The legal status of paramilitary organizations varies across domestic legal systems. This commentary seeks to examine the legitimacy and lawfulness of resistance movements, focusing on the Lebanese Hezbollah resistance movement’s status within the Arab country’s legal and political order.

To that end, it is necessary to begin with a brief overview of the resistance movement's origins and institutional character. The emergence of Hezbollah was the culmination of several intersecting historical developments. These included the longstanding socioeconomic marginalization of Lebanon's Shia population, concentrated in the impoverished region of Jabal Amel, stretching from the Israeli border to the Litani River; Israel's occupation of the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba hills following the 1967 Six-Day War; the repercussions of the military activities conducted from southern Lebanon by members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) beginning in 1970; the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975; Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978 (the Litani Operation); and the subsequent deployment of Syrian military forces in Lebanon. These developments prompted Lebanese Shia leader Imam Musa al-Sadr to establish the military wing of Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Dispossessed). This armed organization was later renamed Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Resistance Regiments), better known by its Arabic acronym, Amal. Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon (“Operation Peace for Galilee”) subsequently facilitated the formation of a coalition comprising the Islamic Amal Movement under the leadership of Sayyid Hussein al-Musawi, a splinter faction of Amal, the Iraqi Hizb al-Da'wah, guided by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, as well as other groups, including the Association of the Ulama of the Beqaa, the Islamic Committees, Islamic Jihad, and certain members of Fatah affiliated with the Abu Jihad faction. All these developments laid the foundations for the emergence of an organization that formally announced its establishment under the name Hezbollah in 1984. Since its inception, Hezbollah has operated through integrated legal, political, and military structures. Although it has never formally constituted itself as a registered political party under Lebanese law, it has consistently participated in elections to the Lebanese Parliament through the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc electoral list.

For several decades, Hezbollah has enjoyed both explicit and implicit recognition and support from successive Lebanese governments. Over this period, successive ministerial statements have consistently affirmed the legitimacy of resistance in various formulations, referring, inter alia, to the "right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation," the "legitimate right of the Lebanese people to resist" (Omar Karami Government, 1991), resistance as a "national and political duty" (Rafik Hariri Government, 1995), the "necessity of liberating southern Lebanon through the courageous resistance" (Salim al-Hoss Government, 1998–2000), and once again the "right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation" (Tammam Salam Government, 2014–2016). Beyond these ministerial declarations, the 1969 Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) authorized Palestinians residing in Lebanon to conduct military and guerrilla operations, provided that such activities respected Lebanon's sovereignty and national security. A different legal framework, however, emerged with the 1989 Taif Agreement, which brought an end to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). The agreement called for the disbandment of all militias and the transfer of their weapons to the Lebanese State. Consistent with this approach, the Siniora government in 2006 endorsed the principle that national defense should remain the exclusive responsibility of the State. Both the Taif Agreement and the Siniora government's position were subsequently reflected in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which called for the disarmament of all armed groups operating within Lebanon.

The armed conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel in 2024, which followed Israel's military operations in Gaza, and in 2026, which were triggered by the joint US–Israeli aggression against Iran, unfolded during the presidency and premiership of two political leaders who were not aligned with Hezbollah, namely President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Both the 2024 Israel–Lebanon agreement and the 2026 tripartite framework agreement between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States placed particular emphasis on the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the establishment of the Lebanese State's exclusive authority over the possession of arms. The framework agreement, in particular, contains provisions affirming the "disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure"; the "exclusive control of weapons by the Lebanese State"; the "verification and certification of the successful disarmament of non-state armed groups"; the "disarmament of all armed groups operating outside State authority"; the "disarmament and dismantling of such groups throughout Lebanese territory"; and the requirement that "these groups shall have no military or security role, nor retain any armed capability, anywhere in Lebanon." Setting aside the political, military, security-related, or ideological arguments advanced for Hezbollah's continued existence, this commentary seeks to address a narrower legal question. Its purpose is to examine, from the standpoint of international law, whether Hezbollah's possession of arms may be regarded as legally legitimate.

1. The right of self-determination of peoples under foreign military occupation

Under international law, peoples living under trusteeship, foreign occupation, colonial rule, or racist regimes are entitled to the right of external self-determination, namely, the right to free their territory from such forms of alien domination. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, which has recognized the legitimacy of "struggles" against alien subjugation (Resolution 2625), alien domination (Resolutions 2649 and 3103), foreign occupation (Resolution 2786), and foreign domination and alien subjugation (Resolutions 2787 and 3070). Similarly, Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, by extending the law of international armed conflict to wars fought against alien occupation, implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of such struggles. International legal instruments consistently vest the right of external self-determination in peoples rather than states. It follows that where a territory is subject to foreign occupation, the people inhabiting that territory are entitled to resist the occupying power in pursuit of the restoration of their territorial integrity and self-determination. According to the present analysis, Israel has occupied the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba hills since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and, following the 2026 conflict, has occupied at least six percent of Lebanese territory. On this basis, the continuing occupation of parts of Lebanon provides the legal foundation for the inhabitants of those territories to engage in resistance against the occupying power.

2. The obligation to support the right of self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation

Even assuming the termination of the current occupation of Lebanese territory, the legal legitimacy of Hezbollah may, according to this analysis, still be defended on the basis of its support for the Palestinian people's struggle against occupation. Under international law, the United Nations and all states are under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation arising from Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, to ensure Israel's compliance with international humanitarian law, and to employ lawful means to bring to an end serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), including the right of self-determination and the prohibition of aggression. These obligations are reflected, inter alia, in paragraph 4 of operative clause of the International Court of Justice's 2004 Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 7–9 of operative clause of its 2024 Advisory Opinion, and Article 41 of the International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Accordingly, both the United Nations and the Lebanese State are under an obligation to respect and ensure the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to support its realization through the termination of foreign occupation. In this context, the present analysis contends that, should the Lebanese government fail to discharge this obligation, disarmament of Hezbollah for the purpose of contributing to that objective would be inconsistent with the duty to ensure respect for, and support the realization of, the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

3. The invalidity of international organizations' decisions contrary to the right of self-determination of peoples under occupation

Although United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), and 1701 (2006) call for the disarmament of Lebanese paramilitary forces, the implementation of these resolutions is subject to two fundamental legal impediments. First, the preambular sections of these resolutions emphasize the necessity of ending Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory. However, approximately six percent of Lebanon's territory remains under Israeli occupation, rendering the conditions necessary for the implementation of the remaining provisions of these resolutions unfulfilled. Second, the right of peoples to self-determination, including the right to resist foreign occupation, constitutes a jus cogens norm of international law. Consequently, any resolution or decision that is incompatible with this peremptory norm lacks legal validity. This principle is expressly reflected in Article 16 of the 2022 Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), adopted by the International Law Commission.

4. The invalidity of state decisions contrary to the right of self-determination of peoples under occupation

The right of peoples to self-determination in the face of foreign military occupation, including the right to engage in national resistance, is a fundamental human right that has attained the status of a jus cogens norm of international law. Accordingly, any decision or measure adopted by a State that recognizes, endorses, or contributes to the maintenance of such an unlawful situation is without legal effect (Article 15 of the 2022 Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens)). The Framework Agreement provides only for Israel's withdrawal from the designated Pilot Zones and does not extend to the so-called Security Zone, or Yellow Line, located approximately 5 to 10 kilometers from the Israel–Lebanon border (the Blue Line), which remains under Israeli occupation. Consequently, any demand for the disarmament of Hezbollah while the Israeli occupation continues cannot be regarded as consistent with the international legal framework governing the right of self-determination under foreign occupation.

5. ‘Sovereignty in abeyance’ in the context of foreign military aggression

The decision of the Lebanese Government to disarm Hezbollah in the context of continuing foreign military aggression or occupation raises serious concerns under both constitutional and international law. The concept of sovereignty in abeyance, as well as the related notion of the failed State, reflects the proposition that a central function of sovereignty is the effective protection of a State’s population and the preservation of its internal and external security. Where a State is unable to discharge these essential functions, the practical exercise of certain sovereign responsibilities may, under exceptional circumstances, be assumed by alternative actors. The doctrines of the social contract and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) recognize that the primary obligation to ensure the security and protection of the population rests with the State. Nevertheless, the State’s failure to fulfill this obligation does not, in itself, eliminate the possibility of protective action by other actors where fundamental rights are threatened, particularly in situations involving grave breaches of international law. In such circumstances, a person or group of persons may exercise a governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities (Article 9 of ARSIWA). Accordingly, Hezbollah, as an organization possessing a substantial social and political base within Lebanese people, may be argued to possess a more immediate claim to legitimacy, in comparison with external actors based on R2P, to undertake protective measures against serious international violations, including foreign military aggression.

6. The inherent right of self-defense of legal persons and non-state actors

The right of self-defense may be understood as an inherent right attached not only to natural persons and States but also, under certain circumstances, to legal persons and organized entities possessing a distinct legal and operational identity. Just as certain non-State actors may assume obligations under international law, most notably the obligation to respect the rules of international humanitarian law, they may also be recognized as holders of certain corresponding rights, including the right to defend their existence, organizational integrity, and members against attacks. From this perspective, Hezbollah, as well as other organized non-State actors such as Yemen's Ansarullah resistance movement and Iraqi Hezbollah, may be considered as possessing an inherent right of self-defense against attacks directed at their organizational structure, personnel, and continued existence. Within this conceptual framework, the possibility of invoking a form of collective self-defense by or on behalf of such actors may also be examined, particularly where they maintain an alliance or cooperative relationship with a State actor, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran.

7. The status of Hezbollah members as lawful combatants when fighting belonging to a party to the conflict

Pursuant to Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, members of paramilitary groups or volunteer corps belonging to a party to an international armed conflict may qualify for the protections afforded to prisoners of war where they fulfill the established conditions for combatant status: when operate under responsible command, display a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. The key criterion of affiliation with a party to the conflict (belonging to) does not necessarily require formal incorporation into the armed forces of a State. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, the existence of such a relationship may be established where a militia or volunteer corps acts on behalf of a party to the conflict (on behalf of). The ICRC recognizes that this connection may be demonstrated through various forms of evidence, including the existence of a relationship of control, an express or implied agreement, or the absence of a denial of such a relationship in relevant public and official opportunity (ICRC Commentary on Convention (III), paras. 1001–1009). In the case of Hezbollah, reference may be made to Article 6 of its Charter, which describes Iran as an actor with which Hezbollah maintains a relationship of “cooperation and brotherhood” and identifies Iran as a base for its political and ideological struggle. Although Martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Khamenei stated in a speech in 2024 that the actions of the resistance movements were not conducted as Iranian proxy operations, those statements were made primarily in relation to the activities of resistance groups supporting the Palestinian peoples during the Gaza conflict. In the context of a separate international armed conflict arising from military operations by the United States and Israel against Iran in 2026, the legal assessment may differ, and the existence of an operational or organizational link between Hezbollah and Iran could become subject to examination under the criteria of international humanitarian law. It should be emphasized that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions maintains a distinction between the jus ad bellum question concerning the legality of resort to force and the jus in bello determination of the status and protection of persons participating in hostilities. Accordingly, the legal characterization of a party’s conduct as lawful or unlawful does not, in itself, determine the status of individual fighters under international humanitarian law. Therefore, if Hezbollah members were found to be fighting in affiliation with a State party to an international armed conflict and simultaneously satisfied the cumulative requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, they could potentially qualify as privileged combatants and benefit from prisoner-of-war status upon capture.

8. The status of Hezbollah members as lawful combatants in resistance to an invading force

Beyond affiliation with (belonging to) a party to an international armed conflict, Article 4(A)(6) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides an additional basis for recognizing the combatant status of members of organized resistance movements. Under this provision, inhabitants of a territory that has not yet been occupied who spontaneously take up arms upon the approach of an enemy force in order to resist the invading forces may benefit from the protections of the Convention, including prisoner-of-war status upon capture, provided that they carry their arms openly and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. This category, traditionally referred to as “levée en masse”, reflects the principle that a population facing imminent foreign invasion retains the inherent right to participate in the defense of its territory where the regular mechanisms of national defense are unable or unwilling to prevent the advance of the enemy. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, the intention of an adversary to invade or re-establish occupation may constitute sufficient grounds for such a spontaneous uprising, without requiring the territory to have already fallen under effective occupation (ICRC Commentary on Convention (III), para. 1065). So, in foreign invasion, individuals who participate directly in resistance may acquire the status of privileged combatants when they satisfy the cumulative requirements established by Article 4(A)(6). Applied to Hezbollah, this legal framework could provide an alternative basis for assessing the status of its members where their actions are undertaken in response to a foreign invasion or an attempt to re-establish military occupation. In such circumstances, and provided that the relevant conditions are met, Hezbollah members could potentially be characterized as lawful combatants rather than unprivileged fighters.

9- Effective sovereignty and international recognition

Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Charter stipulates that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force..." Accordingly, the UN Charter prohibits the recourse to force only in relations among member States and remains silent on internal armed conflicts. Therefore, there is no prohibition on the recourse to force by non-State actors. In relation to the armed forces of a State, what would be decisive is the ability of each of the two parties to exercise effective control over a territory. Should Hezbollah's effective control over a part of Lebanon be established, the possibility of declaring or recognizing it as a legitimate belligerent, or even as an autonomous government, would not be excluded.

10- Right to manifest religion

Article 18, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) enshrines the right to manifest religion. This provision stipulates that "This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching." One of the injunctions of Islam, as set forth in the Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal, mandates the utilization of instruments of power to instil dread (tarhib) in the enemies, a command expressed in a continuous and ongoing form (turhibūna bihi). The provision of means of strength, including armaments, against the enemies of Islam constitutes a religious obligation for Muslims. Should the State adopt policies inconsistent with this obligation, this right remains vested in the committed religious minority. Given the foreign-policy objective of such armament, it is unlikely to be deemed a disruption of public order, and consequently, it would not fall within the scope of the exception provided for in paragraph 2 (referring to the limitations clause) of Article 18 of the Covenant.

Conclusion

Domestic legislation prohibiting the possession of arms by citizens, popular movements, or organized armed groups may come into tension with the right of peoples under foreign occupation to self-determination, including the recognized right to resist foreign occupation under international law. To the extent that portions of Lebanese territory remain under Israeli occupation, it may be argued that the disarmament of Hezbollah in the current circumstances is incompatible with the legal framework governing the exercise of the right of self-determination.

Moreover, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination gives rise to obligations erga omnes and, according to a widely accepted view, reflects a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law. Accordingly, all States and international organizations are under a duty not to recognize, assist, or maintain situations resulting from the denial of that right. Decisions adopted by the United Nations or by the Lebanese government that are inconsistent with these obligations may therefore be challenged as lacking legal effect to the extent of such inconsistency.

It may further be argued that where the Lebanese State is unable or unwilling to discharge its fundamental responsibility to defend its territory against foreign aggression or occupation, it cannot, as a matter of principle, prevent other organized groups from undertaking protective functions that the State itself has failed to perform. Under this approach, if Hezbollah members engage in armed resistance against an invading force while satisfying the conditions prescribed by international humanitarian law, they may qualify as lawful (privileged) combatants under the Third Geneva Convention. Likewise, if Hezbollah members participate in hostilities in affiliation with (belonging to) a State party to an international armed conflict, such as Iran, and the requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention are fulfilled, they may similarly be entitled to combatant privilege and prisoner-of-war status upon capture.

Furthermore, should Hezbollah be recognized as an organized entity possessing legal personality as a party to an armed conflict, attacks directed against the organization itself may raise questions regarding its entitlement to invoke a right of self-defense under international law. Likewise, if armed hostilities were to occur between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah, the latter's effective territorial control, organized command structure, and sustained military capacity could support its recognition as a party to a non-international armed conflict, with the corresponding legal consequences under international humanitarian law. Moreover, under the right to manifest religion, Muslim communities are obligated, by virtue of the principle of tarhib (deterrence through instilling awe), to undertake the provision of armed force for the purpose of deterring - not aggressing against - their enemies.

Finally, it is noteworthy that States such as the United States routinely rely on private military and security contractors, at considerable public expense, to perform functions relating to national defense and external security. By contrast, when a domestically rooted armed movement such as Hezbollah claims to undertake comparable defensive functions without formal State remuneration, its role is frequently rejected by the host State.

Allegations such as terrorist activities—regardless of which hostile group might commit them, and Israel has the darkest record in this regard—must be analyzed on a comprehensive scale, taking into account the origin and root cause of occupation, aggression, and war crimes, such as those occurring in Palestine. This is necessary to avoid the political and legal fallacy of reducing the issue to a mere allegation against Hezbollah.


Seyed Yaser Ziaee is the Associate Professor of International Law from the University of Qom, Iran

  yaserziaee@gmail.com