TEHRAN – The Israeli war on Lebanon serves as a major test of the Arab world's willingness to cooperate with Iran. The Islamic Republic has linked its own ceasefire discussions with the U.S. to the inclusion of Lebanon in any agreement. To counter this, the Trump administration has heavily pressured Beirut to enter U.S.-mediated negotiations with Israel. The primary goal is to push Lebanon into direct talks with Israel, potentially forcing the Lebanese government into direct conflict with Hezbollah.

Writing for IRNA, Seyed Hossein Mousavi, director of the Middle East Research Center for Scientific and Strategic Studies, urged Arab states—particularly those along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf—to support Iran's policy of safeguarding Lebanese interests, especially as Israeli leaders pursue the "Greater Israel" project.

The following is the text of his article:

The war imposed by the United States and Israel against Iran has marked a turning point in contemporary history, demonstrating that a new Middle East is being reshaped—one that will be significantly different from what the U.S. and Israel had envisioned.

It has now become evident that the imposed war failed to achieve the desired outcome sought by the West, and their objectives of overthrowing the Islamic Republic were unsuccessful. What the West, particularly the U.S., had long marketed as the “New Middle East” has, in the aftermath of the war, lost its appeal. The prospect of Arab and Islamic countries joining the Abraham Accords has now become a bitter irony.

The attack on Iran and the unilateralism and arrogance displayed by the U.S. and Israel, coupled with their disregard for the interests and fate of their allies in the Arab world—especially the Persian Gulf states—has taught Arab and Islamic countries an important lesson: that the U.S., due to its unquestioning alignment with the Zionist regime, cannot be considered a stable and reliable partner.

At the same time, Israel’s clear shift in its security strategy from deterrence to regional dominance and strategic hegemony, along with its openly declared ambition to reshape the regional geopolitical map under the banner of “Greater Israel,” a concept promoted by Israel’s right-wing and extremist factions, has made it clear to almost everyone in the Middle East that Israel’s hostility is directed not only toward the Islamic Republic of Iran but also inherently toward Arab and Islamic countries.

In the “Greater Israel” map, designed by Israeli strategists such as Oded Yinon and pursued by Benjamin Netanyahu and the current right-wing Israeli government, the Arab states surrounding Israel would be fragmented to ensure Israeli supremacy. Under this vision, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt would lose portions of their territory, transformed into buffer zones or devastated lands in the name of Israel’s security. Moreover, there would effectively be no Palestinian state, rendering the internationally supported and Arab-backed two-state solution impossible. Alongside the military implementation of this project, Israel’s extremist leadership has promoted the slogan of “Greater Israel,” framing dominance over Arab territories as part of Jewish civilization and a fake historic Jewish claim to the Middle East.

It appears that Arab countries have increasingly become aware of this significant threat to their own existence. Turki Al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence, warned of this phenomenon in an article published in Asharq Al-Awsat on May 9 in which he urged Arab states to exercise restraint in response to Iran’s actions during the war, as Iran was targeting U.S. military bases in Persian Gulf Arab states. It now seems that these states have realized that escalating tensions, encouraging further conflict, and emphasizing their disputes with Iran ultimately serve Israel’s interests.

The essence of the Abraham Accords project is the normalization of relations between Arab and Islamic countries and Israel. However, one side of this equation—Israel itself—appears fundamentally uninterested in peaceful normalization with its neighbors. Instead, it seeks to impose its power and secure their unconditional submission.

Arab countries also seem increasingly convinced that the American military presence on their soil is detrimental to their interests. Rather than enhancing their security, the deployment of U.S. forces has contributed to strengthening Israeli dominance and supporting Netanyahu’s adventurist policies. Furthermore, in light of the findings and consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, the Arab states on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf now face a critical crossroads in determining their future foreign policy orientation.

On the one hand, they recognize that enduring historical, geographical, and geopolitical realities compel them to maintain good-neighborly relations with Iran and to repair bilateral ties. On the other hand, Iran’s heightened awareness of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a powerful geopolitical instrument introduces an element of uncertainty regarding the future economic development and prosperity of these countries.

For this reason, they naturally prefer to pursue a path of peace with Iran—especially since Iran emerged from the fires of war with dignity and resilience after confronting the U.S. as the greatest military power in the world and Israel as a  regional power, and withstanding some of the most intense military strikes imaginable. It is therefore evident that these countries must acknowledge this reality and strive to improve relations.

Nevertheless, Arab states remain concerned that the power vacuum created by a reduced U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf—a development that has effectively materialized through attacks on American bases in the region and a reduction in the passage of U.S. naval fleets through the Strait of Hormuz—could be filled by an expanded Iranian military presence. Yet experience has repeatedly shown that whenever the regional Arab states have extended a hand of friendship toward Iran, they have received a fraternal response. It is clear that if hostile actions cease, the factors promoting coexistence in the Persian Gulf region will prove stronger than those driving division.

Lebanon may serve as a useful test case for measuring the Arab world’s willingness to cooperate with Iran. Hezbollah, representing a significant segment of Lebanon’s Shiite community, has undertaken legitimate measures to defend its territory against Israeli territorial ambitions and efforts to dominate Lebanon. In an effort to prevent this issue from becoming linked to indirect negotiations between Iran and the U.S., Washington has increased pressure on the Lebanese government to participate in trilateral talks in Washington and to engage in dialogue with Israel.

It is evident that the objectives of these meetings—the third round of which was recently held—offer no guarantees for ending Israel’s repeated and ongoing territorial violations against Lebanon. As noted earlier, Israel’s security strategy is based on fragmenting neighboring countries. Israel’s primary objective in participating in these trilateral discussions is to encourage the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. It seeks to turn the Lebanese state into a partner against Hezbollah, even if the cost is dragging Lebanon into the abyss of civil war. Moreover, experience has shown that Israel does not consistently adhere to its agreements and continues to pursue its broader strategic objectives.

The Persian Gulf states could have played a constructive role in the course of Iran–U.S. negotiations by firmly supporting Iran’s insistence on including a comprehensive ceasefire and an end to the war in Lebanon among the provisions of any understanding. They could also have cooperated in leveraging the influence created by Iran’s negotiations with the U.S. to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Everyone understands that the Lebanese government brings little leverage to these negotiations, and that their likely outcome may be to encourage internal conflict rather than peace. Demonstrations of goodwill by Arab countries—particularly the Persian Gulf states—could help strengthen trust between Iran and its neighbors, thereby paving the way for the gradual emergence of new structures for coexistence and strategic cooperation in West Asia.