TEHRAN – U.S. Professor Lawrence J. Hatab believes “the distinction between theory and practice, or principles of knowledge and action, is a fundamental one in philosophy, especially since philosophy must begin with reflection rather than normal living.”

Hatab, who is teaches at Old Dominion University, made the remarks in an interview with the Mehr News Agency.
Following is the text of the interview:
Q: “Philosophy: theory and practice” is the main subject of the World Philosophy Day in 2010 in Iran. Can this subject help develop deep dialogue between Western and Eastern philosophers?
A: The distinction between theory and practice, or principles of knowledge and action, is a fundamental one in philosophy, especially since philosophy must begin with reflection rather than normal living. But the ancient Greeks, like most of Eastern philosophy, believed that philosophy was a way of life and not just reflection. Modern philosophy in the West, beginning with Descartes, developed a strong separation between abstract theory and action, because modern science required a detachment from even normal experience. Much of Western philosophy since has continued such a division, either in terms of a professionalized discipline or in terms of an assumption that practices require a theoretical grounding or governing in order to be truly intelligible. Such has been the case in much of moral philosophy, for example. While theorizing is not in itself problematic, the West can learn from the East's closer connection to practice and living. It should be said, however, that American Pragmatism has been dedicated to overcoming the theory-practice divide by arguing that philosophy itself should arise out of and end in human practices. Two giants of 20th Century philosophy, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, also maintained that philosophy goes astray when detached from, or presuming to govern, lived practices.
Q: Do you believe that philosophy and metaphilosophy are separate from each other?
A: Philosophy and metaphilosophy can be separated in the ongoing work of investigation into philosophical topics, but metaphilosophical questions are essential in the deepest matters of how philosophy itself is conceived, how it operates, and how it is expressed. For example, Analytic philosophy generally considers the history of philosophy to be relatively unimportant compared to established methods of rationally examining perennial philosophical problems. Continental European philosophy, beginning with Hegel, not only considers the history of philosophy to be important, but essential, in that philosophy itself is historical, that no philosophy can be independent of its times, inheritances, and reactions to past and present conditions (the origins of Analytic philosophy itself cannot be understood apart from its reaction against Hegelian currents in British philosophy). In this way the historical background of philosophy must always be kept in mind before particular investigations are carried out, and such a background warns against misconceiving philosophy as purely stable and fixed, as a present enterprise independent of the past and future.
A related metaphilosohical question concerns how philosophy emerges in human experience. Heidegger paid special attention to this in terms of the Greek idea that philosophy begins with wonder. The Greek term is thaumazein, which is more than casual curiosity; it means being struck by preplexity and driven to resolve it, which has the temporal structure of aiming forward to resolve a present disorientation over an established (past) condition. Aristotle said that philosophy begins in wonder but puts an end to wonder with answers. Heidegger insisted that the structure of wonder is never-ending in philosophy, in the sense that philosophy is always animated by a questioning spirit, always open-ended and searching, especially since the temporal-historical element of philosophizing is never overcome by final answers.
Another metaphilosophical question concerns how philosophy is expressed. Most of philosophy is conceived as rational, objective analysis divorced from emotional effects, rhetoric, and artistic-literary devices. Yet the first great philosopher, Plato, embedded philosophical examination in narrative dialogues and even mythical expression. Some philosophers, notably Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, did not think that philosophy could be separated from literary and rhetorical forces, particularly because such forces add vivid, living richness to philosophical work, in keeping with the ancient Greek notion that philosophy is not just thinking but a way of life.
Q: How do you read the text of your disciplines? Do you take notes of some important points of the texts which you read? Do you hold dialogue with others about those texts for a deeper understanding of the texts?
A: My reply to the question of texts will have to emphasize what goes on in the so-called Continental tradition as distinguished from the Anglo-American Analytic tradition. The Continental approach stresses the whole texts of great thinkers, rather than supposed perennial philosophical problems that part of a text might illustrate (e.g., epistemology, metaphysics, etc.). The Continental tradition also presumes the historical nature of philosophy, so that a past text must be understood both in terms of its own context and how that text can be interpreted today. So we in the Continental approach are continually pouring over texts and treating them as invitations for interpretation. This can sometimes amount to text-worship at the expense of forward thinking, but one justification is that no current understanding of philosophy can be separated from the influence of great texts, going all the way back to the Greeks.
Lawrence J. Hatab is full professor at Old Dominion University in USA. His areas of specialization include 19th- and 20th-Century Continental Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, and Social and Political Philosophy. He is author of “Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence”, “Myth and Philosophy”, “A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics” and “Ethics and Finitude”