U.S. wary of emerging powers in Persian Gulf region: Lobe
In a brief interview with the Mehr News Agency on March 2, he elaborated on the roots of the crisis in the Middle East and the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. Following is the text of his responses to the interviewer’s questions:
“There are many roots, at least from Washington’s point of view. In the first place, the region is considered one of vital interest to the U.S. because of its (and the world) economy’s dependence on oil and gas and the fact that the largest hydrocarbon reserves are found in the (Persian) Gulf. As a result, whichever power is dominant in the region enjoys major geostrategic advantages over any possible rival that is not energy-self-sufficient. Until the first (Persian) Gulf War, Washington relied on playing off regional powers (such as Iraq and Iran) to prevent the emergence of any indigenous power gaining regional dominance. Since the first (Persian) Gulf War, it has relied directly on its own military presence and power. Its preference, however, is to preserve its dominance through friendly regimes. Until the Islamic Revolution, that included the shah.
“A second root is Washington’s de facto alliance with Israel, which has grown particularly close under George W. Bush. Israel is seen, for the most part, as a reliable ally, as well as a formidable military power. To the extent that the other powers in the Middle East see Israel as a U.S. client and a Western intruder in the Islamic world, the U.S. is forced to deal with a serious contradiction between its interest in maintaining access to the region’s energy and influence over who else gets access, on the one hand, and its alliance with Israel, on the other. Powerful lobbies within the U.S. perpetuate the contradiction and make it extremely difficult for any administration to resolve.”
Standoff over Iran’s nuclear program
“I think both countries (the U.S. and Israel) prefer that the crisis be settled peacefully but are very skeptical that it can be in the absence of Iran’s agreement to very strict verification measures to ensure that Tehran is not, indeed, trying to build a weapon. In any event, both countries would also prefer “regime change” in Iran -- particularly since Ahmadinejad’s election -- and are certainly making probes to see if that can somehow be accomplished. But neither is confident that it can be – at least in the relative short term – and both are aware that a military attack against Iran is likely to rally people behind the government (which would make regime change far more difficult).
“Israel clearly feels more threatened for a variety of reasons (the history of the Nazi Holocaust, among them, but also Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and possibly for Hamas). And because Israel feels strongly that it cannot by itself destroy Iran’s nuclear program and would need the U.S. to help it do so (if it concludes, as it did regarding Iraq in 1981, that Tehran is close to a major breakthrough toward producing nuclear weapons), then it does have an interest in creating a crisis atmosphere that would put pressure on Washington to provide that support.
“Before its invasion of Iraq, I think the Bush administration was also determined to intimidate Iran (that was one reason why the invasion was carried out) into abandoning its nuclear program and promoting regime change, but has since lost much of its eagerness.”