CAIRO - Within the context of the decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1948 war-later known as the Nakba-stands as the most tragic and consequential starting point in the modern history of the Middle East.

This war marked the foundational moment for the establishment of the State of Israel, but it also represented a profound, ongoing tragedy for the Palestinian people, leaving strategic, political, and social consequences that persist to this day.

The roots of this conflict can be traced back to the nineteenth century with the emergence of the Zionist movement, which was based on the idea of establishing a national homeland for Jews in Palestine.

The movement exploited a range of historical and religious claims and benefited from strong Western support, particularly from Britain and the United States. Zionism played a decisive role in building a strong, organized Jewish community in Palestine through intensive settlement mechanisms, which accelerated especially after the Balfour Declaration in 1917.

The period of the British Mandate over Palestine (1920–1948) was a pivotal phase in the evolution of the Zionist project. The Mandate allowed Britain to create ideal conditions for implementing the Balfour Declaration by facilitating Jewish immigration and enabling Zionist organizations to acquire vast tracts of land.

In this context, Zionist groups such as the Haganah, Stern, Irgun, and Palmach succeeded in transforming their settlements into well-trained military centers, establishing a significant military and economic presence that paved the way for the founding of Israel after the end of the British Mandate in 1948.

Jewish settlement activities in Palestine were not random; rather, they were strategically organized. Zionist organizations deliberately established settlements in strategic areas along the borders with neighboring Arab states-Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria-to secure the future borders of the Jewish state.

The Arab military mobilization in 1948 proved that military force alone is insufficient to achieve victory without a clear, coordinated political and strategic vision. They also concentrated their settlements in resource-rich areas such as the Hula Valley and Galilee, which gave them clear strategic advantages during the ensuing war.

On the other hand, although Palestinians and Arabs recognized early on the dangers associated with Jewish settlement, they failed to organize themselves effectively.

This failure was due to internal divisions, the absence of a unified strategy, and reliance on the hope that Britain would change its stance-a hope that never materialized. Consequently, Arab efforts to confront the Zionist project remained weak and uncoordinated, in stark contrast to the high level of organization and strategic planning on the Jewish side.

As the end of the British Mandate approached, Zionist organizations had established a strong military presence on the ground. The Haganah alone boasted more than 100,000 fighters and was able to arm itself thanks to robust international support, making it the most organized and advanced military force in the region.

At the same time, the Arab Liberation Army and the forces of neighboring Arab states lacked organization, coordination, and a clear strategy, in addition to suffering from severe shortages in arms and training.

When the State of Israel was declared on May 15, 1948, the Arab armies that entered the war faced enormous challenges. Despite the Arab military mobilization, which included forces from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, these armies suffered from poor organization, a lack of military coordination, and the absence of clear objectives or joint battle strategies. This failure in coordination and joint leadership gave the Israeli side a significant advantage.

On the battlefield, the Jordanian army, led by British officer John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), played a prominent role in maintaining control over strategic areas such as Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Iraqi army also achieved notable successes, particularly in the battles for the city of Jenin. However, the political leadership in Baghdad did not provide sufficient support to sustain operations and expand on the military gains achieved on the ground.

Similarly, the Egyptian army faced numerous difficulties, including a lack of weapons, inadequate training, and weak combat experience among its commanders. Despite courageous fighting in battles such as the Battle of Fallujah, the siege and isolation of Egyptian forces by the Israelis exposed major flaws in Egyptian military planning. As a result of poorly considered political and military decisions, Egyptian forces suffered heavy losses and were unable to achieve any strategic victory.

Meanwhile, the Israeli leadership under David Ben-Gurion managed the battles with strategic acumen. Israel succeeded in significantly strengthening its military capabilities during the ceasefires imposed by the United Nations, using these periods to import large quantities of weapons and military equipment, especially from Eastern Europe and the United States. This military support was a key factor in enabling Israel to achieve battlefield superiority and successive victories.

Western powers - chiefly Britain, the United States, and France - provided substantial political, military, and economic support to the Zionist project. The issue of "defective weapons" that arose in Egypt after the war clearly revealed the extent of political and military confusion among the Arab states. Although investigations did not prove that faulty weapons were a decisive cause of defeat, the episode reflected corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of strategic planning. This scandal was among the factors that contributed to the July 1952 Revolution in Egypt.

In a broader political context, Western powers - chiefly Britain, the United States, and France - provided substantial political, military, and economic support to the Zionist project.

This was evident in facilitating Jewish immigration to Palestine and providing political backing at the United Nations for the 1947 Partition Plan. In contrast, the Arab states were unable to counter this support, leading to a worsening situation on the ground in favor of Israel.

By the end of the war, Israel had succeeded in controlling about 78% of historic Palestine and displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, in what became known as the Nakba. This tragic outcome marked the beginning of successive waves of Palestinian displacement and a refugee crisis that continues to this day, creating deep and complex humanitarian and political problems that remain unresolved.

This war left a deep wound in Arab and Palestinian memory, highlighting the weakness of Arab military and political capabilities compared to the strategic organization and meticulous planning of the Israelis.

The war was a direct cause of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict and proved that military force alone is insufficient to achieve victory without a clear, coordinated political and strategic vision.

The 1948 war remains a crucial strategic lesson about the importance of planning, organization, coordination, and international cooperation.

Victory was not solely the result of military might but also the outcome of combined political, diplomatic, and military efforts-something Israel achieved at the time, while the Arabs clearly failed, leading to the continued suffering of the Palestinian people and the exacerbation of crises in the Middle East.

The Palestinian issue, which began as a major crisis during the Nakba of 1948 and has persisted for decades, continues to pose a profound challenge to security and stability in the Middle East.

To remedy the strategic mistakes of the past, Arab states must reformulate their strategy in a manner different from previous approaches.

The post-Nakba experience has shown that a military solution alone is insufficient to advance the Palestinian cause, especially in light of ongoing Western support for Israel.Experience has shown that the Palestinian cause cannot be addressed through random initiatives or unilateral actions by individual states; rather, it requires a comprehensive and coordinated Arab strategy with a clear vision of its objectives, taking into account the balance of international and regional power.

The primary element is to build a unified and strong Arab position capable of exerting pressure on the international stage by adopting joint and clear stances on core issues such as Jerusalem, the right of return, and settlements. This would enhance the effectiveness of Arab negotiations and improve their terms.

Furthermore, the post-Nakba experience has shown that a military solution alone is insufficient to advance the Palestinian cause, especially in light of ongoing Western support for Israel. Therefore, Arabs must strengthen their diplomatic and political tools in major international institutions and work to build new international alliances.

In this context, Arab countries can use their economic and diplomatic power to exert effective pressure on Israel by leveraging economic and trade relations and strengthening ties with emerging global powers such as China, India, and Russia.

This could help create a new international balance that reduces unconditional support for Israel and increases pressure on it to respect Palestinian rights and implement relevant international resolutions.

On the Palestinian domestic front, decades of experience indicate the need for Arabs to support a new Palestinian strategy based on enhancing national unity and ending the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian internal division has been one of the main factors leading to the deterioration of the Palestinian cause and has weakened its negotiating position regionally and internationally.

Therefore, Arab states must play a pivotal role in achieving Palestinian national reconciliation and supporting the formation of a unified and effective Palestinian government capable of meeting challenges and enhancing its international legitimacy.

In this regard, Arabs can provide strong political and material support to the Palestinian Authority and promote economic and social development in the occupied Palestinian territories, enabling them to become a viable political entity rather than a vulnerable party pleading for solutions.

The most important strategic factor in overcoming past Arab failures is the need to adopt a long-term strategy of steadfastnessOn the cultural and media front, the experience of past decades has revealed the weakness of Arab media in confronting the Israeli narrative internationally, allowing Israel to present its version of events more effectively and acceptably to global public opinion.

Therefore, it is important to invest more in media and cultural diplomacy by establishing strong media platforms in multiple languages to clearly present the Palestinian and Arab narrative, highlight the historical injustices suffered by the Palestinian people, and counter Israeli misinformation campaigns.

These efforts should not be limited to traditional media but should also make more effective use of social media to reach wider audiences, especially youth and decision-makers worldwide.

Finally, the most important strategic factor in overcoming past Arab failures is the need to adopt a long-term strategy of steadfastness, not limited to mere reactions, but based on building joint Palestinian and Arab strategic capacities capable of withstanding pressure and resisting Israeli measures.

This requires integrated efforts to strengthen Palestinian infrastructure and sustainably and gradually develop economic, political, and military capabilities, enabling Palestinians and Arabs to move from a position of relative strength that allows them to impose just solutions.

Only in this way can the memory of the Nakba be transformed from a moment of defeat into a starting point for a new strategic approach that restores the centrality of the Palestinian cause regionally and internationally.

By Mostafa Kamal