MADRID – The recently concluded conflict between Iran and Israel—with twelve days of open hostilities—was not merely a battle between two historical antagonists.

It marked the opening chapter of a new era in security, diplomacy, and the very definition of national interests in the Persian Gulf. The Arab littoral states—from Saudi Arabia to Qatar and the Emirates—have had to confront, perhaps for the first time in decades, the collapse of the illusion of external tutelage and the emergence of unavoidable regional dynamics. 

Amid this upheaval, Iran’s centrality is no longer in question. The urgent question now is different: can the region design its own stable and pluralistic order, with Iran as its cornerstone, and let go of frameworks imposed by foreign powers?

A conflict that redraws the security paradigm

Historically, the Persian Gulf’s security systems have rested on two pillars: protection by major Western powers and the strategy of containing Iran through force, pressure diplomacy, and marginalization. 

The June war, however, served as a catalyst for systemic crisis. The scale and precision of Iran’s response to Israeli attacks—including an unprecedented long-range missile strike on targets in Qatari territory—took both the global public and Arab elites by surprise. 

The message was unequivocal: neither Western military bases, nor the most sophisticated weapons packages, nor alliances with Washington or London offer total immunity from a regional power capable of combining conventional military might, missile technology, and asymmetric warfare.

From that point onward, even in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, speaking of "containing" Iran began to sound like an outdated formula—detached from a geopolitical landscape where deterrence is no longer anyone’s monopoly. The Persian Gulf countries’ ability to determine their own future, once remote and symbolic, has emerged as the only realistic safeguard.

One of the clearest outcomes of the recent crisis has been the overt or tacit recognition that any attempt to build sustainable security in the Persian Gulf must involve Iran directly. Continuing policies of exclusion or pretending that the Islamic Republic’s structural weight in the region can be ignored is no longer viable.

The emerging dialogues between Tehran and Persian Gulf countries are not driven solely by fear or exhaustion with escalation. They also reflect a more mature understanding of the factors that shape stability. Even Saudi Arabia, long reluctant to embrace scenarios of détente, has come to realize that security based on perpetual confrontation is a losing game. Cooperation in early warning systems, missile defense, and incident control has begun to displace the maximalist rhetoric of previous years. 
This does not imply harmony or the absence of competition, but rather a pragmatic acceptance of plural interests and the necessity of including Iran—not to impose upon it, but to establish balances.
In this light, Iran’s attack on the Al Udeid base—limited, calibrated, and strategic—exposed the vulnerability of all actors in the face of regional escalation. But it also sparked unprecedented intra-Arab coordination, with emergency meetings and consultations—not only to demand more guarantees from Washington but, more importantly, to initiate discussions about the creation of a credible regional defense system. 

This turn toward regional sovereignty marks a break with decades of external dependency and responds as well to a generational demand for fewer external tutelages and more homegrown solutions.

A model crisis: Israel's isolation and the Persian Gulf's dilemmas

One of the clearest fractures the war brought to the surface was the now-undeniable divergence in strategic models between Israel and the Persian Gulf states. For Tel Aviv, security is built on military supremacy, offensive preemption, and the absolute negation of perceived or real threats—regardless of the diplomatic architecture it may cost. Israel, even during the peak of hostilities, acted unilaterally, without thorough consultation or coordination with its regional allies.

The Persian Gulf region, in contrast, has spent the past decade investing in economic diversification, multilateral diplomacy, and coexistence strategies that aim to transform oil wealth into inclusive development. 

Despite their internal rifts, Arab governments understand that their stability depends as much on security as on prosperity and the integration of their societies into the global order. 

The war revealed just how different—and ultimately irreconcilable—these two logics are. Discomfort with the Zionist regime became increasingly evident, with Arab foreign ministers expressing serious reservations about future alliances that might endanger their internal agendas.

Thus, the bitter experience of recent days offers a clear lesson: the tacit alliance model against Iran—promoted by some in the wake of the Abraham Accords—no longer convinces either the populations or the political elites of the region. Coexistence with Tehran, based on clear rules and mutual respect, appears far more secure than the recycling of endless tensions.

The conflict also exposed the profound failure—and, in many cases, the deeply counterproductive role—of global powers in shaping Persian Gulf security. 

The United States, long positioned as the self-appointed arbiter of regional stability, did not act as a guarantor but as an accelerant of crisis. Its covert attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, carried out in coordination with Israel, escalated the conflict and triggered a wave of retaliatory violence that threatened the entire region. Rather than offering protection, Washington's actions revealed a security architecture designed not for the defense of the Persian Gulf, but for the projection of U.S. power and the defense of Israeli interests. 

Its erratic stance—lurching between provocative aggression and belated calls for de-escalation—has made clear that the so-called American umbrella is both selective and fragile. For many in the region, the war confirmed what has long been suspected: that reliance on U.S. “guarantees” is not only untenable, but increasingly dangerous.

Thus, the end of the “era of external guarantees” looms on the horizon. The Persian Gulf must recognize that, in moments of crisis, only regional cooperation frameworks and self-reliance can provide timely and credible responses.

The exposure of vulnerabilities during the war—from missile strikes on energy infrastructure to temporary shutdowns of vital trade routes—has added momentum to proposals for a truly local defense architecture. This is not merely about acquiring more sophisticated weapons, but about sharing intelligence, harmonizing technical protocols, and setting aside political resistance to build a rapid response and early warning network.

Here, Iran emerges not only as an inevitable actor but as a potential partner in certain critical areas: risk management, information sharing, and coordination against threats originating outside the region itself. Such cooperation does not imply the absence of rivalry, but it does open the door to gradual trust-building mechanisms and the possibility of defusing crises before they erupt. Citizens across the Persian Gulf are also demanding solutions grounded in internal responsibility—not in external promises that no longer convince.

A strategic shift toward multipolar security

The Iran-Israel clash has served as a mirror for regional governments. Threats are no longer binary; the map can no longer be neatly divided into absolute “friends” and “enemies.” Arab states are witnessing, in real time, the risks of unilateralism and the necessity of diversifying alliances. The future seems to lie in accepting a plurality of actors and building flexible partnerships capable of adapting to cycles of crisis and détente.

The confusion surrounding the future of the Abraham Accords and the uncertainty over the continuation of normalization with Israel reflect the search for new balances, no longer dictated by outside interests. Today’s priorities include defending territorial integrity and collective security, but also pursuing development, social justice, and a stronger voice in global diplomatic forums.
The recent war has definitively redrawn the mental boundaries of security in West Asia. 

The question is no longer whether Iran can be ignored, contained, or vilified, but how to integrate it—without losing autonomy—into a realistic, plural, and equitable regional architecture.

The future no longer depends on the reliability of distant allies, but on the capacity of local societies and governments to build flexible consensus, acknowledge differences, and share risks. The era of dependency did not end because regional actors willed it—it ended because facts on the ground irreversibly changed the Gulf equation.

The key question is no longer just what weapons are possessed, but what pacts and agreements can sustain shared life beyond the short term. Far from being an anomaly to be excluded, Iran has proven that any vision for the future that leaves it out is illusory. The opportunity is historic: to abandon outdated frameworks, embrace realism, and above all, reclaim the right of Persian Gulf states to a future of their own—shaped by and for themselves. From now on, security will be regional—or it will not be at all.