Fresh testimony from survivors of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena has intensified scrutiny over the March 4 U.S. attack that sank the vessel near Sri Lanka, raising serious questions about whether the strike constituted a deliberate war crime and whether India and Sri Lanka played indirect roles by delaying safe harbor for the ship.

The new evidence comes from Commander Abuzar Zarri, captain of the Dena, and the vessel’s first officer, who appeared in an Iranian television report released on April 21. Zarri, who had previously been reported dead, appeared injured and using a crutch. Their account offers the first direct testimony from survivors of the attack and strengthens allegations that the U.S. Navy carried out a calculated “double-tap” strike designed to maximize casualties.

The Dena, a Mowj-class frigate of the Iranian Navy, had been returning from India’s MILAN 2026 international naval exercise in Visakhapatnam, where it participated alongside naval forces from several countries, including the United States and Russia. According to Zarri, the Iranian ship had been disarmed as a condition of participation.

“One of the exercise’s conditions was that missiles and torpedoes should not be carried by participating vessels,” Zarri said, confirming that the frigate was not carrying anti-submarine torpedoes or strategic missiles. This meant the ship was unable to defend itself against underwater attack.

This detail is crucial because the U.S. Navy had also participated in MILAN 2026 and was fully aware of the Dena’s disarmed status.

According to the captain, the first U.S. torpedo struck the ship at 3:35 a.m. on March 4, damaging its shaft and propeller and leaving the vessel immobile. “We lost our mobility,” Zarri said, adding that there were no immediate fatalities from the first strike.

For the next 90 minutes, the crew attempted emergency procedures while gathering on the aft deck, preparing for evacuation or surrender. The first officer said he ordered sailors to assemble on the helicopter landing pad while he checked the ship to ensure no one was left behind.

At 5:06 a.m., a second torpedo struck the aft section directly beneath the assembled crew.

“The second torpedo killed 104 of our friends, our comrades, our dear brothers,” Zarri said. “That was their intention.”

The timing and location of the second strike have become central to accusations of a war crime. Critics argue that once the ship had been disabled and the crew was visibly preparing to abandon ship, firing again violated customary naval warfare rules. The second strike, they argue, was not aimed at neutralizing a military threat but at causing mass casualties.

The attack occurred just minutes before the Dena was expected to enter Sri Lankan territorial waters near Galle, where it hoped to find protection from U.S. pursuit.

This has shifted attention to the role of India and Sri Lanka.

Before the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran formally began on February 28, Iranian officials had already requested safe harbor for the Dena and its two escort vessels—IRIS Lavan and IRIS Bushehr— from Sri Lanka and when it refused to agree, from India. 

Sri Lankan President Anura Dissanayake later confirmed that Colombo received the request on February 26. Iranian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Alireza Delkhosh has said the request came even earlier, during meetings between Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani and Sri Lankan Navy chief Vice Admiral Kanchana Banagoda during the MILAN exercise.

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar later admitted that Iran had requested docking permission on February 28 and that India granted permission for all three vessels on March 1. However, only IRIS Lavan was ultimately allowed to dock at Kochi.

No satisfactory explanation has been provided for why Dena and Bushehr were denied immediate access.

This contradiction has fueled accusations that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Jaishankar knowingly delayed sanctuary despite understanding the danger facing the Iranian ships.

Geographically, the delay is difficult to explain. If the squadron had been near Hambantota or Galle in Sri Lanka, the Dena could have reached Kochi in less than 24 hours—or even faster if India had granted access to Tuticorin, a much closer Indian port. At full speed, safety could have been reached within 14 hours.

Instead, the frigate remained exposed in international waters until it was struck.

Former Sri Lankan naval chief Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara has publicly criticized Colombo’s delay, saying authorities could have saved lives had they acted promptly. Iranian officials have similarly warned neighboring countries not to become “complicit in the crimes of the United States and Israel.”

Following the sinking, the diplomatic fallout widened.

Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has acknowledged strong U.S. pressure to block repatriation, including threats involving trade concessions and tariff relief. Reuters has also reported that Washington opposed the return of the survivors and coordinated closely with Israeli diplomatic channels.

Meanwhile, India has faced criticism for appearing to align itself with U.S. and Israeli strategic objectives against Iran, abandoning its long-standing policy of non-alignment. 

Russia has also entered the picture by offering Sri Lanka expanded energy cooperation, while Iran has promised oil and fuel supplies for “friendly countries” that resist Western pressure.

On March 13, 183 members of the Lavan crew were repatriated from Kochi to Iran; on April 14, the 32 Dena survivors and 206 members of the Bushehr crew were allowed to fly home from Sri Lanka. The larger political question remains: whether the sinking of IRIS Dena was merely a wartime naval strike—or a coordinated act enabled by diplomatic obstruction.

For Tehran, the answer appears increasingly clear.

What happened off the coast of Sri Lanka, Iranian officials argue, was not simply an attack on a warship. It was the deliberate destruction of a disarmed and disabled vessel and its evacuating crew  prevented from reaching safety—and a test of who in the region chose neutrality, and who did not.

Further reading:

For more evidence and detailed reconstruction of the events, see the series of articles published on:

March 24, https://johnhelmer.net/the-sinking-of-the-iranian-frigate-iris-dena-was-murder-executed-by-the-us-navy-and-calculated-then-covered-up-by-the-indian-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister/,  
  
on March 29, https://johnhelmer.net/fate-of-the-iran-navy-squadron-india-continues-to-side-against-iran-joins-us-pressure-against-sri-lankan-neutrality-russia-offers-oil-rescue-for-sri-lanka-premium-for-india/, 

and on April 21 , https://johnhelmer.net/the-murder-of-the-iris-dena-first-public-testimony-by-the-surviving-captain-and-first-officer/ .