The series of unfortunate and costly decisions made during the two terms of the Bush administration, combined with economic decline at home, might devastate the United States’ world standing much sooner than most analysts predict. What was difficult to foresee was that the weakening of U.S. global dominance, spurred by erratic and unwise foreign policy under Bush, would re-ignite the Cold War, to a degree, over a largely distant and seemingly ethnically-based conflict -- that of Georgia and Russia. Who could have predicted a possible association between Baghdad, Kabul, and Tbilisi?

But to date the decline of U.S. global power to the advent of the Bush administration, or even the horrific events of September 11, 2001, is not exactly accurate. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the unraveling of the Warsaw Pact -- especially as former members of that pact hurried to join NATO in later years -- empowered a new breed of U.S. elite who boasted of the economic viability and moral supremacy of U.S.-styled “Capitalism and Democracy”. But a unipolar world presented the U.S. leadership with an immense, if not insurmountable, task.
While 9/11 and a gung-ho president presented a convenient opportunity to reassert U.S. global dominance, action was taken the moment the Soviet Union collapsed. Such efforts, however, were not accentuated until 1997, with the establishment of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a think tank from which many neoconservative policy advisors operated. Their aim was “to promote American global leadership… (which) is both good for America and good for the world.” William Kristol and Robert Kagan, PNAC founders, were inspired by the Reaganite policy of “strength and moral clarity”. But that supposedly inspiring model was justified on the basis of the Cold War, which no longer existed. Fashioning an enemy was a time-sensitive and essential task to justify the repositioning of U.S. power to reclaim domains that were left vacant with the disappearance of the bipolar international system, which existed since World War II.
Even the PNAC’s more recent report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, published in 2000, appeared of little relevance and urgency. It expressed the “belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the pre-eminence of U.S. military forces”. The report would have been another neglected document were it not for the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which turned it into a doctrine defining U.S. foreign policies for nearly a decade.
The wars and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq were aimed at strengthening the U.S. hand in protecting its interests and managing its international affairs. Afghanistan’s position was strategic in warding off the growth of the rising powers of Asia -- aside from its military and strategic value, it was hoped to become a major energy supply route -- while Iraq was to provide a permanent U.S. military presence to guard its oil interests in the whole region and to ensure Israeli supremacy over its weaker but rebellious Arab foes.
The plan worked well for a few weeks following the declaration of “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq. Since then, the U.S. has learned that managing world affairs with a decidedly military approach is a recipe for disaster. Faced with foreign occupation, Iraqis fought back, creating a nightmare scenario and promising U.S. defeat in their country. The United States’ original plan to exploit the country’s fractious ethnic and religious groupings also backfired, as shifting alliances made it impossible for the U.S. to single out a permanent enemy or a long-term ally. In Afghanistan, the picture is even more bleak as the country’s unforgivable geography, the corruption of U.S. local allies, the resurgence of the Taleban, and the U.S.-led coalition’s brutal response to the Taleban’s emboldened ascension have rendered Afghanistan a lost cause by any reasonable military standard.
But the trigger-happy mentality that has governed U.S. foreign policy during the Bush years is no longer dominant and has been since challenged by a more sensible, dialogue-based foreign policy approach, as championed, reluctantly, by Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama. The change of heart is not entirely moralistic, however, but largely pragmatic. According to a survey conducted jointly by Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for a New American Security, published February 19, 2008, 88 percent of current and former U.S. military officers believe that the demands of the Iraq war alone have “stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin”. Although not “broken”, 80 percent believe it is “unreasonable to expect the U.S. military to wage another major war successfully at present”, as reported by CNN. Such an estimation is not too different from similar assessments provided by top U.S. military commanders, most of whom found their way to early retirement for similar reasons.
The new military limitations faced by the U.S. in the Middle East have also resulted in the weakening of U.S. political sway and standing. Moreover, its regional allies have also suffered one blow after another: Israel in Lebanon, Georgia in South Ossetia, U.S. allies in Venezuela and other South American countries, etc. Indeed, it is only a matter of time before a challenger to U.S. global hegemony arises and tests U.S. resolve under new circumstances. While growing U.S. involvement in Eurasia and its missile defense shield was considered part and parcel of the neocon plan for “rebuilding America’s defenses”, it was considered by Russia a threat to its national security.
The Georgian invasion of South Ossetia represented a golden opportunity for Moscow to send an unmistakable message to Washington. By crushing the U.S.-Israeli trained Georgian army, Russia declared itself a contender to unchallenged U.S. global dominance, which had lasted for nearly two decades. Countries such as Iran and Syria are quickly warming up to the new Russia, as the latter seeks to rebuild its own alliances and defenses.
The nature and the direction of the U.S.-Russian confrontation are yet to be determined with any reasonable preciseness. Internal and external factors for Russia itself (corruption, the oligarchs, and its ability to court a stable alliance) will all prove consequential in the current confrontation. What is clear, however, is that the upcoming U.S. president will find himself face-to-face with a drastically altered world order, one that is defined by military pandemonium, national and global economic decline, and the rise of new powers, all vying to fill a widening, chaotic power vacuum, provided courtesy of the Bush administration.
Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press, London).