The United States use of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a tool and its political pressure on the agency is not limited to Iran’s nuclear issue.

Since Swede Sigvard Eklund served as IAEA director general from 1961 to 1981, all replacements and retentions of senior personnel of the United Nations nuclear watchdog have been made at the request of and under pressure from the world’s five major nuclear powers, with the United States taking the lead.
After Eklund, his compatriot Hans Blix was also pressured. This pressure reached a crescendo in 2002 and 2003 during the confrontation over the U.S. allegation that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons, which was used a pretext for the attack on the country.
This method has also been used with current IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei over the past four years. U.S. officials made it clear to him that he would have to support Washington’s charges about Iran’s nuclear program if he wanted to retain his position as IAEA director general and the U.S. funding for the IAEA, which accounts for 25 percent of the agency’s budget.
In fact, the agency and ElBaradei can not completely avoid the pressure. The closure of the nuclear dossier of South Korea, which had enriched uranium to 77 percent, within a few hours, and the cooling of Libya’s hot nuclear dossier after all its nuclear equipment was handed over to the U.S. are two of the many examples of this.
Over the past 48 months, the IAEA has continuously sought to verify the allegations about “ambiguities” in Iran’s nuclear activities, which actually did not come from the agency’s extensive investigations but were the product of a U.S. disinformation campaign.
Over the years, the U.S. claims about the Doshan-Tappeh, Lavizan-Shian, Parchin, and bismuth projects, along with dozens of other issues, have determined the path of the IAEA’s cooperation with the country instead of the actual obligations of this international organization toward Iran.
There have been continuous inspections, and all the ambiguities fabricated by the United States were cleared up through the evidence provided by the inspectors.
Meanwhile, Iran’s peaceful uranium enrichment activities were halted for two years, many of the projects were left half-completed, and the agency did not fulfill its responsibility to support and equip Iran’s nuclear projects.
Now, the Iranian nation has many important questions that Mr. ElBaradei should answer.
In regard to Iran’s nuclear activities, why did he realize the “disingenuous” nature of the U.S. so late? After four years of uproar and two unjustified UN Security Council resolutions against Iran, why is he only now speaking of diplomacy and the United States’ efforts to undermine him and the agency?
Who should be held responsible for the great damage done to Iran’s endeavors to develop the country that has been caused by the “ambiguities” about Iran’s nuclear activities fabricated by the U.S. and its allies? Who will compensate for the damage to Iran’s international status that has been a result of the unilateralism of the “disingenuous”?
Who will hold Western officials accountable for using international organizations like the IAEA and the UN Security Council as tools?
Despite these lingering questions, in order to free the world from unilateralism and to strengthen the IAEA and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has welcomed ElBaradei’s recent statements.
Indeed, the new Iran-IAEA agreement to “resolve the remaining issues” shows that Iran has adopted a positive attitude.
In addition, the statements of the IAEA director general included some important new points:
(1) It was the first time that ElBaradei used the word “disingenuous” in reference to the United States. He also said, “I see war drums by those basically saying the short solution is to bomb Iran, which makes me shudder because the rhetoric reminds me of pre-Iraq war.”
(2) ElBaradei stated that the recent agreement is not temporary, and it is not possible for Iran to conduct nuclear activities without IAEA supervision. He also said the IAEA has made clear “privately and publicly that we will continue and have the right to give any questions in the future. The Iranians can never get a pass (on their nuclear work) until we decide they get a pass.”
(3) ElBaradei noted that U.S. media outlets are seeking to weaken the agency, its director general, and the process of cooperation. He stated, “If you look at some of the American newspapers today, there is a coordinated, orchestrated campaign to undermine the process, undermine the agency, undermine me.”
(4) ElBaradei acknowledged that U.S. officials have made some demands to the IAEA about Iran. He did not use the word “pressure” but said, “We were criticized for refusing to accept ‘yes’ as an answer, which I thought was a bit disingenuous.”
(5) ElBaradei emphasized that Iran had made the proposal to start a process to clear up the ambiguities. He noted that once Iran had offered to answer the IAEA’s questions, “we have to accept yes as an answer. We can not afford to say no.”
And lastly, ElBaradei implied that Western intelligence agencies did not have any damaging information about Iran’s nuclear activities when he said, “Despite suspicions about Iran’s future intentions, the IAEA had not seen any undeclared for example facilities, enrichment activities or any weaponization of their program nor have we received any information to that effect.”