TEHRAN – In this exclusive interview with Tehran Times, Lourival Sant'Anna, Brazilian war correspondent, international affairs analyst for CNN Brasil, and columnist for Estadão, examines the strategic, political, and geopolitical dimensions of the recent US-Israel aggression against Iran.

Having reported from some of the world’s most volatile conflict zones, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, Sant’Anna argues that the conflict is not merely a military confrontation but also a battle of narratives aimed at shaping political legitimacy and public perception. He discusses Iran’s asymmetric warfare doctrine, the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz, the limits of US military power, and the growing influence of external actors such as China and Russia in shaping the trajectory of the crisis.

The following is the full text of the interview:

You have suggested that both Iranian and U.S. actions in this conflict can be “performative” or designed to shape perception. To what extent do you see this war as a contest of narratives rather than a purely military confrontation?

War is the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz famously put it. Trump thought he would leave a profound mark on history by changing the Iranian government, a “quick win” suggested to him by Netanyahu. It did not happen, and now the U.S. president is struggling to find a politically acceptable way out of this quagmire. The Iranian government understands that and prioritizes making sure the U.S. pays the highest possible economic and political price, in order to discourage future attacks on Iran. Therefore, the two sides are trying to shape opposite perceptions: on the U.S. side, that this war was worth the human and economic cost; on the Iranian side, that it was not worth it for the Americans. That is why it is so difficult for both sides to reach an agreement: each seeks to prove the exact opposite of the other.

You noted that Iran seeks to “maximize the cost” of U.S. and Israeli actions. Would you characterize this as a coherent long-term doctrine of asymmetric warfare, and how effective has it been so far?

Yes. Considering the stark asymmetry between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance, Iran has been remarkably successful in maximizing the cost for its adversaries. Its use of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage is proof of the strategic value of straits throughout history, from the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century BCE to the Gallipoli Campaign of World War I. In both cases the Dardanelles proved decisive. The fact that the IRGC managed to preserve its speedboats despite the bombardment of the Iranian Navy, together with the new reality created by the widespread use of drones, has enabled Iran to maintain control over that chokepoint. And yes, this is an important lesson about the relative nature of conventional military superiority. Ukraine had already demonstrated that against Russia in the Black Sea. Now analysts are studying what this means for China’s ambitions in the Taiwan Strait and for American contingency planning regarding the Strait of Malacca in a hypothetical conflict with China.

You have highlighted the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz in influencing global energy markets. In your view, is Iran’s approach primarily aimed at deterrence, economic coercion, or forcing diplomatic concessions?

I think it is all three. Iran’s conventional missile program and its allies— Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen's Ansarallah movement, and Iraqi resistance groups — have proved insufficient as deterrents, whereas Hormuz has shown itself to be decisive. And that is, of course, because of its enormous economic impact. The aim is also to obtain concessions in the negotiations over the nuclear program. So all three elements play a role simultaneously.

Despite U.S. military superiority, you have pointed to significant limitations on its ability to escalate. What are the key structural constraints—political, economic, or geopolitical—that prevent Washington from translating military force into decisive outcomes?

The U.S.’s main structural constraint in this case is political. The proximity of the midterm elections, combined with the deep unpopularity of this war, exerts enormous pressure on Trump to shorten the conflict. American voters’ frustration has both an economic component — the rising cost of living aggravated by the energy shock caused by this war — and a political one: Trump’s unfulfilled promise not to engage in “endless wars.”
There are also geopolitical constraints: the lack of enthusiasm among U.S. allies — with the exception of Israel — to support this offensive war, and the way China and Russia are taking advantage of the situation. China, by playing an arbiter role thanks to its economic influence over Iran and its leverage over Pakistan, the main mediator in the conflict. Russia, by increasing its revenues through higher energy exports. The expenditure of roughly half of America’s most sophisticated missile stockpile against Iran weakens Trump’s position ahead of his upcoming summit with Xi Jinping, not least because replenishing that arsenal requires critical minerals over which China holds a near monopoly.

You have argued that intelligence assessments suggested Iran was far from acquiring nuclear weapons. How does this affect the credibility of U.S. and Israeli justifications for military action?

This is one of the most obvious weaknesses in the justification for this war. Trump himself announced the “complete obliteration” of the Iranian nuclear program following the bombardments in June last year. Therefore, the U.S. president’s justification for this latest war undermines his own credibility. 
In technical terms, enriched uranium is a necessary but insufficient condition for building a nuclear weapon. Highly sophisticated metallurgy, triggering systems, and warhead miniaturization capabilities are also required, and there is no evidence that Iran has acquired those capabilities.

You observed that Iran uses time strategically in negotiations. Does this suggest that Tehran currently holds a stronger negotiating position, or is this leverage limited by economic pressure?

There is, of course, a time limit to this leverage because of the economic impact of the blockade on the Iranian population and on Iran’s physical capacity to store its oil — or otherwise the enormous cost of shutting down oil wells. But in this case, what matters most is which side has the greater tolerance for pain. And it seems clear that the U.S. and its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf have less of it than Iran.

You have emphasized China’s role due to its dependence on Iranian energy. How do you assess the influence of external actors such as China in shaping the outcome of this conflict?

For China, any war or global crisis is economically damaging because of its dependence on imported energy and food, as well as on exports. However, this particular crisis favors China geopolitically because it gives Xi leverage vis-à-vis Trump, thanks to Beijing’s influence over Iran and Pakistan and its resulting arbitrage power over the conflict. In addition, the depletion of the American arsenal makes U.S. dependence on Chinese critical minerals even more acute.

Based on your experience covering multiple wars, do you believe that a military solution to the Iran conflict is achievable, or is the situation structurally inclined toward a negotiated outcome?

I think resolving this dispute is extremely difficult because of a combination of factors: Trump’s ambition to “leave a mark on history” by forcing an Iranian capitulation and securing a nuclear agreement better than the JCPOA, at a moment when Iran feels it has more leverage than it did in 2015; Netanyahu’s influence over Trump and other Republicans, together with his determination to weaken Iran as much as possible; and the Iranian government’s firm determination to preserve its pride and honor and deter any future attacks, regardless of the costs Iran may have to endure in the present.