TEHRAN - For decades, Persian Gulf Arab nations have invested heavily in hosting U.S. military infrastructure. Bases like Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, Al Udeid in Qatar, and the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain were envisioned as protective shields, symbols of deterrence, and pillars of regional stability. 

These facilities were financed, maintained, and supported with the capital and resources of these Arab nations, with the expectation that American presence would translate into security. What was meant to safeguard sovereignty and stability can now be seen in a different light: these very installations are exposing host nations to new vulnerabilities.

The strategic calculus behind these bases was clear. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, regional Arab states pursued long-term security arrangements with the United States. These included hosting major air, naval, and logistics installations, integrating U.S. missile defense systems, and financing advanced infrastructure. In return, the U.S. projected power across the Persian Gulf, serving as both shield and deterrent against what it described as regional “threats”. The assumption was that this arrangement would create a net gain for host nations, giving them both military protection and diplomatic leverage.

However, the events unfolding after the joint U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran on February 28; exposed the limits of this logic. On that day, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes. Ove a month into the war, they have not only hit military, nuclear and energy infrastructures but have also bombed residential areas killing approximately 2,000 people. In response, in addition to targeting Israel, Iran has conducted a series of missile and drone attacks throughout the Persian Gulf, against U.S. military positions in the region. 

Reports from credible international media, indicate that high-value U.S. aircraft, such as E-3 Sentry AWACS radar jets and aerial refueling tankers, were damaged at Saudi bases. So far over a dozen U.S. service members have been killed and dozens of others have been injured.  While precise assessments remain classified or under embargo, independent reporting confirms that these strikes inflicted tangible operational and human costs.

This sequence of events highlights a paradox in modern security arrangements: bases designed as strategic assets can become points of vulnerability. Fixed installations, by their very nature, are visible and static. Their presence concentrates high-value equipment and personnel, making them attractive targets during escalation. Persian Gulf states, having invested heavily in hosting these bases, now face exposure to conflicts in which they are not the primary actors. Decisions about deployment, defense, and retaliation are largely controlled by the United States, which may have strategic priorities misaligned with those of the host nations. The intended protective shield has, in certain respects, become a magnet for danger.

The Persian Gulf experience underscores broader lessons about the nature of security in the contemporary era. While foreign partnerships, advanced systems, and strategic infrastructure enhance defensive capabilities, they cannot guarantee immunity. Deterrence does not equal invulnerability. Even the most sophisticated air defense networks cannot eliminate the risks posed by determined adversaries armed with precision missiles and unmanned systems. Furthermore, the presence of foreign forces and assets inevitably integrates the host nation into conflicts it might otherwise avoid, exposing civilian populations and critical infrastructure to potential harm.

Under international law, a state retains the inherent right to self-defense if its territory, forces, or citizens are subjected to an armed attack, as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Following the U.S.–Israel strikes, Iran’s subsequent missile and drone attacks targeting military installations in the region can be understood as a response under this principle of self-defense. 

For Persian Gulf states, the implications are profound. Beyond the immediate material and human costs of damaged aircraft and wounded personnel, there is the erosion of public confidence in the state’s ability to guarantee security. There is the added political cost of having national territory become a battleground for a foreign war, and the strategic cost of dependency on decisions made abroad. True security, these events illustrate, cannot be fully outsourced. It must be cultivated domestically through resilient defense capabilities, diversified partnerships, and diplomatic engagement.

For Iran, the situation is different. The country has developed its military capabilities domestically and does not rely on foreign powers for its security. While the U.S. and Israel have struck Iranian military targets, they have not been able to disable Iran, because it produces its own weapons and possesses the knowledge to develop new systems — a capability that cannot be taken away. By contrast, the military assets of Persian Gulf states are limited in effectiveness, since their operation depends largely on the United States.