Mitsugu Saito, former Japanese Ambassador to Iran (October 2018–October 2020), has spent decades studying the Middle East, and his latest book, "Why the United States Lost to Iran" (Bungeishunju Ltd., July 2026, 224 pages), argues that Washington misjudged its political objectives in the recent war with Iran. The book, published with an initial print run of 10,000 copies — a notably large figure in Japan for a specialized foreign-policy title — follows his 2022 work, "Is Iran a Threat? — A Regional Power on the Strait of Hormuz and Japan's Diplomacy" (Iwanami Shoten).

Saito currently serves as a Guest Professor at Kwansei Gakuin University, where he teaches the modern history of the Middle East after World War I, and is a commentator on Middle East affairs at the Okazaki Institute, a Tokyo-based think tank. Since the outbreak of the Iran war, he has been a prominent voice in Japanese media, offering analysis on the conflict.

Tehran Times spoke with Ambassador Saito in Tokyo about the strategic miscalculations behind the war, Iran's asymmetric leverage, the shifting trust of Persian Gulf states in the United States, and Japan's distinctive relationship with Iran.
Before turning to the interview and the questions and answers, Mr. Saito wished to make the following statement regarding his position and the perspective from which he approaches the war:

“First of all, I served in seven countries in the region, including the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman as ambassador. Based on more than twenty years of experience in the region, I try to make my analysis entirely impartial, without taking any particular ideological position.
I left the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs six years ago, and I currently have no connection whatsoever with the Ministry or any other part of the Japanese government.
I criticize U.S. President Donald Trump not because I dislike him, but because I believe he has confused the political objectives of the war with Iran. At the same time, I do not ideologically support the Islamic Republic of Iran. My analysis is entirely based on my own judgment.”

You characterize the conflict as a clash between two fundamentally different strategic cultures, with President Trump playing “poker” while Iran plays “chess.” What were the key miscalculations caused by this strategic mismatch, and how did they fuel the escalation?

First of all, “poker versus chess” is very much a metaphor. It is not a description of both countries' entire decision-making process.

I wrote my book for the Japanese public, who have very little knowledge of or interest in the Persian Gulf region, although Japan depends on the region for over 90 percent of its oil imports.

I decided to write this book so that Japanese people could understand, at least from my perspective, what is going on and what this Iran war is about. Therefore, I used several analogies and metaphors to help them understand the situation.

You argue that military superiority does not guarantee strategic victory. Is this a general lesson from asymmetric warfare, or is the U.S.-Iran case unique?

This is a general lesson from the history of wars. There have been many cases in past wars. For example, during the Vietnam War, there was no doubt that the United States had overwhelming military power. However, it ultimately failed to achieve its political objectives.

In my view, the lesson is that American political leaders pursued objectives that were difficult to achieve. I see a similar problem with President Trump. He pursued contradictory objectives.

In this war, Iran’s sophisticated asymmetric strategy is certainly one reason why it has been able to withstand the military superiority of the United States. But confusion over America’s political objectives is another important reason why the United States seemed to be defeated by Iran at this moment.

Iranians also know another historical lesson very well. Nader Shah was an extraordinarily successful military commander who won battle after battle and built his own empire. However, his military victories produced little lasting value, and his reign ended disastrously. The problem with Nader Shah was that he did not have sufficiently clear political objectives to achieve through his battles.

So, I think asymmetric warfare is a very important element in Iran’s ability to withstand military superiority. But my other argument is that even repeating tactical victories does not necessarily lead to strategic victory. This is a lesson from the history of warfare.

Regarding the metaphors you have mentioned earlier, do you think these different understandings of the world and of war contributed to the escalation of the conflict and made it difficult for the two sides to reach an understanding that could end the war for good?

Since this war started, I have been saying that this war will not end until both parties — President Trump and the Islamic Republic of Iran — can preserve their dignity.

There can be no one-sided victory. Iran is now in a much better position, but it would be nonsense to imagine that Iran will occupy Washington. Similarly, America has mighty military power, but U.S. military power can't occupy Tehran.

This is a very important point. Usually, people focus on the Strait of Hormuz. Yes, Hormuz is a very important strategic point. However, Iran’s strength comes from its geographic environment. Iran is surrounded by the Zagros and other mountains along its borders.

Even though the United States is the strongest military power, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the US Forces to conquer Iran because of its geography.So, if there is no option for the United States to conquer Iran, Iranian dignity must be acknowledged to end the war. No one-sided game allows the United States to prevail. 

There is only a slight chance of achieving an outcome that saves the dignity of both parties, but this is the only chance to end this war in the long term.

As you said, many analysts focus on the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its importance as Iran’s leverage. How much of Iran’s leverage comes from the Strait itself compared with its military capabilities, strategy, and political will?

The Strait of Hormuz is the most important tool Iran has to pressure President Trump.

Indeed, this is working. But at the same time, the war should be calculated in terms of different elements.

One is military power and asymmetric power. The United States has huge military power, but Iran has mobilized asymmetric power, including control of the Strait of Hormuz.

But the second point is also very important. Neither military power nor asymmetric power is sufficient to achieve victory. The second point is political will.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a very strong political will that it will not be defeated. This is very important.

On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, President Trump often changes his goals. Even if the United States is a mighty military power, if the strategy is not proper— and President Trump changes his goals often—that becomes a problem.

In my book, I wrote that President Trump is now not fighting against Iran but fighting against gas prices in the United States. This is a victory for Iran's asymmetric strategy.

 You are the only Japanese diplomat to have served as an ambassador to both Iran and Israel, which makes your views and experiences particularly significant for our audience. From your vantage point, what would you identify as the single most critical miscalculation made by Washington and Tel Aviv regarding Iran’s strategic patience, and how did that miscalculation contribute to the outcome you describe?

Based on my experience in Israel, I think it is very clear that the Israeli government and the Jewish population in Israel seriously believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a security threat. Whether it is true or not, this is a reality: they believe it.

So this is one of the highest priorities for them: to collapse the Islamic Republic of Iran

It is the top priority and the goal of every country in the world: the survival of the country, the prosperity of the people, and economic development within the rules of the international community; however, Israel is different. Israel has shown a willingness to pursue what it regards as vital national-security objectives even when doing so brings it into conflict with international law or strong opposition from the international community. 

This time, I suppose Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convinced President Trump that this was the best chance to attack Iran, and Netanyahu succeeded.

There is also one more thing. Netanyahu had his own private reasons for persuading President Trump to attack Iran. He was charged with bribery, and if he were leaving office, it could significantly increase his legal and political vulnerability. A general election was also coming in October.

So he needed some tangible success, and for him, destroying Iran would help him win the election.

You have spent years in the Middle East across multiple postings. Has this war changed how Persian Gulf states view the United States as their security guarantor, or does that role still hold?

I served in  Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman.

Based on my experience in these countries, they relied on the U.S. security umbrella for decades for two main reasons.

One reason is, naturally, that they fear increasing Iranian influence in their countries.

But another, less well-known reason is equally important: they are not in good relations with each other.

Typically, they suspect each other, cannot cooperate, and have even fought each other throughout history.

The latest notable case was the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain from 2017 to 2021. It was surprising for outsiders, but for them, there are many reasons. They have many border disputes, historical rivalries, and tribal or religious differences.

The (P)GCC is not a single, unified organization, but its members are deeply divided, and to avoid fighting each other, they need a U.S. guarantee.

I wrote an analysis about this 20 years ago at Columbia University, arguing that they suspect each other and therefore need a U.S. security guarantee to prevent fighting.

When the (P)GCC wanted to have a security agreement with the United States, the U.S. said, “Okay, we can have an agreement between the U.S. and the (P)GCC as a whole.” But they refused. They wanted individual security guarantees to protect themselves against possible aggression from their neighbors.

The Qatar boycott really demonstrated this. It was believed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE even intended to invade Qatar. Still, a huge U.S. military base was there, and the U.S. military presence in Qatar was an important constraint on any possible military action.

This is a key reason they have bilateral security relationships with the United States.

However, this war proved that the U.S. security guarantee is not as effective as they expected.

They have already begun to diversify their security partnerships. They may ask themselves: What about Russia? What about China? What about Turkey or Pakistan?

For example, recently the Saudis signed a Mekkah Joint Defense Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan.

But my second point is this: They are still afraid of each other. For that reason, they still need a U.S. presence or some security arrangement with the United States.

So I do not say that the (P)GCC will totally keep its distance from the United States. They still need a U.S. presence or U.S. commitment, but they will diversify. The United States will no longer be the sole guarantor of their security.

Do you think that because Iran had to retaliate and attack U.S. bases in these countries, the Persian Gulf states have lost their trust in the United States for good, or is this temporary?

 Their trust in the United States has been very seriously damaged.

But mainly because of their rivalry with each other, they need someone who can stop them from fighting. Turkey and Pakistan cannot stop fighting between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for example. Only the United States can do that.

In that sense, they will diversify their relations and security ties with other countries, but the United States will remain a major security partner.

You described Japan’s relationship with Iran as distinctive within the U.S. alliance system. What makes Japan’s position different from that of European allies that also depend on Middle Eastern energy but have taken a more confrontational approach toward Iran?

First, yesterday (August 13), the Japanese PM called your president. Japan is the only G7 country whose head of government can talk directly with the Iranian president. This fact itself proves that Japan has a different position from other G7 countries.

However, I have been saying that both Iran and Japan should not be overconfident about this unique Japan-Iran relationship. But it is not as strong as it once was.

Let me briefly explain the more recent history of Japan-Iran relations.

One typical case was the Azadegan Oil Field Development Agreement with Iran.

When Iranian President Mohammad Khatami officially visited Japan in 2000, he proposed the Azadegan oil concession to Japan, and the Japanese government and companies were interested. 

However, the United States pressured Japan not to do so and not to benefit Iran.

But finally, despite U.S. pressure, a Japanese consortium signed an agreement with Iran in 2004 and started exploration. It almost reached the stage of producing oil from the Azadegan oil field.

However, unfortunately, that was the time when Iran’s secret nuclear program was revealed, and Iran was internationally criticized, followed by United Nations Security Council sanctions.

Finally, the Japanese consortium withdrew from Iran.

However, the situation changed, particularly in East Asia.

There was a continuous threat from North Korea, while China was expanding its military power. Japan faced more strategic challenges and growing security concerns.

For Japan, the Japan-U.S. security alliance became more important year by year.

Through this development — and this is my personal observation — the Japanese government and Japanese private sector have tended not to provoke the United States.

I call this “self-restriction.” Even without any intervention from the United States, the Japanese side tends to keep more distance from Iran.

For example, when I was ambassador to Iran in 2019, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Tehran to mediate between theTrump administration and Iran.

However, he could not visit and mediate between Iran and the United States on his own. President Trump asked Prime Minister Abe to go to Tehran and persuade Iran to negotiate with the United States.

This is a fact you can check in the memoir by John Bolton, Trump’s National Security Advisor. Bolton wrote that Trump asked Abe to go to Tehran to pursue negotiations in his book, titled “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir”.

But to be fair to Japan, it would have been very easy if the Japanese PM had asked Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate with Trump. The Leader would have refused.

So Japan proposed its own unique proposal that could have made both the Iranian side and the U.S. side happy.

With this unique mediation plan, as ambassador in Tehran, I negotiated with Iranian officials, mostly with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who at the time was vice foreign minister.

Unfortunately, this Japanese mediation plan did not work.

What I intend to tell you is that, while it is true that Japan’s growing security concerns in the Far East oblige it to limit its relations with Iran, as in the case of Prime Minister Abe, in general the Japanese government and Japanese public are happy, if the situation allows, to expand relations with Iran.

You mentioned that you wrote your book for the Japanese public and that you used metaphors to explain the situation. Was this the main reason you decided to write the book — to explain one of the most important conflicts happening in the world to the Japanese public — or were there other motivations that inspired you?

 My motivation was, as I mentioned already, that Japan depends on oil coming through Hormuz over 90%.

After the war started, the Japanese public was almost — I would not say panicked, but shocked — by the fact that oil was no longer coming through the Strait.

So I decided to write this book to help people understand what is really going on in the region and why U.S.-Iran relations have deteriorated so much, eventually leading to war.

Ignorance is not good. People should understand what is really going on.
Japanese people, in general, are indifferent to the Middle East and know little about it. Therefore, I intentionally used several metaphors and analogies to help them understand the situation.

How has the book been received in Japan, especially by scholars and policymakers?

First of all, I wrote this book primarily for general readers.

Overall, the response was very good.

As far as I know, the response from academics was positive as well.

But much Japanese scholarship on the Middle East has traditionally been strong in specialized fields such as religion, history, and language. My own approach is somewhat different: I combine history, culture, and religion with international relations and the psychology of political leadership.

My approach therefore differs from more conventional military-balance analyses. Some people appreciate it because it is a relatively new approach, while others find it difficult to understand through the lens of their established methods.

 You have lived and worked in Iran. What impression of the country stayed with you the most?

I was very much impressed by the Iranian people because Iranians are very conscious of and very proud of their history, culture, and national dignity.

As I anticipated, foreign pressure only makes them more nationalistic.

I am also very much impressed by the Iranian people because, based on my experience in the Middle East, Iran is a very unique country. 

There are Persians, Azeris, Kurds, and others, but in general, Iran has successfully established a nation-state. It is marvelous in the Middle East, where most states are divided by ethnic groups, tribes, religion, and region.

Iraq once believed it had succeeded in establishing a nation-state, but after the Iraq War, what happened? It dissolved into tribes, religions, and so on.

Iran, however, is very coherent.

Another important thing is that I was very much impressed by the number of bookstores in Tehran.

Also, the Divan of Hafez is very popular among Iranian people. I was very surprised.

During my postings in the (P)GCC countries, I did not encounter the same visible culture of Arabic-language bookstores and classical literature that I experienced in Iran.

There are English bookstores, but they are for expatriates.

So I was very impressed by the many bookstores in Iran and by how closely poetry, such as the Divan of Hafez, is connected to the daily lives of Iranian people.

Finally, if you could send one message to the people of Iran today, what would you say to them?

I have great respect for Iran’s long history, culture and people. My years in Iran remain an important part of my life, or I dare say, the highest point of my diplomatic career.

At the same time, friendship with a country does not mean agreeing with everything its government does.

I have expressed concerns about some policies of the Islamic Republic. But it is just as when I criticize the policies of the United States, Israel, or other governments, as long as I believe my criticism is justified.

So I do not praise the Islamic Republic of Iran 100 percent.

Still, I respect Iran very much, and I hope the Iranian people can live in peace, with dignity and prosperity, without war in the near future.