TEHRAN - The twentieth century began with the emergence of a new concept in terrorism studies and criminology within political science: a notion titled “gaining fame or attracting public attention through the assassination of an important figure.” The assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth in 1865, and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip in 1914, are often considered examples of this type.

Assassinations through which the perpetrator intended to draw the attention of society to himself or his affiliated group, and thereby gain fame and legitimacy within the structure of power.

Some ask how it is possible that a figure who spoke so explicitly against the warlike tendencies of previous U.S. presidents—especially in the Middle East, to the extent that his past tweets can now be used against his reversed performance—could exhibit such blatant contradictions. On November 11, 2013, he tweeted: “Remember that I predicted a long time ago that President Obama would attack Iran because he is weak in negotiations. He is not skilled!”

Yet apparently, seven years was not a long time for an unbalanced individual like Trump to, through a terrorist and illegitimate attack on a senior Iranian military figure on the soil of a neighboring country, surpass the foolishness of his political rivals in warmongering and escalating tensions in the Middle East, and fall into something worse than all that he had accused the Democrats of.

January 8, 2020, was an important day for Trump. From then on, he could repeatedly refer to the killing of Lt. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in various political circles to gain credibility and legitimacy for himself for a long time. His constant references to this act in different speeches show how important this killing was for his ascent within the power structure and for acquiring political legitimacy.

During an election rally on July 29, 2021, held in Wellington, he told his supporters—from Republican activists to right-wing media and the local conservative candidates he backed: “I think killing Qassem Soleimani was the biggest thing that ever happened in my entire life.”

Shortly thereafter, in his campaign on February 4, 2024, for the 47th presidential election of the United States, in a clear attempt to fully appropriate what he considered the credit of Soleimani’s assassination, he even removed his long-time ally and strategic partner from the map of the killing and explicitly stated: “Israel was originally part of the plan to kill Soleimani, but was left out at the last moment.” He did not even want to share this “honor” with Netanyahu.

Before and after that, he repeatedly confessed to and boasted about this killing, attempting to claim all its credit for himself. On February 27, 2026, he again emphasized, “I killed Soleimani,” and on the same date, for the umpteenth time in a tweet, he reiterated that “General Soleimani should have been eliminated many years ago,” implying that no one but him had the capability.

October 22, 2025, however, holds a different place among the many statements of this serial killer. In his efforts to win votes from the most extreme right-wing Republicans, he referred to the assassination of Gen. Soleimani as a sign of “America’s deterrent power” and as putting an end to “regional bullying,” claiming that this action would change the dynamics of the Middle East. The change in the region’s dynamics, given the central importance of a figure like “Qassem Soleimani,” as a result of this reckless act, was indeed obvious and required little intelligence. What required reason was the direction of these changes—whose interests they would serve, to what extent, and by which effective forces they would unfold.

Now, after six years and following the reckless and short-sighted actions of the U.S. president in fueling conflict in the heart of the Middle East and the axis of resistance — during the 12-day war and the Ramadan war (the ongoing one) — the direction of these transformations is not difficult to assess.

Trump did not know that not only Qassem Soleimani, but also the command structure of the resistance and the biological organism of its body in the region had, for decades, learned and practiced decentralized growth. What Israel perceived and reported to him as an octopus embodied in Soleimani, and later in the Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—urging him to strike its head in Iran—were in reality multiple coral-like formations with scattered roots and arms across the vast sea of the Middle East, growing in every corner of resistance against apartheid and oppression. The Islamic Republic of Iran had merely provided the water necessary for their survival—water that Israel sought to dry up. But can water be taken from the sea?

Trump, however, neither wanted nor was even able to retreat from, deny, or back away from the credibility he believed he had gained through the killing of Soleimani. He was compelled to pursue these hollow claims until they were “proven” in the Middle East. The problem he thought would be solved by Soleimani’s assassination, and was not, had to be pursued in the 12-day war and the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Then, within months, he realized again that others understood that what he had claimed for six years had still not occurred, forcing him to return once more during the Ramadan war, this time openly, using any means necessary to fragment and neutralize Iran’s power.

His lies became chains around his feet, trapping him more firmly than the Democrats ever could in the swamp he himself had created in the Middle East. What Trump increasingly experiences today is the complete destruction of his capacity to generate legitimacy for himself within the legitimizing structures of the United States.

At the institutional-legal level of this structure, Trump invoked preemptive self-defense and presidential authority as commander-in-chief, based on his interpretation of an “imminent threat,” as a source of legitimacy. However, many legal experts and official U.S. institutions expressed serious doubts about this claim. For example, UN Special Rapporteurs, including Agnes Callamard, stated that the evidence presented regarding an “immediate threat” to justify the killing of Soleimani was insufficient and that the act could be considered a violation of international law. Several U.S. senators and constitutional law experts also emphasized that the government failed to convincingly demonstrate the existence of an imminent threat to Congress.

At the discursive-identity level, by moralizing foreign policy, portraying the United States as a force of good against “terrorism,” and relying on the slogan “peace through strength,” he sought to create social legitimacy. However, polls and political analyses showed that American society remained deeply polarized. Research institutions such as Pew Research Center reported that public opinion in the United States regarding military action against Iran was deeply divided, with a significant majority concerned about being drawn into another war in the Middle East. Many analysts also warned that such actions could increase anti-American nationalism in the region.

At the media-narrative level, Trump attempted to shape the dominant narrative through rapid announcement, moral framing, simplification of geopolitical complexities, and the use of decisive language. Yet mainstream media and Western security experts challenged the official narrative. Newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that intelligence assessments regarding the regional consequences of this action were far more complex than the image presented by the White House. Even some former U.S. military commanders warned that removing a senior commander would not necessarily weaken proxy structures and could instead intensify cycles of retaliation.

Perhaps the most important test, however, occurred at the functional-security level, where legitimacy is measured not by narrative but by results. Trump needed to demonstrate whether U.S. security had increased, whether the enemy had retreated, and whether a major war had been avoided. Yet many security think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations, warned that the action increased the risk of direct conflict with Iran and brought the region closer to the brink of a large-scale war. Military analysts also emphasized that Iran’s proxy networks are decentralized in nature, and eliminating even a highly influential commander does not mean the collapse of these networks.

From a strategic perspective, some American experts stated that this action might lead not to deterrence but to intensified competition and instability. For instance, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has repeatedly emphasized that military actions without a clear political strategy often produce unpredictable and even counterproductive consequences. Similarly, European security analysts warned that such assassinations could weaken unwritten international norms regarding the immunity of official figures and set a dangerous precedent for other powers.

Overall, if legitimacy is understood as the result of effectiveness, domestic consensus, and international acceptance, much evidence suggests that Trump’s efforts to legitimize this action not only failed to produce a stable consensus but also deepened internal political divisions in the United States and increased security concerns at both regional and global levels. From this perspective, the legitimacy-building structure he relied upon was exposed to erosion and challenge rather than consolidation.

This very issue increased pressure on Trump to demonstrate more significant and effective achievements, and his escalating confrontations with major narrative-shaping media outlets such as CNN stemmed from this reality: without imposing his constructed narrative, he could not win the lost battles of his wars. Yet even these tensions did not benefit him, and his anger at CNN for challenging his claim of “obliterating” Iran’s nuclear facilities has today turned into a global joke about “re-obliterate”—as if something completely destroyed must be destroyed once again.

Undoubtedly, these six years have passed faster for Trump than for the rest of the world, as he did not expect to fall so quickly into Netanyahu’s trap and become entangled in two disgraceful wars. Having entered confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran under the pretext of restoring America’s dignity after the hostage crisis and the failure in Tabas, he now does not know how to justify the humiliation resulting from his continuous losses in these recent wars. In his pursuit of power and political legitimacy, he assassinated someone who, by his own admission, was far greater than himself; now, more than ever, he sees himself as illegitimate and without achievement. This is why he found himself compelled to support Israel for another attack and the assassination of the most significant figure of contemporary history—yet this time, learning from the previous assassination, he shifted the responsibility onto Israel.

From this point on, history will remember Trump as the most professional serial political killer: someone who, in pursuit of fame and political credibility, assassinated figures far greater than himself in order to climb the ladder of power, only to see everything he stood upon vanish rapidly beneath his feet. He was right— the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and then the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were the greatest events of his life: events as vast as the complete destruction of political credibility and power for the president of a country once considered the most powerful in the world. History, from here on, will remember him as a central figure in the decline of that power.