Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, which are ethnically homogenous and modern nation-states, Libya represents a difficult and highly complex case to examine insofar as its tribal texture and vast landmass are concerned.

How far to go to stop violence in Libya and how to end Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s repressive regime pose daunting challenges to the international community. But at the same time waiting for the evidence of atrocities to rise to the level of genocide before the world can act to stop the Qaddafi’s regime from indulging in wanton violence for his self preservation is just as fundamentally defective policy as taking a neutral position in the face of unfolding violence. Perhaps more problematic is the question of why NATO has rushed to come to the aid of the Libyan opposition movements while the brutal suppression of opposition groups in Bahrain is either marginalized or tacitly approved in the name of national security. The Obama administration’s foreign policy risks degenerating into a “circus of confusion” or demoralizing inconsistency at best, in view of the fact that the standard explanation from the White House seems to be that foreign policy is full of trade-offs.
It is important to understand the limits to what can be done in such circumstances. To deal with Libya and have any meaningful leverage on its leaders’ decisions is no mean task. Firstly, Libya is less dependent on the global trading system and somewhat isolated from the outside world’s pressures. Nearly 95 percent of the country’s export earnings come from oil and 75 percent of the state budget is based on oil revenues. There are many European and Asian countries that are keen on pursuing their commercial interests in Libya. Secondly, Qaddafi’s 41-year reign has systematically destroyed civil society, political parties, and other civil organizations. With the exception of the state, there are practically no effective institutions in place, and that is why tribes constitute major social and power networks in Libya. A complex vortex of tribal affiliation, identities, ties, and interests accounts for major social and power relationships within the regime and the military.
A good case can be made that Libya has forfeited its claim to sovereignty given the use of foreign mercenaries to attack pro-democracy supporters and shed the blood of innocents. There is a strong urge on the part of the international community to invoke the “responsibility to protect” where a local government is unwilling or unable to help its own population. In the case of Libya, Qaddafi regime is directly attacking its own people. It is hard to escape the question: Why has the same ethos of “responsibility to protect” never been invoked in the case of the Palestinians living under brutal and abject conditions in Gaza?
Aside from this inconsistency, NATO’s mission in Libya is rather vague and begs the question of what is the endgame: regime change or protecting innocent civilians caught in crossfire? The two Resolutions concerning the Libyan situation, approved by the UN Security Council, seek different and sometimes contradictory missions. Whereas Resolution 1970 is about arms embargo, Resolution 1973 underscores the importance of enforcing a no-fly zone “by whatever measures necessary.” The options envisaged under this rubric are in fact open-ended and could lead to mission creep. This confusion notwithstanding, with Libya providing only 2 percent of the world’s oil supply, any attempt to portray the Unites States and its Western allies (especially France and England) as bent on invading yet another Muslim-Arab state for its oil is a bit exaggerated. The NATO members must avoid the temptation of putting troops on the grounds, in large part because this move would risk getting NATO locked in taking military actions that most likely exacerbate the conditions on the ground. The Libyans’ battle against their tyrannical regime must be supported by the international community but ultimately it has to be sorted out by the Libyans themselves. While the status quo in Libya is no longer sustainable, it is important to avoid getting embroiled in yet another military adventure that could cause more harm than good.
Mahmood Monshipouri is associate professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. He is the author of Muslims in Global Politics: Identities, Interests, and Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) and is currently working on a book entitled, Terrorism, Security and Human Rights: Harnessing the Rule of Law (forthcoming, Lynne Rienner Publishers)