MADRID – According to the official statement released by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, Israel achieved all of its stated objectives in its operation against Iran. “All the goals of the operation have been fulfilled,” the text declared, thereby justifying Israel’s acceptance of the ceasefire proposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump. 

However, beyond this triumphalist tone, the strategic balance presents a far more nuanced picture. What exactly was Israel aiming for? And to what extent can it be said to have reached those goals?

The first stated objective was to neutralize what Tel Aviv considers an existential threat: Iran’s nuclear program. According to Ori Goldberg, an Israeli analyst specializing in regional politics, the attack was justified on the premise that Iran was just days away from reaching uranium enrichment levels ``

Although the Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan facilities were bombed and damaged, the core of Iran’s nuclear program remains operational. Israel cannot omit Iran’s technological and scientific knowledge, nor can it affect the nation’s resolve to maintain a nuclear program. 

Far from weakening Iran, the operation triggered a significant political shift: the Iranian Parliament passed—by an overwhelming majority—a law to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This decision not only marks a break with the Western oversight framework but also constitutes a sovereign gesture that redefines the balance of power. Moreover, it points to a potential withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a move that would place Iran in a position of greater strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West.

The second objective of the offensive was to destabilize the Islamic Republic’s political system, with the expectation— already openly stated by former Israeli War Minister Yoav Gallant —of facilitating “regime change”. This logic underpinned actions such as the attack on Evin Prison, a symbol of Iran’s judicial apparatus, which generated widespread international condemnation, especially as it primarily affected civilians. This strategy was backed by figures from the Israeli establishment, such as Raz Zimmit from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), who bluntly stated that “the long-term solution to the Iranian threat lies in regime change.”

But that expectation quickly unraveled. As analyst Mouin Rabbani has noted, the Iranian political system demonstrated a structural solidity that refuted the forecasts of its detractors: institutional vacancies were filled quickly, the military chain of command was reinforced, and no cohesive opposition emerged capable of capitalizing on the crisis. On the contrary, the external aggression acted as a catalyst for social mobilization that reaffirmed the principle of national sovereignty. Far from fracturing the Islamic Republic, the foreign offensive ended up consolidating its internal legitimacy.

The third objective was to degrade Iran’s ballistic missile program, which Israel regards as one of the main threats to its regional military supremacy. Despite Israeli efforts to destroy production, storage, and launch facilities, Iran responded with a series of coordinated attacks that penetrated Israel’s most sophisticated air defense systems, including the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-3. From a technical-military perspective, this episode represents a humiliating setback—not only because of the damage inflicted on strategic Israeli infrastructure, but also because of the blow it dealt to the credibility of systems in which the United States has invested billions of dollars.

The Iranian operation made it clear that deterrence is not the exclusive preserve of Western powers. The Islamic Republic responded with restraint, proportionality, and a strictly defensive logic, while simultaneously demonstrating its ability to strike key targets if its sovereignty is threatened.

Israel achieved “undeniable tactical successes,” such as the elimination of senior military commanders, but these did not translate into sustainable advantages or a real shift in the regional strategic balance. The correlation of forces in West Asia has not changed significantly, and the Israeli offensive—rather than weakening Iran—has reinforced its narrative of resistance, sovereignty, and self-determination in the face of international pressure.

On the other hand, the cessation of hostilities does not eliminate the Israeli threat. In this regard, attention has shifted to the “ceasefire” in Lebanon, which Tehran views as a pretext for Israel to continue bombing the country’s south—now without a symmetrical response from Hezbollah. Iranian authorities fear that Israel may try to replicate in Iran a model similar to the “informal demilitarized zone” in southern Lebanon: a space without effective sovereignty, vulnerable to military incursions under any pretext.

While Iranian officials insist that replicating such a pattern on Iranian territory would be far more difficult—given the robustness of their defensive capabilities—they also stress that constant vigilance remains essential.

As for a possible resumption of negotiations with the United States, the Islamic Republic will remain firm in its demands: it will not accept talks that do not begin with an explicit recognition of its sovereign right to enrich uranium on its own soil. For Tehran, relinquishing that right would not only be counterproductive but outright suicidal. Historical experience shows that dismantling a strategic capability—such as the nuclear program—does not lead to sustained relief from external pressures. Rather, such pressures tend to be redirected toward other sensitive areas, such as the missile program or, ultimately, an attempt at regime change.

In this context, accepting “zero enrichment” would amount to dismantling Iran’s deterrent capacity and exposing itself to a perpetual cycle of pressure. The cases of Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon demonstrate that demilitarization does not guarantee security—and that ceasefires, far from representing lasting truces, often function as extensions of warfare by other means.

As Mahdi Mohammadi, adviser to the speaker of Iran’s Parliament, warns: “Everything depends on what happens next. If we remain skeptical and vigilant, correct our deficiencies, maintain unity, consolidate our network of influence, and retain the will to strike the enemy, this brief pause will be an opportunity. Otherwise, it will be nothing more than a trap for the enemy to regroup and launch an even greater war.”

In this light, the halt in fighting should not be interpreted as a definitive outcome, but as an intermediate stage that opens up both risks and possibilities. Its resolution will largely depend on Iran’s ability to turn external pressure into internal cohesion, strengthen its strategic deterrence, and shape a new regional balance more favorable to its sovereignty.