TEHRAN - Cindy Vestergaard, a senior researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies and a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Centre, says the Additional Protocol to the NPT “does not mean that the IAEA can access military sites that are unrelated to nuclear activity.”

The Additional Protocol “means if there is suspicion of undeclared nuclear activities, particularly any related to weaponisation, the IAEA has the right to request access,” Vestergaard tells the Tehran Times.

Vestergaard says the protocol is nothing new and “as of today 125 states have an additional protocol in force”.

Following is the text of the interview:

Q: Iran has ruled out inspection of its military sites under a final nuclear treaty and this has turned into a challenging issue in the nuclear talks between Iran and 5+1 group. Do not you think that demands for inspection of military facilities go beyond the Additional Protocol?

A: The Additional Protocol has been around for almost twenty years. Passed in 1997, the Model Additional Protocol is an addition to a State’s comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Only for States with a CSA and an AP in force can the IAEA draw a broader conclusion whether all nuclear material in a State remains in peaceful activities.

For those with CSAs but no AP, the Agency draws the conclusion that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful activities. Military sites are not excluded from the provision of ‘complementary access’ by IAEA inspectors to resolve questions related to the correctness and completeness of a State’s nuclear declaration.

It allows for the IAEA to take environmental samples anywhere in the country where there is reasonable suspicion of nuclear material or related-nuclear activities taking place. This does not mean that the IAEA can access military sites that are unrelated to nuclear activity; it means if there is suspicion of undeclared nuclear activities, particularly any related to weaponisation, the IAEA has the right to request access.

Q: Some countries like the U.S. and UK are implementing the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Are these countries entitled to let IAEA inspect their military sites?

A: Under the NPT, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), such as Iran, are required to adopt safeguards agreements while the possessors of nuclear weapons are not unless they choose so on a voluntary basis at selected facilities. Each of the five NWS (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) has a voluntary offer safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place, each varying in scope.

The United States has volunteered all of its civilian facilities eligible for safeguards under the IAEA-U.S. Agreement, (except those with ‘direct national security significance’) as do the United Kingdom and France given the combined effect of IAEA and Euratom safeguards. In the UK, for example, Euratom safeguards are applied at UK civil nuclear sites, including those that historically were sometimes used for military purposes such as the conversion facility at Springfields.

Q: Generally, isn’t the Additional Protocol a pretext for the U.S. to impose a new legal regime on Iran?

A: The unique status for NWS however allows them to exempt materials from third party oversight. This is a very different situation than for NNWS, including Iran, where the NPT obligates NNWS to forego nuclear weapons.
The additional protocol is therefore not ‘new.’ As of today, 125 states have an additional protocol in force. It is useful too, enabling the IAEA to have a complete picture of a State’s nuclear activities and provide confidence that a State’s nuclear activities are entirely for peaceful purposes.