TEHRAN – Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently agreed to resume cooperation after the agency's inspectors left Iran during a U.S.-Israeli bombardment campaign on Iranian nuclear facilities in June, and were subsequently barred from re-entry. 

However, the agreement's implementation remains uncertain, as Iranians have stated they will halt the process if Europe does not cease its efforts to reinstate pre-JCPOA UN sanctions against Iran.

Against this backdrop of heightened confrontation, Tehran Times spoke with Yosri Abu Shadi, a former senior inspector at the IAEA, to examine the Agency’s neutrality, Western double standards, and the prospects for a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone in West Asia.

Below is the full text of the interview: 

How would you compare the IAEA’s approach toward Iran today with its approach during earlier leaderships, such as Mohamed ElBaradei or Yukiya Amano?

The pressure on the IAEA is the same irrespective of the director-general. But sure, the selection of director-general always comes with some support from the West, particularly the United States.

There was no one who came really neutral, irrespective of his country. Even ElBaradei from Egypt was much closer to the West. Hans Blix, at certain points, yes, in some conflicts like the North Korea conflict, he was accepting all the IAEA intelligence sources and also all accusations against North Korea. In Iraq, he tried to be neutral, actually, and he said that the program of Iraq became level zero, although it was not that much, actually.

But anyway, currently, Mr. Grossi, in his last report against Iran, went too far. ElBaradei was similar, but maybe not that far like Grossi. The last report of May 31, Grossi used many false indications against Iran as violations, which are extremely trivial reasons for such violations.

And unfortunately, he surely accepted the pressure of the West, and his report of May 31 was highly politicized, non-technical. That is how it is. Continue with question two, about how the U.S. is pressurizing the IAEA and their director-general.

To what extent do the U.S. and European governments exert pressure on the IAEA Secretariat and inspectors in shaping the narrative about Iran?

Actually, we have to remember that 25% of the budget of all international organizations is paid by the United States. Actually, it is the highest contributor to all these international organizations. However, in particular, the IAEA safeguards, which is really the main difficulty or problem, because in most of the other departments, like technical cooperation, like safety, the IAEA plays a very good role, a very positive role, neutral.

There is not much pressure, except in the Department of Safeguards, because they have inspections, they have witnesses, and all countries they are visiting should be following the NPT treaty. But that is why it was unfortunately sometimes misused to accuse some countries without real evidence, starting with North Korea, actually, and then Iraq, especially the reactivation of its nuclear program, which was not true. And then Iran, at the beginning, with a lot of false indications.

And then Syria, when they claimed falsely that there was a nuclear reactor destroyed by Israel and built by North Korea, which I proved until today was a false statement by the CIA and others. So there is surely political pressure. And in most cases, that political pressure prevails, unfortunately, which affects the IAEA’s neutrality.

How transparent is the IAEA’s decision-making process when drafting reports? Are member states allowed to challenge political language that goes beyond technical findings?

There is surely strong political pressure, particularly for the Safeguards Department. The reports coming from the IAEA, unfortunately, are not always technical. Unfortunately, they contain exaggeration, like, for example, the environmental samples, which always accuse many countries by finding micrograms of uranium or plutonium, and that is taken as a strong indication that the country is violating and is doing a nuclear weapons program.

However, when we come, really, technically, to this environmental sample of micrograms, we found it absolutely could not be used as a real indicator. There is cross-contamination, fabrication, pollution, many things. It should not even be used as an accusation against any country.

Unfortunately, this particular method was created by the Americans and exaggerated for every country they are willing to accuse. That is one. Of course, the country should actually object to such false reports.
And that’s what’s happening, really. In almost all cases, we heard it: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and even Egypt.

Western media often portray Iran as being “on the brink” of building a nuclear weapon. From your professional perspective, how accurate or misleading are these portrayals?

Iran definitely has a capability to be a nuclear weapon state, particularly for highly enriched uranium. They proved it. They did already 60 percent.
I’m 100 percent sure they can make the 90 percent very easily. They have now close to 500 kilograms of uranium at 60 percent enrichment, which means they can have even more than 10 atomic bombs. The manufacture — Iran is well-developed in military technology, which means explosives and others.

So, manufacturing a nuclear weapon by Iran is not really a technical problem. It is a political point because Iran has this fatwa from its Leader many years ago that the nuclear weapon is forbidden by God because it destroys humanity. Now, if this decision is somehow suspended, then sure, Iran has the capability to do it.

Israel is not a signatory to the NPT and has an undeclared nuclear arsenal, yet it faces no IAEA inspections. How does this selective approach affect the credibility of the Agency?

Unfortunately, when the NPT was initiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, it did not obligate all states to sign. That is, all states should not have nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, they left it optional.

Plus, they also allowed the five nuclear weapon states, the P5 states, to have nuclear weapons. Of course, with the understanding that in the future they should really eliminate them. And we see now more than 55 years from the start, they didn’t actually eliminate their nuclear weapons.

Now, today, we have over 187 states having signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states — like Iran, like Egypt, like all countries in the Middle East except Israel. Of course, in addition to Pakistan, India, and North Korea, which signed and then withdrew.

So, because this treaty allows not signing, Israel didn’t sign. And it is all accusations to others because they signed and violated, like Iraq. But Egypt also signed. Israel didn’t sign. So, that is unfortunately the bias of this treaty.
And, of course, also to allow the five nuclear weapon states, the P5, to continue after all these 55 years having thousands of nuclear weapons which can destroy the whole world.

Could a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East realistically be achieved if the IAEA does not hold Israel accountable?

The nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was started by Egypt and Iran many years ago to try to realize in this region that there will be no state having nuclear weapons. However, as we know, Israel is the only state in the Middle East having nuclear weapons and not signing the treaty of the NPT.
Now, when in 1995 they extended the request for the extension of the NPT, there was some refusal because Israel didn’t sign. However, at the end, they said, okay, we shall add an annex to say all the countries in the Middle East will join this nuclear-free zone agreement, including Israel. Israel, of course, didn’t accept that.

However, all Arab states and Middle East states signed the definitive version of the NPT treaty. That was, in my view, a big mistake, because as we see, Israel never considered this annex, which was actually a condition for the extension of this treaty. I always proposed to Middle East countries, particularly the Arab countries, to threaten to withdraw from the NPT, because this condition was never realized in all these years.
So, I don’t think, till now, it is supported by my view, but let’s see in the near future.

What role do personal ambitions of Directors General (such as Grossi) play in shaping the Agency’s political stance?

If you talk about Grossi, his role in shaping the Agency’s political stance — actually, the Agency’s political stance, unfortunately, in particular for safeguards, was much affected by the strong pressure from the West.
Now, Grossi is just following instructions, and he had personal ambitions to be the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He thought that. In fact, before May 31, he had some chances.

After May 31, with his very highly political report against Iran, I highly doubt that man will go on, particularly with Iran’s accusation that he already violated the UN officer’s oath of secrecy. They have the proof to say he did it and passed secret information to Israel, and he didn’t deny that. Now Iran has a complaint in the UN Security Council to investigate that. I hope they will do that, because at the end, he is just an officer of the United Nations.

He had the oath not to reveal any information. If Iran really has this evidence that he did, they should submit it, and he should actually go to court and be punished. But, let’s see.

I have very much doubt that he has a chance now to be the Secretary-General of the UN.

Do you see a risk of the IAEA becoming increasingly irrelevant if it continues to be seen as politicized?

Yes, unfortunately, I’m not happy with the way of safeguards. For all other departments, the role of the IAEA is very good and very helpful, especially to developing countries when the IAEA provides them radioisotopes and equipment and facilities to help in hospitals, industry, agriculture, and also in the safety of nuclear facilities, especially nuclear reactors.

So, the IAEA has a very good role. I hope it will continue this way. But the Department of Safeguards has to be considered differently, because all the politics affect that department in particular and it is misused.

Iraq was destroyed, actually, because of the wrong reports coming from the CIA, although the IAEA position was somehow a little bit different, except for the second time. Unfortunately, ElBaradei was not that neutral because of the war of 2003. I hope that the IAEA should be fully neutral and not dependent on the budget of any country. This should be really separated, and let’s see how is the future of it.

Having worked inside the system, do you still believe the IAEA can fulfill its founding principles of impartiality and non-discrimination?

I have hope for that, but let’s be practical. I hope also the share of the non-Western countries in the budget of the IAEA will be increased.
We see now China became the second-largest contributor in the budget after the United States. They pay almost 15%. So, it’s not a big difference.
Now, if that continues, then the IAEA will be free from American or Western influence. I hope that will happen soon, because I hope the IAEA will continue as it is. And we shall see.

If the Agency continues on its current path, what risks do you foresee for global nuclear governance in the next decade?

If you mean really that if the IAEA continues the way it is now, the safeguards, and this accepting the pressure of the West, I think it will be very risky. I think the whole safeguard system can collapse if it continues like this.
And I hope and wish that one time we have a DG, Director-General, who is really free from any political influence on the Agency or on himself. I hope it will continue, and I hope we can see a neutral IAEA organization without the influence of any other body.