The actions and threats perpetrated by the US and Israeli regimes in their aggression against Iran during the Second and Third Imposed Wars— inter alia, encompassing the assassination of Iranian citizens, the assassination of the martyred leader of Iran whose assassination profoundly grieved millions, and notably, the massacres of the little children of Shadjareh Tayebeh, a primary school in the city of Minab and the civilian population of the city of Lamerd, both in southern Iran, alongside systemic attacks on critical infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and communication networks—constitute unequivocal war crimes under international criminal law. Supported by extensive legal substantiation, these acts warrant the most severe punitive measures. Consequently, this provides a robust foundation for examining the criminal liability of these regimes, with a specific focus on two individuals; Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Within the framework of international criminal law, beyond the state responsibility of aggressor regimes, individual criminal liability is not confined solely to the direct perpetrators of an incursion. Rather, individuals who have played a substantive role in the conceptualisation, planning, authorisation, facilitation, or sponsorship of such criminal enterprises are equally subject to legal prosecution. Therefore, the threats and hostilities orchestrated by the aforementioned regimes and individuals—specifically Trump and Netanyahu—regarding their aggressive and criminal acts against Iran, which represent definitive war crimes, necessitate a rigorous judicial process. This process must be predicated upon the systematic collation of evidence, the substantiation of the elements of the crime, and strict adherence to the standards of a fair trial. Such an undertaking establishes the legal framework for retribution and provides a legal basis for seeking justice for the victims on behalf of the noble Iranian nation.

The imperative to establish a judicial mechanism for the adjudication of war crimes is fundamentally anchored in the principle of the “fight against impunity” within international law. Post-Second World War developments—specifically the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, and the subsequent advent of international criminal courts—have decisively demonstrated that neither political office nor military supremacy can serve as a shield against individual criminal accountability (Bassiouni, 2011). Furthermore, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 impose a binding obligation upon states, in response to grave breaches of international humanitarian law, to take all necessary measures to identify, pursue, and prosecute the perpetrators, or alternatively, to facilitate their extradition (Geneva Convention, 1949).

Accordingly, the establishment of a national tribunal to investigate these events, document evidence, determine the culpability of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and legally pursue the perpetrators constitutes a fundamental obligation of the Iranian state in safeguarding the lives, security, and essential rights of its citizens. Such a process would not only vindicate the rights of the victims but also lay the groundwork for a robust, internationally recognised legal case.

1. The Capacity of the International Legal Framework Regarding the War Criminal

To prevent war, mitigate its consequences, and ensure the accountability of perpetrators, the international legal system has developed a coherent body of rules across three domains; the prohibition of aggression, international humanitarian law, and individual criminal responsibility. Following the Kampala Amendments, the crime of aggression was recognised as the fourth core crime falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC); consequently, the planning, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression by political or military leaders can incur international criminal liability (Assembly of States Parties, 2010). This corpus of rules forms the jurisprudential foundation for prosecuting international crimes in both domestic and international tribunals.

The most fundamental basis of this framework is the United Nations Charter, which, by proscribing the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, has firmly established the prohibition of aggression as a cardinal rule of international law (UN Charter, 1945, Article 2(4)). This constitutes the primary and most egregious violation committed by the American and Israeli regimes during both the second and third imposed wars. Accordingly, any use of force must align with the principle of military necessity and may only occur following the authorisation of military action by appropriate international institutions. This implies that force is permissible only to the extent strictly required to achieve a legitimate military objective; actions lacking military necessity or bearing a purely punitive character fall outside the permissible bounds of international law (Dinstein, 2021).

Within the realm of international humanitarian law, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977—particularly Additional Protocol I—constitute the primary framework for the protection of the wounded, the sick, prisoners of war, and civilians. Many of these rules are now recognised as customary international law, rendering them universally binding upon all states (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2005; Additional Protocol I, 1977). By emphasising the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the proscription of acts intended to spread terror among civilian populations, and the immunity of civilian objects, these instruments establish a clear legal framework for limiting the methods and means of warfare (Additional Protocol I, 1977).

Furthermore, the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly forbids collective punishment, asserting that criminal responsibility is strictly individual in nature; no group or population may be subjected to punitive measures simply by virtue of their regional or ethnic affiliation (Geneva Convention IV, 1949, Article 33). Beyond the protection of persons, international humanitarian law affords special protection to critical infrastructure—such as hospitals, educational institutions, water installations, power plants, dams, and other facilities upon which the survival of the civilian population depends—permitting them to be targeted only under exceptionally narrow circumstances (Additional Protocol I, 1977). In addition to treaty law, customary international law—forged through the consistent practice of states and their belief in a corresponding legal obligation (opinio juris)—plays a crucial role in binding states to principles such as the prohibition of targeting civilians, the ban on indiscriminate attacks, and the duty to take precautionary measures (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005). Certain among these principles, notably the prohibitions against aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and many war crimes, possess the status of jus cogens (peremptory norms) in international law, from which no derogation by any state or treaty is permitted (Cassese, 2013).

Alongside the international responsibility of states, international criminal law places heavy emphasis upon individual criminal responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility dictates that military commanders and superior officials are criminally liable not only for their direct orders but also for their knowledge of crimes committed by subordinates and their subsequent failure to prevent those acts or punish the perpetrators—a principle now codified in Article 28 of the Rome Statute (Rome Statute, 1998).

Moreover, pursuant to Article 25 of the same statute, natural persons may be prosecuted for committing, ordering, planning, instigating, aiding, abetting, or otherwise significantly participating in the commission of international crimes (ibid.). The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), through its development of the joint criminal enterprise (JCE) doctrine, further demonstrated that criminal liability is not restricted to the direct physical perpetrators; rather, anyone who plays a substantial role in the design, direction, or execution of a criminal plan can be held culpable (ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Tadić, 1999). These legal foundations provide the necessary mechanisms to file indictments against Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu for the commission of numerous crimes within Iran, as well as for their persistent threats against the Iranian state and its people.

2. The Framework of Charges and Legal Evidence

Translating the allegations against the American and Israeli regimes—as well as the individual conduct of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu—into actionable judicial cases requires that the behaviours attributed to these individuals and their respective governments be analysed within the context of specific criminal offences, invocable legal bases, and mechanisms for prosecution. The framework proposed herein does not constitute an exhaustive catalogue of crimes, but rather serves as a preliminary paradigm for organising evidence and delineating avenues of investigation. The definitive imputation of any specific criminal charge necessitates formal inquiry, rigorous evidentiary assessment, the establishment of a causal nexus, the determination of each accused’s degree of complicity, and strict adherence to fair trial standards. Nevertheless, the systematic recording and classification of these instances represent the foundational step in compiling a coherent legal dossier, preserving evidence, and enabling subsequent legal pursuit at both the national and international levels.

Within this framework, the primary axis of charges pertains to the act of military aggression itself and operations directed against the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The most critical areas warranting investigation encompass military aggression against Iran, the planning of or participation in acts of aggression, the attempted assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, strikes against the highest-ranking political officials aimed at collapsing the state's governance structure, the simultaneous assassination of military commanders and scientists, the execution of decapitation strikes against command structures, and public threats to assassinate Iranian leaders. These actions are to be evaluated under core principles such as the prohibition of the threat or use of force as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the right to life articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the principle of non-intervention, individual criminal responsibility, the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), alongside Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Articles 7 and 25 of the Rome Statute (UN Charter, Art. 2(4); ICCPR, Art. 6; Rome Statute, Arts. 7 and 25). Such conduct provides the basis for scrutinising the culpability of high-ranking political and military officials in the design, authorisation, endorsement, or execution of these operations.

A further category of charges is dedicated to targeted assassinations and the systematic eradication of scientific, military, and political infrastructure. This includes the massacre of children and students—most notably in the attack on the Minab school—the assassination of senior officials of the Islamic Republic, military commanders, nuclear and scientific researchers, civilian personnel within government institutions, and even the family members of political figures, culminating in the aggregate slaughter of over 4,000 Iranian citizens. The jurisprudential foundation for these charges rests upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Fourth Geneva Convention, international human rights law, Article 6 of the ICCPR, Articles 8, 25, and 28 of the Rome Statute, the legal frameworks governing targeted killings, the doctrine of command responsibility, and the rules protecting civilian populations (Convention on the Rights of the Child; Fourth Geneva Convention; ICCPR, Art. 6; Rome Statute, Arts. 8, 25, and 28).

Within this paradigm, beyond the direct perpetrators, the role of political and military authorities in the conceptualisation, direction, and provision of intelligence, operational, or political support for these actions is subject to rigorous examination. The third axis encompasses attacks on civilians, critical infrastructure, and civilian property. The most salient issues in this section include the killing of non-combatants, strikes against scientific, educational, and medical centres, attacks on nuclear facilities, the destruction of vital infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, the instillation of terror among the civilian populace, strikes on residential zones, collective punishment, the devastation of public property, and threats to annihilate national infrastructure or energy facilities.

These acts are assessable under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, customary international humanitarian law, Articles 51 and 52 of Additional Protocol I, and Article 8 of the Rome Statute. They necessitate meticulous documentation of human, economic, and infrastructural casualties, coupled with a rigorous military-legal analysis of each individual attack (Fourth Geneva Convention 1949; Additional Protocol I 1977; Additional Protocol I, Arts. 51 and 52; Rome Statute, Art. 8).

Aiding and abetting, incitement, the facilitation of crimes, the exploitation of political influence to obstruct international investigations and accountability, the violation of the principle of individual responsibility, and threats of attack against the Iranian nation, its civilisation, or its infrastructure can be investigated as independent bases for criminal liability (Rome Statute, Art. 25; Nuremberg Principles; principle of combating impunity; principle of the prohibition of the threat of force).

The juridical examination of the actions attributed to the American and Israeli regimes must not be confined to isolated incidents; rather, they must be analysed as an interconnected continuum of political decisions, military aggressions, intelligence operations, and their ensuing human consequences. From this perspective, the compilation of a comprehensive national dossier not only serves to establish the truth and preserve evidence, but also provides the essential groundwork for determining individual and organisational culpability, facilitating subsequent legal recourse before international tribunals.

3. The Jurisdiction of the Judicial System of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Adjudicating International Crimes

International criminal law is predicated on the foundational principle that national judicial systems bear primary responsibility for the prosecution and punishment of international crimes, with international bodies assuming only a subsidiary role. This approach is codified in the Rome Statute through the principle of ‘complementarity’. Under this principle, the International Criminal Court (ICC) exercises jurisdiction only when a state with the requisite authority is unwilling or unable to conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions (Rome Statute, 1998, Article 17). Consequently, an efficient domestic legal system for addressing international crimes is integral to the architecture of international criminal justice. Within the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Constitution—by emphasising the establishment of justice, the protection of public rights, the independence of the judiciary, and the mandate to redress grievances—provides the necessary framework for the exercise of judicial authority (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles 156 and 159). The Islamic Penal Code (2013) further regulates the general principles of criminal jurisdiction; it does not confine the competence of Iranian courts merely to crimes committed within the national territory, but also provides for the adjudication of specific offences committed abroad.

The most significant basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is the territorial principle, according to which all crimes committed within the land, maritime, and air territories, or any other domain under the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran, fall within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Complementing this is the principle of personal jurisdiction, which permits the state—under stipulated conditions—to exercise authority over crimes committed by its nationals abroad, or, in certain instances, over crimes perpetrated against Iranian nationals. Furthermore, the protective principle enables the state to prosecute, within the framework of domestic law, acts occurring outside the national territory that threaten the security, independence, sovereignty, or essential interests of the country, even when committed by foreign nationals (Ryngaert, 2015).

A related concept is that of real or security jurisdiction, which, in many legal systems, is applied to crimes such as espionage, terrorism, forgery of official documents, and other offences against the security and existence of the state. Conversely, universal jurisdiction is predicated on the nature of the crime rather than territory, citizenship, or national interest. On this basis, crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture—by virtue of their violation of the fundamental values of the international community—may be adjudicated by the courts of any state, provided there is a legal basis for doing so (O’Keefe, 2004).

In reality, domestic law and international criminal law are not competing systems; rather, they are mutually reinforcing, governed by the principle of complementarity. The more robust the legislative foundations and the more efficient the operational mechanisms of a national judicial system, the greater the prospect for achieving criminal justice and countering impunity. On this basis, the establishment of a national court to address charges related to the crimes of the two aggressor regimes and the two aforementioned individuals is not a substitute for the International Criminal Court, but rather a constituent part of the complementary process of international criminal justice (Rome Statute, 1998).

A domestic court can facilitate this process by legally documenting events, preserving evidence, recording testimonies, analysing documents, establishing the chain of responsibility, and constructing a cohesive case file, thereby providing a basis for international institutions, human rights organisations, and independent investigative mechanisms. Since international criminal law relies on the accumulation of evidence and the reliability of documentation, even assuming the existence of political obstacles to international proceedings, the construction of a robust case at the national level can preserve and strengthen the possibility of holding criminals accountable and subjecting them to criminal prosecution in the future.

4. The Jurisdiction of International Bodies in Addressing International Crimes

The distinction between State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility is a foundational principle of international law. A single act of conduct may trigger both the international responsibility of the State and the criminal liability of the individuals involved in its planning, ordering, preparation, or execution. Consequently, various international bodies and mechanisms, each operating with specific jurisdiction, function complementarily within the global system for combating international crimes.

The most significant permanent institution in this sphere is the International Criminal Court (ICC), established under the 1998 Rome Statute, which possesses jurisdiction over four core crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The Court operates on the principle of complementarity, intervening only when the State possessing jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to carry out genuine investigations and prosecutions (Rome Statute, 1998, Art. 17).

However, the Court’s jurisdiction is not absolute; it typically requires either the State where the crime was committed or the State of the accused's nationality to be a party to the Rome Statute, the ad hoc acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, or a referral of the situation by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, which applies even to non-member States (ibid., Arts. 13–15).

In parallel, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) serves as the venue for resolving disputes between States and, unlike the ICC, lacks the mandate to prosecute natural persons (Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945). Thus, State responsibility is adjudicated within the ICJ, while individual criminal responsibility is addressed by international criminal tribunals. Furthermore, the principle of universal jurisdiction represents a significant development in international criminal law; under this doctrine, certain crimes—including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture—may be prosecuted by the courts of any State, regardless of the locus of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator, provided such jurisdiction is incorporated into domestic law, due to the nature of these crimes as attacks upon the fundamental values of the international community.

Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the international community relied on ad hoc criminal tribunals to address widespread atrocities. The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), established pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, played a crucial role in developing international criminal law and solidifying principles such as command responsibility, individual criminal liability, and joint criminal enterprise (Cassese, 2013).

Subsequently, hybrid courts—incorporating both domestic and international judges and blending domestic and international law—such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, provided effective mechanisms for addressing crimes in contexts where neither the domestic judicial system alone was functional nor referral to the ICC was deemed feasible or desirable (Cryer et al., 2019).

While the UN Security Council is not a judicial body, it may, under its Chapter VII powers, refer a situation to the ICC upon determining a threat to international peace and security, or facilitate the establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals (UN, 1945). The experience of the Darfur and Libya referrals demonstrates that the Council can pave the way for international criminal prosecution even in relation to non-parties to the Rome Statute, although the exercise of this capacity is perpetually influenced by voting mechanisms and the veto power held by the Security Council’s permanent members (Schabas, 2020).

5. The Legal Process for Establishing a National Case

Establishing a criminal case against the political and military officials of a foreign state within the judicial system of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires a documented, legally rigorous process grounded in the principles of criminal procedure, rules of jurisdiction, and the standards of proof in international criminal law. Such a case must be built upon the thorough collection of evidence, the establishment of the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, the determination of individual responsibility, and adherence to the principles of a fair trial.

The first stage involves the formation of a national fact-finding commission, mandated with an independent legal remit to document events, scrutinise decision-making chains, identify direct and indirect perpetrators, examine documents, and gather testimonies. In contemporary law, fact-finding commissions are regarded as essential instruments for uncovering the truth, solidifying the legal record, and preparing the ground for judicial proceedings (Hayner, 2011). Following this, the collection and verification of evidence is of fundamental importance; as the mere occurrence of damage or loss of life is insufficient for attributing criminal liability, a demonstrable link must be established between the decision, the order, the action, and the criminal result. Consequently, military documents, official statements, satellite data, forensic reports, victim testimonies, and digital evidence must be recorded and preserved in strict accordance with the standards of chain of custody (International Criminal Court, 2019).

Upon the completion of investigations, the appointment of a special prosecutor serves to professionalise and consolidate the proceedings. The prosecutor must examine the elements of the alleged crimes—based on the principle of individual criminal responsibility—and issue an indictment. This document must precisely delineate the conduct of the accused, the extent of their knowledge and intent, and the legal grounds for the charges. Establishing a special criminal court would further necessitate the enactment of specific legislation to define its jurisdiction, rules of procedure, the composition of the judiciary, and the rights of the accused. Ultimately, a documented verdict from such a court, beyond its domestic implications, could be invoked in international proceedings, thereby facilitating the issuance of arrest warrants, international judicial cooperation, and cross-border legal pursuit (Bassiouni, 2015).

Conclusion: The End of American Exceptionalism and Lawlessness, and the Necessity of Prosecuting Aggressors

The civilisational and military authority of Islamic Iran has demonstrated to the world that no power, regardless of its political influence within international institutions or its geopolitical standing, will remain immune from accountability for its aggressions and crimes. The Islamic Republic of Iran has brought about many auspicious endings; one such achievement has been the termination of the era wherein terrorist and child-killing regimes—namely those of America and the Zionists—could rely on their political, media, and military supremacy to evade the legal repercussions of their actions. The emergence of Iran as a new power, combined with the proliferation of data recording and dissemination technologies and the state's enhanced capacity to pursue legal action against transnational crimes, has fundamentally challenged the traditional structure of impunity. No political official, even at the highest echelons of power, can remain under the illusion that their decisions will forever fall outside the scope of Iran’s criminal accountability.

Consequently, the establishment of a national tribunal within the Islamic Republic of Iran to adjudicate crimes committed against the Iranian people—with a focus on the martyred children and the martyred leader of Iran—utilises established domestic and international criminal legal frameworks to confront the culture of impunity rooted in exceptionalism and lawlessness. Furthermore, such an initiative represents a concerted effort against the entrenched notion that international criminal justice serves merely as an instrument for the will of dominant powers. Possessing the necessary legal, political, security, and regional capabilities, the Islamic Republic of Iran is positioned to initiate the documentation, prosecution, and pursuit of perpetrators of war crimes, whether this process proceeds under the aegis of international institutions or encounters political obstruction.

By articulating the principle of universal jurisdiction regarding international crimes whilst strictly upholding the requirements of a fair trial, the state will consolidate its standing within the evolving landscape of international criminal law. The message of this process is indisputable. The era of absolute impunity has concluded, and no political or military official shall evade historical and legal responsibility by seeking refuge behind a flag, military might, or the patronage of allies.

If grounded in credible evidence, judicial standards, and the principles of international law, the case regarding these war crimes can serve as a litmus test for the actual credibility of the global justice system—one in which the criteria for judgement will be truth, law, and the rights of the victims. The robust Iran has already demonstrated its capacity to alter the established rules of the game.

 Saied Reza Ameli is Professor in Communications and Global Studies, University of Tehran, and Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran