With the long-awaited release of the new National Defense Program Guidelines last week, Japan has finally entered the post-Cold War era. Tokyo has recognized that the most likely threats to its national interests now come from China, and has shifted its strategic focus accordingly. It has also signaled that it will modestly increase its military strength in the most important weapons systems to counter China's naval and air buildup. The question now is, has Tokyo done enough? And what effect will its new posture have on growing maritime tensions in East Asia?

The NDPG is the first real strategy document to be put forth by the current Democratic Party of Japan government. It provides guidance for the simultaneously released Mid-Term Defense Program, which will set the force structure for the next decade. Both the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program were delayed a year, while the DPJ forced all government ministries to rewrite their budgets; former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's tussle with the Obama administration over the relocation of a U.S. Marines Corps Air Station inside Okinawa also added to the delay.
There had been much speculation in both Tokyo and Washington about how directly the NDPG would address Japan's conflicted relationship with China. The end result is a mixed bag. But there is enough in the new report to commend it as a good start.
The report's most important change is the introduction of a new defense strategy. For decades Tokyo was guided by its ""basic defense concept,"" which was essentially a passive strategy, reacting to threats only when they directly menaced Japan's interests. The new approach calls for developing a ""dynamic defense capability"" to shape the regional environment, proposing closer cooperation and coordination with the United States, a more active defense presence abroad and enhanced engagement with other Asian nations.
Yet the new NDPG also calls into question the Self-Defense Forces' ability to carry out this new forward-leaning strategy, by mandating further trimming of the defense budget. Reflecting Japan's difficult fiscal condition, the government will decrease SDF strength by 1,000 troops, to 147,000 regular forces. Exactly how Japan will undertake more defense activities with reduced resources will be the test of how credible the DPJ is on security issues.
The NDPG's goals were influenced by the recently concluded Council on Security and Defense Capabilities. As some observers have remarked, neither the council's report nor the NDPG proposes dramatically building up Japan's capabilities to meet the perceived threats from China and North Korea head-on.
Rather, they attempt to restructure Japan's defense force to bolster certain crucial capabilities. The report calls for an increase in Japan's submarine force to 22 subs, up from the current 16, and the addition of two more Aegis-equipped ballistic missile defense destroyers. The Air Self-Defense Force will move another fighter-interceptor squadron to Okinawa and will go ahead with plans to procure its next generation of fighters, which is currently stalled while Tokyo attempts get access to America's F-35 program. Less-effective weapons systems will also be reduced, including a one-third cut in the Ground Self-Defense Force's tank corps, which was built up during the Cold War to face a potential Soviet invasion of Japan's northern territory.
The goal of all these changes is to allow Japan to focus more credibly on protecting its southern islands from the growth in Chinese naval and air power. The prudence in this shift in focus was revealed when, not long after the new strategy was announced, China Daily, a state-run newspaper, denounced the new plan as ""provocative"" and ""paranoid."" As if to underscore Japan's concerns, Beijing also announced that it would send fishery patrol boats regularly to waters off the contested Senkaku Islands.
It was off these islands that Japanese coast guard vessels arrested a Chinese fishing boat in September, triggering a major dispute between Tokyo and Beijing; China retaliated by arresting four Japanese citizens working on the mainland and cutting dramatically the supply of crucial rare earth minerals to Japanese corporations. The incident followed increased Chinese naval activity around Japan's southern islands, including a well-publicized passage of Chinese naval ships through Japanese waters in March of this year.
Tokyo has watched as China's growing naval capabilities have led to greater assertiveness toward its neighbors. New disputes with Vietnam and Indonesia over exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea have flared up over the past several years as well. Chinese spokesmen even warned the U.S. against conducting naval drills with South Korea in the Yellow Sea this past summer.
With nearly 70 submarines and a growing surface fleet, the Chinese navy is now a regular presence in the vital sea lanes of East Asia. Yet it is China's refusal so far to agree to common ""rules of the road"" in international waters, its expansive maritime claims and its aggressive actions in defense of its private fishing fleet that have really raised the suspicions of Japan and other Asian nations.
Here is where views on how to deal with China diverge. Those who believe that the best way to maintain stability in East Asian waters is for Japan to have a credible naval force will see the new NDPG as a positive step. Others, like China, may see it as needlessly provocative.
From either view, Japan's new posture represents only a modest increase in military capabilities. Observers will be further disappointed that the Kan government has decided so far not to revise the ban on arms exports, which would allow Tokyo to collaborate with other nations on defense technology and provide a possible market for Japanese military technology, thus helping to lower the costs of Japan's own defense procurement. Similarly, there will be general disappointment that Prime Minister Kan, while recognizing the new types of threats to Japan, will not be increasing Japan's defense budget to allow it to respond more credibly to long-term security challenges.
In many ways, the success of this plan will rest, therefore, on Japan's continuing alliance with the United States. Like Japan's, America's Navy and Air Force face a future of tighter budgets and greater demands on their resources. Even though its forces will remain for some time the strongest and most capable in East Asia, Washington will have to depend on its allies more in coming years to carry a greater share of the defense burden. Recognizing this, the Democratic Party of Japan has re-affirmed its intention to work more closely with the United States. Now the two will have to come up with specific forces, plans and policies to keep Asia's waters peaceful. If they retain their credibility, then the chances that China will recognize the benefits of constructive dialogue, as opposed to assertive posture, will also increase.
Mr. Auslin is director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for WSJ.com.
(Source: WSJ