Donya‑e‑Eqtesad argues that the core problem in negotiations lies in the US approach. Washington’s behavior in recent years — especially in recent days — shows that a significant part of its strategic calculations is based on the logic of the “chicken game.” According to this logic, the US continues economic and military pressure during negotiations and repeatedly violates the ceasefire in an attempt to force Tehran to retreat.

Such an approach not only fails to build trust but also sends a clear message: the goal of dialogue is to change Iran’s behavior through coercion, not to reach a balanced and sustainable agreement. Continuing maximum pressure and ceasefire violations increases tensions, makes Iran’s security calculations more cautious, and narrows diplomatic flexibility. The Cold War experience shows that strategic stability is not achieved through unilateral pressure but through recognizing power realities, mutual limitations, and establishing clear rules for managing competition.

Shargh: Continuing the war benefits no one

Shargh wrote that the continuation of the current situation and the fragile ceasefire benefits no one. The paper argues that this war has no winner: the United States is rapidly consuming its strategic oil reserves and, although it is the world’s largest oil producer, its domestic consumption is extremely high. High oil prices could damage the US economy. On the other side, China — the world’s largest oil importer — has turned to its strategic reserves, but rising costs and damage to its refineries show that the world’s second‑largest economy would also suffer greater economic harm if the war drags on. Meanwhile, oil prices are falling, and global energy investors are shifting their capital from countries around the Strait of Hormuz to new markets. As a result, Iranian oil cannot remain untouched by the consequences of this war. For all parties involved, it is in their interest that tensions in the region end as soon as possible.

Etemad: Diversifying trade routes

Etemad examined Iran’s policy to reduce the crisis in maritime trade. It wrote that in the maritime domain, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz remains one of Iran’s key geopolitical levers. However, the subtle point is that Iran has shifted from relying solely on threats to joint management with countries such as Oman. This shift, along with the gradual relocation of some Iranian commercial companies from Dubai to Oman and Turkey, reflects Tehran’s understanding of the need to reduce dependence on a single corridor. Expanding economic and transit cooperation with Oman and Turkey — two countries with relatively balanced relations with both East and West — is part of a broader strategy to diversify trade routes. The goal is clear: to increase Iran’s bargaining power and prevent foreign actors from assuming that Tehran has no alternatives under sanctions pressure.

Iran: Lebanon as Tehran’s red line in negotiations

The Iran newspaper describes Tehran’s view of Lebanon as follows: From Iran’s perspective, any weakening of Lebanon or placing it in a vulnerable position could have consequences beyond Lebanon’s borders. Therefore, when mediators raised proposals concerning Lebanon, Iran responded clearly: Lebanon is not a bargaining chip that can be traded for other concessions at the negotiating table. Some analysts believe Tehran wants to send a message to Washington that the Lebanese crisis must not become a tool for political pressure or extracting concessions in negotiations. Iran will not remain silent in the face of pressure on Lebanon — even if this complicates the negotiation process. Iran’s political and on‑the‑ground support for Lebanon is seen as part of a broader effort to maintain a deterrence balance against Israel, which remains one of the most important security factors in the Middle East’s complex dynamics.

Khorasan: A major operation — but not enough

Khorasan wrote that Iran’s response to US hostility — specifically the attack on Qeshm and Sirik maritime facilities — was a major action beyond the expected level, but still insufficient. If the US can bring a country to its knees solely through a naval blockade, this strategy will become a low‑cost, high‑return model in the Pentagon’s playbook and will be repeated. Over the past year, the US began with Venezuela, then moved to Iran, and is now looking toward Cuba. Breaking the blockade does not necessarily mean entering a full‑scale war; rather, it means imposing high and unpredictable costs on the US so that Washington concludes the strategy is not worth its benefits. These costs may come in the form of responses to the US fleet or through positive measures that neutralize the blockade’s economic effects.