's missile arsenal. Short-range missiles can easily strike U.S. positions across the Persian Gulf, while medium-range missiles—capable of hitting targets up to 2,000 kilometers away—cover the entire region, including Israel and U.S. assets in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

While U.S. air defenses at these bases are sophisticated, they remain limited, even with the additional batteries Washington has recently scrambled to the area. Iran has spent 40 years preparing for this exact scenario, perfecting an asymmetric warfare strategy designed to overwhelm American defenses with swarms of drones and missiles, ensuring that its targets are successfully struck.