THAILAND (The Nation) -- It did not mention any names - but Singapore reiterated during the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting last week ahead of the summit, that before accepting any new members, ASEAN had to consider the geopolitical implications of further expansion.

Thus for the first time, the shift was moving away from economic imperatives and regional consolidation to strategic propositions.
After the end of the Indochina war, the enlargement of ASEAN was the outcome of efforts to integrate the other half - the impoverished side - of Southeast Asia as soon as possible to develop a prosperous region.
The grouping's arch-enemy, Viet Nam, was first to join in 1995, followed by Laos and Burma in 1997 and capped up with Cambodia in 1999. The new political landscape was thus transformed with 10 Southeast Asian countries under one roof.
Over a decade, the meaning of geopolitics within the region had gradually taken on a greater significance.
In early 1995, the decision to admit Burma was based solely on the prevailing ASEAN perception that China's growing influence there would be a threat. At the time the conventional wisdom was to integrate the troubled nation without delay to deter China's advance.
-----Grouping to expedite Burma’s membership
Therefore, the grouping was quick to expedite Burma's membership despite its huge political baggage. However, more than 14 years have elapsed, and as China's influence and presence continues to grow unabated, so is ASEAN's ability to coexist with the pressure from the north.
Doubtless, the new geopolitics with rising China necessitates ASEAN's growing willingness to engage other powers beyond its immediate region. The call for an expanded East Asia Summit was the clearest manifestation.
The U.S., Russia, India and Australia are the four big players that ASEAN has currently invited to engage with the countries from Northeast Asia. Obviously, the geographic extension of East Asia under the ASEAN purview has now extended from Kashmir to the Pacific Coast. Additional members of the East Asia Summit in the future, especially the European Union, would again expand the geopolitics of ASEAN, covering more than half the world.
That helps to explain why ASEAN has repeatedly rejected Pakistan as a full dialogue partner. It was due to the new geopolitics. Obviously, the grouping does not see any benefit deriving from the nearly 20-Year ASEAN-Pakistan relationship.
Further upgrading of the current status of dialogue partner would not help. When the ASEAN Regional Forum was formed in 1994, Pakistan was not considered inside the so-called geographic footprint of Asia.
However, after Pakistan and India successfully tested their nuclear bombs in 1998, a year later both were admitted as ARF members simultaneously. India became a full dialogue partner in 1995.
After Timor Leste expressed a strong desire to join ASEAN in early March, it has set off uncompromising debates among its members on whether an additional member located at the edge of Southeast Asia would render geopolitical ramifications in years to come. Singapore, which strongly opposed the inclusion, seems to think so.
Timor Leste as the 11th ASEAN member would increase Indonesia's geopolitical weight in the region. When it was part of Indonesia from 1975-1999, Indonesia was under the dictatorship of Suharto and it was an albatross around Jakarta's neck. Rapid democratization after the 1998 people's uprising brought in new leadership, Indonesia has rapidly expanded its diplomatic profile at both regional and international settings.
As a young democracy, Timor Leste would also add to the democratic voice within ASEAN countries. Thailand views the young nation as a champion of democracy. As such, as a new ASEAN member, Timor Leste could serve as a linchpin for the region's democracies. Unlike the benign and passive Brunei, the former Portuguese colony would be more vocal and dynamic, especially under the present leadership.
Under the current circumstances, the country that carries the geopolitical advantage over Timor Leste is Australia. Since its independence over a decade ago, Canberra has played the most significant role as a developing and stabilizing force in the world's poorest nation despite some intermittent outcries from the Dili leaders. Joining ASEAN would further impact on the geopolitical landscape in this diverse region and further consolidate the relations between Indonesia and Timor Leste.
China's growing presence in Timor Leste after 2006 has been cited by some members as one of the reasons to hasten its ASEAN membership. In more ways than one, ASEAN also has realized in an unequivocal way that inclusion of new members with ever-increasing Chinese influence by no means helps to reduce Beijing's influence. Burma has been the case in point.
It remains to be seen how such perception will evolve in the future within the grouping. ASEAN is used to weak and undemocratic Indonesia of yore. Unlike the rest of ASEAN, Indonesia now has a clearly defined global agenda with the region's most extensive diplomatic networks. Jakarta also has regional programs to promote democracy and human rights. Its huge population size of 240 million and geographical spread including economic growth has made it another potential of BRIC, apart from the G-20 membership.
Singapore has the propensity to detect upcoming trends, big or small. Therefore when the island republic emphasizes in Jakarta that geopolitics matters in the grouping's enlargement plan, it will.