TEHRAN – A former deputy chief of counter-terrorism at the CIA says the challenging issue over an inspection of Iranian military sites under a final nuclear deal “is not unresolvable”.

“The issue of inspections of Iranian sites that are not declared nuclear sites is one of the issues that remains to be resolved in negotiation. While the issue is challenging, it is not unresolvable,” Paul Pillar tells the Tehran Times in an exclusive interview.

Iran has announced that it will not allow inspection of its military sites or interview with its nuclear experts under the terms of the final nuclear agreement with the great powers.

Iran and the 5+1 group have started intensive negotiations to complete the final text of the comprehensive nuclear agreement.

Pillar is optimistic about the outcome of negotiations because he believes Iran and the United States as the main negotiating partners are making “genuine effort” to strike an accord.

“Both governments are clearly committed to making a genuine effort to conclude the negotiations with an agreement, and I believe they will. They may need a little extra time beyond 30 June.”

Following is the text of the interview:

Q: Aren’t the demand for inspection of Iranian military sites or interview with nuclear experts beyond the Additional Protocol to the NPT?

A: The issue of inspections of Iranian sites that are not declared nuclear sites is one of the issues that remains to be resolved in negotiation. While the issue is challenging, it is not unresolvable. I would not expect the Iranian side to oppose firmly interviews of nuclear experts, regardless of what may have been said by Iranian leaders publicly. Inspection of non-nuclear military sites is a different matter. The final agreed formula will be some arrangement, consistent with the Additional Protocol, in which international inspectors will be permitted some sort of access to such sites, at least to collect samples, but only in response to a specific reason to suspect that prohibited activity is occurring thee and only after discussion of the accusation in some sort of commission.

Q: Do nuclear powers, like the U.S. and UK which have signed the additional, allow inspection of their military sites by the IAEA?

A: No country allows uninhibited access to its own military sites. But the United States has permitted foreign inspection of certain sites in conjunction with arms control agreements it has signed. This was true of some of the agreements on strategic nuclear weapons concluded with the Soviet Union.

Q: Isn't the Additional Protocol a tool to impose a new legal regime on Iran?

A: The agreement between the P5+1 and Iran will by definition be a new legal regime in the sense that it does not merely duplicate or apply some existing legal arrangement. But the advantage of the Additional Protocol is that it provides a kind of model or international standard. Every country--not just Iran--that applies the Additional Protocol concludes its own specific agreement with the IAEA, but there is considerable consistency across countries.

Q: What is your prediction of nuclear talks? Can the sides agree on a comprehensive agreement?

A: Both governments are clearly committed to making a genuine effort to conclude the negotiations with an agreement, and I believe they will. They may need a little extra time beyond 30 June.

Q: Besides non-proliferation, one of the purposes of the NPT is nuclear disarmament but nuclear powers are mostly focusing on non-proliferation, why?


A: It always was going to be difficult to get current nuclear powers to give up their nuclear weapons in the face of continuing conflicts and fears, but it becomes especially difficult as reductions of existing arsenals get closer and closer to zero--at which point even a single nuclear weapon in the hands of an adversary would be seen as a greater threat than it otherwise would have been seen. The United States and Russia have greatly reduced their nuclear arsenals from previously large numbers, but any further moves toward nuclear disarmament will be much harder because they would risk falling behind what smaller nuclear weapons states have.

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Every country - not just Iran - that applies the Additional Protocol concludes its own specific agreement with the IAEA, but there is considerable consistency across countries.