GOA – West Asia is once again approaching a dangerous threshold. Israel’s growing readiness for a direct strike against Iran is no longer confined to intelligence leaks, anonymous briefings, or speculative commentary. It has entered the realm of open political discourse, strategic messaging, and military preparation. In global capitals, the discussion is no longer whether Israel contemplates such a strike, but how close the region is to a point of no return—one that could reshape regional and global security in profoundly destabilising ways.

Israel frames its posture as defensive, compelled by existential necessity. Iranian nuclear capability, it argues, would fundamentally alter the regional balance of power and place Israel’s survival at risk. This narrative has gained traction largely because it is repeated within a geopolitical environment that systematically ignores an inconvenient truth: Israel itself is the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed power.

Israel is widely assessed to possess between 80 and 100 nuclear warheads, developed outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), shielded from international inspection, and protected by enduring Western diplomatic cover. This arsenal is not speculative; it has been acknowledged by former Israeli officials, documented by independent experts, and treated as an open secret for decades. Yet it remains absent from official non-proliferation discourse.

Iran, by contrast, is an NPT signatory, subject to inspection regimes, and - despite persistent allegations - has not been conclusively shown to possess nuclear weapons. The asymmetry is striking. One state maintains an undeclared nuclear arsenal without oversight; the other is sanctioned, threatened, and portrayed as uniquely destabilising for pursuing technological capability within a contested but legal framework.

This double standard is not merely hypocritical. It is strategically corrosive. It communicates to the region that international law is not a universal constraint but a selective instrument—applied rigorously to some, waived entirely for others. Such a system does not prevent proliferation; it incentivises it.

When Israeli leaders openly debate pre-emptive strikes against Iran, Tehran cannot afford the luxury of strategic passivity. Preparedness in this context is neither provocation nor belligerence. It is the rational response of a state confronted with a declared threat. History offers sobering lessons to those who mistake restraint for safety. Iraq’s Osirak reactor was destroyed in 1981. Syria’s Al-Kibar facility was bombed in 2007. Libya dismantled its nuclear programme and soon after saw its state destroyed. In none of these cases did compliance or silence provide protection.

Preparedness, therefore, must be understood correctly. It is not a call for war, nor a justification for first use. It is a doctrine aimed at deterrence—at ensuring that any act of aggression carries costs severe enough to prevent miscalculation. Deterrence exists not to make war inevitable, but to make it irrational.

Israel’s own strategic culture reinforces this logic. Israeli military doctrine has historically prioritised pre-emption, escalation dominance, and overwhelming force. International law has rarely acted as a meaningful constraint. What has constrained Israel is cost - political, military, and economic. Where retaliation is uncertain or fragmented, Israel strikes. Where escalation threatens regional instability or U.S. entanglement, caution prevails.

This reality exposes the gap between Israel’s rhetoric and its record. Despite unparalleled military technology, intelligence capabilities, and unwavering Western support, Israel has repeatedly failed to achieve decisive outcomes against far weaker adversaries. Hamas remains operational despite repeated wars in Gaza. Hezbollah emerged from the 2006 conflict stronger, not weaker. Israel’s military superiority has not translated into strategic resolution or lasting deterrence.

This matters profoundly when considering Iran. Iran is not Gaza. It is not southern Lebanon. It is a state with geographic depth, institutional resilience, regional alliances, and multiple avenues of response - military, economic, cyber, and diplomatic. A conflict with Iran would not be a discrete operation. It would be regional, prolonged, and deeply destabilising, with global economic repercussions.

Israel’s frequent threats must therefore be understood as a form of coercive signalling—designed to intimidate, isolate, and pressure—rather than evidence of strategic confidence. Yet signalling carries risks. When threats are repeated often enough, they narrow diplomatic space and harden positions. They also compel the targeted state to demonstrate readiness, lest silence be interpreted as vulnerability.

Calls for a nuclear-free Middle East have circulated for decades. Iran has consistently supported such proposals. They have failed not because of Iranian obstruction, but because Israel—and its Western patrons—have refused to allow scrutiny of Israel’s own arsenal. Disarmament cannot begin with the only non-nuclear state while the sole nuclear power remains exempt. That is not non-proliferation; it is nuclear privilege.

A credible path toward regional denuclearisation would require acknowledging Israel’s nuclear status, subjecting it to international oversight, and establishing reciprocal security guarantees. Without this, appeals to restraint ring hollow and threats of force appear not as defensive necessities but as instruments of dominance.

Global opinion is beginning to shift, not because Iran’s arguments are new, but because Israel’s impunity has become increasingly visible. The failure to neutralise non-state actors despite overwhelming force, the routine dismissal of international legal norms, and the willingness to contemplate regional war to preserve military supremacy have eroded Israel’s credibility even among traditional supporters.

Preparedness, then, is not the problem. Miscalculation is. Wars in the Middle East have rarely begun because leaders desired them. They begin because one side believes the other will not—or cannot—respond. That illusion is the most dangerous force in the region today.

This is a warning Israel should not ignore. Rather, it must take heed. Power does not guarantee control, and nuclear monopoly does not confer immunity. A strike on Iran would not be clean, quick, or containable. It would ignite a chain of escalation that no actor - not even Israel’s most powerful allies could fully manage.

History offers a final, unforgiving lesson. States do not collapse because adversaries grow stronger; they collapse because hubris replaces restraint. If Israel continues to believe that threats can be issued without consequence, that force can substitute for legitimacy, and that exemption from international norms can endure indefinitely, it risks engineering precisely the insecurity it claims to fear.

Preparedness may prevent war. Arrogance will invite one.

Ranjan Solomon is a political commentator on global justice and peace