Sobh‑e‑No analyzed Trump’s “invalid policy,” arguing that it stems from Washington’s inability to confront Iran’s power. After months of conflict and failure to counter Iran, the United States now intends to use another pressure lever — referring Iran’s case to the UN Security Council — in hopes of forcing Iran to yield.

The current approach of the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency suffers from a “fundamental flaw”: attempting to resolve a crisis they themselves created through military action, without addressing its roots. As long as the Board of Governors refuses to condemn attacks on nuclear facilities under its supervision, calls for cooperation from Iran will not only be ineffective but counterproductive. What the West needs is a redefinition of cooperation — acknowledging that inspections during war or under threat of war differ fundamentally from inspections in peacetime. Otherwise, referring Iran’s case to the Security Council will, like military strikes, lead only to a deeper stalemate.

Khorasan: Beyond the new strategy

Khorasan evaluated Iran’s bold and strategic move to impose new controls on movement through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the paper, Iran’s action carries a message of symmetrical deterrence: if the United States threatens Iran’s access to international markets, Iran will raise the cost of passage for regional and global rivals by introducing a “shipping sanctions list.” In other words, Iran seeks to break the blockade by defining a sanctions‑for‑sanctions equation. Iran states that it does not intend to escalate tensions or take military action after implementing its new strategic lever in the Strait, but simultaneously with it — a move that could place additional strategic and operational pressure on the US military, which is already facing various constraints in weaponry and manpower.

Javan: The Strait of Hormuz as a global power lever

In an article, Javan discussed Iran’s control and assertion of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz as a global power lever, arguing that such control elevates Iran to the status of a global power. The first reason for the strait’s strategic importance is the lack of sufficient capacity to replace it. Another factor is the concentration of energy demand in Asia: China, India, Japan, and South Korea are among the main importers of crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, with roughly 80 percent of shipments destined for Asian markets. A further factor is the strait’s connection to the world’s spare oil production capacity. Disruption in the strait would not only halt part of exports but also complicate the use of spare production capacity in Persian Gulf states. In essence, the Strait of Hormuz is a classic “geopolitical chokepoint.” A real disruption there could simultaneously affect global oil and gas markets, transportation, electricity, energy‑intensive industries, and inflation and growth indicators. Therefore, Iran’s assertion of sovereignty over the strait positions the country as a global power.

Hamshahri: Billions of dollars of Iranian funds still move through US banks

Despite the Trump administration’s intensified economic pressure on Iran, billions of dollars in Iran‑related financial resources still pass through US banks each year — a situation that Western officials and researchers describe as a major vulnerability in Washington’s campaign to cut Iran off from the global financial system. While the Trump administration is tightening economic pressure, it faces an unexpected weak point in its effort to sever Iran’s access to global finance: its own banks. Some financial experts believe Washington’s efforts may have limited impact unless greater pressure is placed on US banks to scrutinize their correspondent banking relationships more rigorously. The US Treasury announced last year that in 2024 it had identified roughly $9 billion in Iranian‑linked funds that were transferred through American banks. Some researchers on Iran argue that if US banks act more proactively, this figure could be reduced.