Indyk, Ambassador, Zionist and Spy
September 27, 2000 - 0:0
TEHRAN The recent scandal in the U.S. State Department and the fact that Martin Indyk was stripped of his State Department security clearance brings to mind the case of Jonathan Pollard. Indyk climbed the rungs of the political ladder overnight, serving two terms as U.S. ambassador to Israel while holding his position as U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the 90s. The presence of Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Martin Indyk, William Cohen and Dennis Ross at high decision-making levels in the U.S., and the massive and competitive effort of presidential and congressional candidates in the U.S. to impart an image that they are close to the Jews is indicative of the bitter fact that in the U.S. one cannot speak about only one Zionist lobby.
Rather, one should admit that the Zionists are the main decision-makers in U.S. foreign policy. Martin Indyk is the designer of the "dual containment" policy toward Iran and Iraq, and one of the key elements in the 90s in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In the research team, which began its activity after the Intifadah, along with American and Israeli professors and army men, he attended to possible solutions to the Intifadah. One can boldly state that the Oslo accords have been the result of the efforts of that group.
Indyk himself took the responsibility for executing the agreement.
Whether as U.S. ambassador to Israel or as deputy secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Indyk made special effort for shaping this policy. On the one hand, Indyk pushed for limiting the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the international scene (so as to deal a blow to the spiritual support for Intifadah); on the other hand, with his sleight of hand he brought the Oslo accords to their present state, which more than seven years since the signing of the agreement an agreement which could have liberated 90 percent of lands occupied in 1967 it gave 40 percent (of regions A and B) to the self-rule government.
This incident shows that American foreign policy toward the Middle East peace process is implemented through a Zionist U.S.
secretary of state and her deputy (Indyk), who has played a role both as deputy secretary and as ambassador. From a different point of view, one can say that in the exchange of information between Indyk and Tel Aviv there has been so much excess that U.S. officials, who normally act secretively in this regard, have not been able to hold this a secret. Otherwise, secret relations between Zionist Jews in the United States who hold sensitive positions will not end with Indyk. This is not the first and it will not be the last.
Rather, one should admit that the Zionists are the main decision-makers in U.S. foreign policy. Martin Indyk is the designer of the "dual containment" policy toward Iran and Iraq, and one of the key elements in the 90s in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In the research team, which began its activity after the Intifadah, along with American and Israeli professors and army men, he attended to possible solutions to the Intifadah. One can boldly state that the Oslo accords have been the result of the efforts of that group.
Indyk himself took the responsibility for executing the agreement.
Whether as U.S. ambassador to Israel or as deputy secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Indyk made special effort for shaping this policy. On the one hand, Indyk pushed for limiting the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the international scene (so as to deal a blow to the spiritual support for Intifadah); on the other hand, with his sleight of hand he brought the Oslo accords to their present state, which more than seven years since the signing of the agreement an agreement which could have liberated 90 percent of lands occupied in 1967 it gave 40 percent (of regions A and B) to the self-rule government.
This incident shows that American foreign policy toward the Middle East peace process is implemented through a Zionist U.S.
secretary of state and her deputy (Indyk), who has played a role both as deputy secretary and as ambassador. From a different point of view, one can say that in the exchange of information between Indyk and Tel Aviv there has been so much excess that U.S. officials, who normally act secretively in this regard, have not been able to hold this a secret. Otherwise, secret relations between Zionist Jews in the United States who hold sensitive positions will not end with Indyk. This is not the first and it will not be the last.