TEHRAN - Donya-e-Eqtesad examined Iran’s simultaneous consultations with Japan and South Korea.

 The paper argued that these parallel talks could be seen as the activation of a quiet yet purposeful wave of Asian diplomacy. This wave does not necessarily take the formal shape of a “mediation initiative,” but it follows a shared logic: the genuine concern of Asian powers over rising tensions in West Asia and their effects on energy security, market stability, and future geopolitical trends. These countries have clearly understood that the Red Sea tensions, the Gaza war, developments in Lebanon, and instability in energy markets are all directly and indirectly linked to Iran’s nuclear file. From their perspective, a return to nuclear diplomacy is not only a political goal but also a key instrument for containing regional tensions and establishing a ceiling of control over crises. Thus, what matters most to Asian diplomats is creating a platform for dialogue and restoring predictability to regional interactions. Reviving the JCPOA is only one possible path toward this broader objective.

Sobh-e-No: The future of tactical cooperation between Tehran and Ankara

Sobh-e-No analyzed recent shifts in Tehran–Ankara relations following Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Tehran. The paper wrote that this trip should be seen as a symbol of consolidating a complex yet manageable pattern in Iran–Turkey relations. At present, the two countries are less direct threats to one another and more parts of each other’s mechanisms for managing environmental risks. The main goals of this visit can be analyzed on several simultaneous levels: consolidation of cooperation in energy, trade, and transit; containing the consequences of developments in Syria and the Caucasus; coordinating positions regarding Gaza and Israel; and seeking to exploit structural gaps in the international system for mutual benefit. Fidan’s trip can be considered a significant point in the ongoing recalibration of Tehran–Ankara relations. Although this process still carries elements of rivalry and historical mistrust, at the current juncture, it emphasizes more than ever the necessity of tactical cooperation and crisis management in the region. If this trajectory continues, one may expect the balance of power in West Asia—at least along the Iran–Turkey axis—to enter a new phase of balance and calculability.

Farhikhtegan: Negotiation conditions were not intended to be accepted

In a commentary, Farhikhtegan addressed three conditions set by the United States as prerequisites for any rapproachment with Iran. The paper notes that the conditions announced by Trump—complete suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran, total cessation of support for resistance movements in the region, and reduction of missile ranges—form a clear picture when considered together. According to the analysis, the U.S. is not seeking an agreement but Iran’s submission. Accepting and implementing these preconditions would provide no guarantee that Israel would refrain from destroying the military and economic infrastructure of a country whose missiles have a range of 500 kilometers. If the true aim were agreement, the conditions should have been framed in a way that allowed for negotiation between both sides, rather than disarming one party entirely while leaving the other in a superior position. Iran will not yield to such demands, and the U.S. is aware of this stance. Presenting such demands not only opens the door to blame-shifting and excuse-making but also enables the White House to begin any potential negotiation from a position of dominance and extract greater concessions. These conditions were never set to be accepted; they were designed to be rejected. Iran’s refusal then provides Washington with the pretext to label Tehran as “the party rejecting negotiations” and to continue the path of maximum pressure.

Arman-e-Melli: Iran’s approach is diversifying economic pathways

Arman-e-Melli emphasized that Iran, under current circumstances, is not seeking to replace its global partners but rather to diversify its economic pathways. While this strategy does not fully resolve the challenges of sanctions, it has the capacity to ease pressures and create new opportunities in markets, energy, transit, and investment. Recent visits by Turkish and Saudi delegations to Tehran should be viewed within this framework: reassessing Iran’s regional role, shaping multilayered cooperation, and leveraging geography as an economic tool in the era of sanctions. The declared goal of reaching $30 billion in annual trade between Iran and Turkey has been repeatedly mentioned by officials, though it remains far from reality. Nevertheless, Tehran hopes that Hakan Fidan’s visit will help open new trade routes and counter some economic difficulties in bilateral relations. Some Iranian experts believe this visit is part of President Pezeshkian’s “neighborhood diplomacy” strategy. Independent analysts, however, caution that Iran–Turkey relations have entered a stage requiring more precise redefinition of frameworks and boundaries of cooperation—a stage that, if mismanaged, could lead to greater misunderstandings.