Ronen Sen, India’s ambassador to the United States is an old hand at conducting intense negotiations, having earlier represented the country in Mexico, Russia, Germany and Britain. But it was his experience as secretary to the Atomic Energy Commission of India that served him well over two years and two days of negotiations with the U.S. over a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Ronen Sen’s role in stitching up the deal was crucial.

Days before the text of the 123 Agreement was made public, the Indian ambassador during an interview to Ashish Kumar Sen, said: “We have taken independent positions on Iran at the IAEA and have implemented UN Security Council resolutions. However, unless people are convinced -- both here (in Washington)and in India -- that this agreement stands on its own merits and is of mutual benefit, it is not going to last.”
Linking this agreement with Iran will be completely counter-productive; it would be totally unrealistic to expect a large and vibrant democracy like India to give up its independence of judgment and action, the ambassador added.
Following are excerpts from Mr. Sen’s interview with the Magazine:
Outlook: Is the U.S. committed to ensuring an uninterrupted supply of fuel to India?
Ronen Sen: The agreement of March 2, 2006, is fully reflected in the 123 Agreement. We have clear-cut assurances on fuel supplies. We are committed to safeguards in perpetuity; these are balanced by assurances of fuel supplies through the reactors’ lifetime.
Outlook: Will the U.S. work with other allies to ensure continued fuel supply if it cuts off its own supply?
Ronen Sen: That is very clear. It’s also in the March 2006 agreement.
Outlook: If the right to return is exercised, are there any provisions for compensation to India?
Ronen Sen: There is clear reference to compensation at fair market value. This is not just in the agreement, there is also a provision in U.S. law.
Outlook: Is India’s dedicated reprocessing facility only for U.S.-origin fuel?
Ronen Sen: This facility will be for reprocessing not just U.S.-origin spent fuel, but for all safeguarded fuel, including fuel from safeguarded Indian reactors. Arrangements and procedures in this regard would be worked out within one year.
Outlook: Will the safeguards at this dedicated facility be any different from those we’ve agreed to for other civilian nuclear facilities?
Ronen Sen: An India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA. Safeguards at the dedicated facility will be no different from those at other facilities but will be somewhat more complex. However, standards have already been determined by the IAEA.
Outlook: What were some of the challenges while negotiating this deal?
Ronen Sen: Over here (in Washington) there are various lobbies that have been very, very active. You can’t change their way of thinking. One is the non-proliferation lobby. People who have made it a career and have an evangelical fervor about their beliefs. It is a strong constituency. Second, there is a constituency that feels that Iran more than Iraq should have been the principal focus of attention of the Bush administration. This constituency, too, is very active, and is completely absorbed with Iran’s nuclear program.
Outlook: How will India react to such pressure on Iran on which there are such strong bipartisan concerns in the U.S.?
Ronen Sen: We have taken independent positions on Iran at the IAEA and have implemented UN Security Council resolutions. However, unless people are convinced—both here and in India -- that this agreement stands on its own merits and is of mutual benefit, it is not going to last. Linking this agreement with any other issue -- today it may be Iran, tomorrow it can be some other issue -- will be completely counter-productive. It would be totally unrealistic to expect a large and vibrant democracy like India to give up its independence of judgment and action. The sooner this is realized the better.
Outlook: Were any scenarios discussed under which the U.S. president would waive its right to return, say, if the Chinese or the Pakistanis tested a nuclear device and India made a case for testing? Would India face less consequences then?
Ronen Sen: No agreement is worked out on the basis of any hypothetical situation. There’s no point discussing it. There will be no document which will be beyond what is there in the public domain.
Ronen Sen: What does the 123 Agreement spell out?
Outlook: First, this agreement makes it very clear that nuclear cooperation is not going to have any adverse impact on India’s strategic nuclear program. Second, it is not going to have any negative impact whatsoever on India’s indigenous research and development program, or on the independent development of India’s three-stage indigenous nuclear power program.
Outlook: But does it curtail India’s right to conduct a nuclear test?
Ronen Sen: We haven’t gone beyond any commitment we have not made already and which is not on public record.
Outlook: This is a historic agreement for the U.S.-India relationship, but how do you explain the criticism?
Ronen Sen: Why is there so much emotion on both sides? Because, very frankly, you find that the dramatic evolution in the U.S. position has caught most people off balance. From being the principal motivating force and main architect of a global non-proliferation regime established about three decades ago, and aimed principally at India, the U.S. has itself become the principal catalyst for exempting India from this regime. Which means an India-specific exemption from the application of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers’ Group) guidelines, and from the application of the requirement of full-scope safeguards. People haven’t been able to come to terms with it.
Given the background of Tarapur, given the cumulative background of old mindsets, questions are being raised -- can the Americans be trusted, have they got their own agenda, is this a Trojan horse, what does it really mean? Others who just can’t believe what is happening, or do not want to believe what is happening, are trying to minimize its significance by saying one should not link India-U.S. relations to these developments.
There are, of course, some in both countries who are Pavlovian in their negative responses, but they constitute a minority. Changes in perception take a longer period of time. So in an interim period there is still a gap between reality and perception. This is one aspect. The second aspect is that this agreement undoubtedly marks the highest point in U.S.-India relations, the highest in the last six decades.
Thirdly, it is the culmination of a process envisioned in the NSSP. Fourthly, whether they want to acknowledge it or not, people recognize that no other country other than the U.S. can bring about a change in the international regime to accommodate India.
Fifthly, this is going to have an impact on technological cooperation—in terms of high technologies, dual-use and defense technologies.
Sixthly, it will help us diversify our energy portfolio and promote energy security, a vital aspect of our national security as well as indispensable for our continued economic growth.
Seventhly, it will reduce our dependence on fossil fuels—which will have a positive environmental impact. Eighthly, in terms of our overall relations between India and the U.S., this is a historic milestone, which manifests both in terms of symbolism and substance, the strength and dynamism of our strategic partnership.
This partnership will be not only of mutual benefit but will have a global impact. I could go on enumerating other positive implications. These have been realized much better in most other countries in the world than in India itself.
Source: Outlook Magazin