LONDON (Press Association) -- Tony Blair was warned there could be “long-term damage” to the armed forces unless Britain slashed its commitment to the Iraq War, a previously secret document revealed on Friday.

On the eve of the March 2003 invasion, foreign secretary Jack Straw and defense secretary Geoff Hoon told the then prime minister the UK had to cut its force levels by two-thirds by the autumn.
Mr. Straw and Mr. Hoon said keeping more troops in Iraq would be outside the Ministry of Defense’s planning assumptions and would have an impact on other operations.
An extract from a previously classified letter from the Cabinet ministers to Mr. Blair, dated March 19, 2003, was released today by the Iraq Inquiry.
Mr. Straw and Mr. Hoon wrote: “It will be necessary to draw down our current commitment to nearer a third by no later than autumn in order to avoid long-term damage to the armed forces.
“Keeping more forces in Iraq would be outside our current defense planning assumptions.
“If ministers wanted us to, we would need decisions now so that we would be able to recommend what would have to give elsewhere.
“Scaling down to nearer a third will limit our contribution thereafter to a maximum of around one brigade, a two-star headquarters and possible (sic) a contribution to higher level command and control, air and maritime components and support enablers.
“Our view is that we should probably agree now to tell the U.S., for planning purposes, that this is the upper limit of our contribution.”
The UK's commitment to the Iraq campaign peaked at 46,000 troops in March and April 2003 and fell to around 18,000 by the end of May, according to MoD figures.
Tom McKane, the MoD's director general of resource and plans from 2002 to 2006, said Mr. Straw and Mr. Hoon's memo was sent amid concerns about the level and length of Britain's commitment to the conflict.
He told the inquiry: “It became apparent during that period that it was expected that there would be a substantial force retained in place after the fighting had been concluded, for a period of some six months or so, which would have obliged the UK to maintain something like a divisional strength force throughout that period, drawn down to a lower force level thereafter.
“That in itself would have constituted a breach in the planning assumptions.”
Mr. McKane said it was assumed at the time that the UK's military involvement in Iraq would last two to three years, with only an Army battle group-sized deployment - typically about 1,000 troops - by the end of that period.
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