MADRID – Europe is at a decisive moment in its geopolitical destiny. Frequently expressed in the rhetoric of “strategic autonomy,” the dream of a self-sufficient Europe acting as a global player collided abruptly with reality after the Ukraine crisis, U.S. pressure on Russia, and the steady escalation of sanctions and punitive measures against actors not aligned with the Western agenda—most notably Iran.

Although the context seemed ripe for the European Union to assert its own weight, the evidence suggests the opposite: far from strengthening its voice, Europe has accepted a subsidiary role, paying a high economic, political, and moral price for ceding control of its foreign and security policy to Washington.

The illusion of autonomy

The notion of European strategic autonomy has filled endless academic and diplomatic forums since 2014. It was invoked as the reasonable alternative to military dependence on the United States and as a historic opportunity to build bridges with Eurasia. Yet facts show that at every major crossroads—whether the war in Ukraine, relations with Moscow, or nuclear policy toward Iran—the EU has consistently chosen to forgo its margin of maneuver and align, often uncritically, with the interests of its increasingly unreliable U.S. ally.

It is not only European diplomacy that seems to have resigned itself to this role; the cost of that strategic surrender ripples through its entire architecture of security, economy, and external influence. Sanctions on Russia have had serious consequences for European industry—especially in key sectors like energy and manufacturing—while reshaping the map of continental alliances. The result is an EU with less freedom of action, increasingly conditioned by dynamics it does not fully control.

The concrete costs: Energy, technology, and global influence

Automatic alignment with Washington has carried tangible costs: the transfer of capital and jobs to U.S. firms, particularly in defense and technology. Europe’s response to the crisis—following the breakdown of dialogue with Moscow—only deepened transatlantic dependence. At the same time, coercive measures against Russia did not substantially alter its behavior, exposing the asymmetry of costs between Europe and the United States.
Europe’s obsession with “following the rules” and its technocratic approach to foreign policy contrast sharply with Washington’s tactical flexibility. The U.S., far from suffering from its “maximum pressure” strategy, has attracted investment and profited from Europe’s resource drain; meanwhile, European industry is forced to buy American energy and weapons at inflated prices, worsening the innovation gap and technological dependence that hobble any project of real independence.

The Iran case: A missed opportunity and diplomatic costs

One of the clearest examples of the cost of European followership is its handling of the Iran file. The nuclear deal (JCPOA) had allowed the EU to regain a mediating role and open new political and commercial channels with Iran—an essential actor in West Asia’s balance and a potential partner for reducing reliance on hostile energy suppliers. Yet the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA marked the collapse of any expectation of autonomous policy from Brussels.

A sober analysis of Iran’s nuclear aspirations requires moving beyond the Manichaean dichotomy imposed by Washington and Tel Aviv. For nearly two decades, Iran’s leaders have emphasized their intent to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, in pursuit of economic development and energy autonomy as a sovereign right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite fears and disinformation spread by hostile lobbies, there is no conclusive evidence that Iran has developed nuclear weapons, and IAEA inspections have historically found no major violations to justify its current isolation.

Had the EU prioritized dialogue and agreement over punishment and threat, it could have consolidated its role as an actor of peace and mediation in Eurasia, creating alternative channels of economic and energy cooperation beyond the U.S.–Gulf axis. Instead, Europe forfeited commercial and political benefits, while Chinese and Russian companies filled the gap left by departing European firms. Under pressure, Tehran proved resilient, consolidating its economy under sanctions, strengthening autonomous regional networks, and aligning itself with the multipolar order that is steadily moving away from Western hegemony.

Perhaps the greatest—if intangible—cost is Europe’s loss of long-term credibility. In Iran’s strategic imagination, the EU no longer appears as a reliable partner or as a counterweight to U.S. unipolarity, but as a soft, fickle intermediary unable even to guarantee the implementation of basic international agreements. This perception limits any possibility of structural cooperation in critical areas: energy, technology, migration management, or regional stability.

Examples abound. Renewed sanctions not only harmed Iran’s economy and society but also undercut Europe’s diplomatic standing in the region. Turkey, India, Brazil, and above all China and Russia stepped in to fill the leadership vacuum, launching their own initiatives to sustain multilateralism and Eurasian integration without Brussels. The cost: reduced access to emerging markets, greater political isolation, and the decline of any European global ambition in favor of powers with real autonomy.

The mirage of European unity

Behind the rhetoric of “European unity” lies deep fragmentation. Germany and Austria prioritize trade and cheap energy; France clings to its nuclear force as its shield; Eastern states automatically align with U.S. maximalism out of fear of Russia; and the South searches for middle paths that rarely materialize for lack of geopolitical weight.

The management of sanctions and common policy toward Iran and Russia has laid bare these fractures: while some push for restoring pragmatic relations, others choose permanent hostility, reproducing a foreign agenda at home. In the long term, this lack of consensus weakens the EU’s negotiating position and widens the gap between the rhetoric of autonomy and actual impotence.

The past years show Europe is passively accepting its displacement to the margins of the global game. Its inability to define an independent policy toward Moscow and Tehran positions it as a mere appendage of Washington, condemned to pay the costs of decisions made elsewhere. The price is steep: resource loss, technological erosion, diminished trust from potential partners, strategic dependence, and growing diplomatic irrelevance.

Paradoxically, being perceived in Tehran as an insubstantial and unpredictable actor means the EU also loses its ability to influence or moderate the Islamic Republic’s excesses and encourage reforms or openness. When the incentive of dialogue is replaced by coercion and punishment, the result is greater defensiveness, nationalism, and the consolidation of alternative alliances.

Toward a new Eurasian architecture

The post-Ukraine era has accelerated the formation of a new Eurasian order, in which the EU is almost a spectator, watching the emergence of alliances and consensuses that challenge the old bipolar logic. Iran, alongside Russia, China, and other emerging powers, is driving multilateral initiatives based on non-interference, sovereignty, and new mechanisms of cooperation and security. Europe, preoccupied with internal crises, arrives late to this game and laments lost opportunities for influence and gain.

To avoid being permanently relegated to the periphery, the EU must rethink its priorities, invest in autonomous capacities—technological, energy, military—and rebuild diplomatic bridges, especially with key actors like Iran. Doing so would not only secure access to vital resources and underused markets but also give Brussels greater maneuverability to defend its interests in an increasingly multipolar and competitive world. Above all, credibility depends on honoring commitments and adopting sovereign positions—not on blind obedience to external dictates.

Europe must acknowledge that the cost of lacking strategic autonomy is not limited to short-term economics. It is a toll that erodes its role as a global actor, limits its options in future crises, and undermines its ability to build equal relationships with regional powers like Iran, which seek not submission but respect and firm dialogue. If Europe’s declining influence in Eurasia, West Asia, and the Global South demonstrates anything, it is that the future belongs to those capable of setting their own terms and pursuing autonomous projects of development and security. Persisting in unilateral followership will only drag Brussels deeper into irrelevance—while others write the script of the 21st century.