The grand deceptions, the inversion of perpetrator and victim, and the great instigation of chaos On the evening of 6 January 2026, as the streets of Tehran and several other Iranian cities were engulfed in terrorist violence that ultimately claimed the lives of more than three thousand people, Mike Pompeo, the former US regime’s Secretary of State, posted an unconventional message on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter): “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them” (The Jerusalem Post, 2026).

The significance of this statement lies in its explicit confirmation of the presence of Israeli regime’s intelligence operatives at the heart of Iran’s domestic unrest, inciting violence and actively orchestrating the slaughter and martyrdom of innocent citizens. This admission was subsequently corroborated in even clearer terms during an interview Pompeo gave to the Israeli regime’s Channel 13. When the host suggested that Washington’s promises of support for Iranian rioters had never materialised, Pompeo countered: “The help did arrive... plenty of help... America is actively working to help them” (Fox News, 2026).

Shortly thereafter, Donald Trump went a step further in an interview, openly acknowledging the supply of weapons to the rioters in Iran. Trump stated: “We sent them a lot of weapons; we sent them through the Kurds” (The Telegraph, 2026). In another public remark, he reiterated: “We sent them a lot of guns. We sent them […]” (Middle East Eye, 2026).

While reserving its inherent right to “self-defence” under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Islamic Republic of Iran declares that under:

- Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

- The “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, 1970), which prohibits any direct or indirect intervention, as well as the organising, instigating, assisting, or financing of subversive or armed activities aimed at the violent overthrow of independent States;

- The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986), which established that the equipping, training, financing, and logistical support of non-State armed forces constitutes a clear violation of both the principle of non-intervention and customary international law;

- Article 3, paragraph (g) of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the “Definition of Aggression”, which classifies the sending or active support of armed bands, groups, or irregular forces against another State as an act of aggression;

- UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965), containing the “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty”;

- Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, which addresses the responsibility of a State that aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act;

- And the binding obligations under the “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” (1999);
the US and Israeli regimes bear full responsibility for all material and non-material damages arising from the arming of hostile armed factions in Iran in January 2026 and the active incitement of street violence in Tehran and other cities throughout Iran.

On the basis of the evidence and arguments set forth in this text, the international community is duty-bound to condemn these actions without delay and to establish the necessary mechanisms for reparations through competent international institutions. To fail in this duty is to grant a green light for future violations, representing a betrayal of the very principles upon which the international legal order is constructed. This paper focuses on two fundamental principles: first, the criminality of intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states—a principle repeatedly violated over the past 47 years against Iran sovereignty—and second, the flagrant violation of the UN Charter by the military interventions of a criminal

US regime and a usurping Israeli regime, which continue to compromise the independence of Iran.

1. The Categorical Criminality of State Intervention in Internal Affairs under International Law
In this regard, several pivotal legal authorities—including the UN Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International Law, the rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and other key international legal instruments—are highlighted below:

1.1 The legal architecture erected post-1945, engineered precisely to prevent such interventions, is both clear and definitive. Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, frequently described as the “cornerstone of modern international law”, mandates that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (United Nations, 1945, Art. 2, para. 4).

1.2 The principle of non-intervention extends well beyond the literal text of the Charter. The 1970 “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States” (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625) articulates this prohibition with meticulous, almost obsessive precision: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State” (UN General Assembly, 1970). Under this resolution, all forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State, or its political, economic, and cultural elements, are categorically condemned. The Declaration further specifies that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State” (UN General Assembly, 1970, Principle 3).

1.3 Furthermore, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its landmark 1986 judgment in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, firmly reaffirmed this legal consensus (ICJ, 1986). That case centered on the US regime's support for the Contras, which entailed training, arming, equipping, financing, and supplying forces operating against the Sandinista government. By twelve votes to three, the Court declared that the US regime had acted “in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State” (ICJ, 1986, para. 292). Crucially, the Court ruled that the prohibition of intervention encompasses not only direct military force, but also indirect forms of interference, including the supply of weaponry, logistical support, and the encouragement of armed groups to destabilise a sovereign state (ICJ, 1986, para. 195).

1.4 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the “Definition of Aggression”, adopted in 1974, provides further granularity. Article 3, Paragraph (g) classifies as an act of aggression “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein” (General Assembly, 1974, Art. 3, para. (g)). The resolution emphasizes that aggression constitutes “a crime against international peace” giving rise to international responsibility (General Assembly, 1974, Art. 5, para. 2).

1.5 The specific prohibition against equipping armed non-state actors to conduct operations against a third state has been repeatedly underscored in international instruments. UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), titled the “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty”, adopted in 1965, condemns “armed intervention and all other forms of interference” and explicitly bars states from organizing, assisting, fomenting, financing, inciting, or tolerating “subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State” (UN General Assembly, 1965, para. 2).

1.6 Furthermore, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1975), whilst focused on a specific category of weaponry, reflects a broader customary principle whereby states are prohibited from employing any means to subvert foreign governments (United Nations, 1975).

1.7 Beyond these considerations, and with respect to the financial, military, and legal support provided by the US regime to the Israeli regime in its aggression and genocide in Palestine, as well as its unlawful aggression against Iran and Lebanon,

Article 20 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), formulated by the International Law Commission (ILC), stipulates that a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is itself internationally responsible for doing so (International Law Commission, 2001). This provision reinforces the principle that the indirect commission of an international wrong does not confer immunity from liability: “Where a state provides non-state actors with weapons, funding, training, or intelligence, and these actors subsequently commit acts of violence against a third state, both the direct perpetrators and their external sponsors shall bear legal responsibility” (ibid.: para. 65).

1.8 The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), to which both the US and Israeli regimes are party, obliges its signatories to prevent terrorist activities directed against other states. Article 19 of the Convention mandates that states shall afford one another “the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings” brought in respect of the offences prohibited therein (United Nations, 1997: Article 19). Beyond this, the mere act of publicly celebrating espionage operations conducted within the territory of another state—as exemplified by Mike Pompeo's 2026 New Year message—constitutes a clear violation of both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the customary norms governing the conduct of intelligence activities (United Nations, 1961).

1.9 The 2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory reaffirmed the inviolability of sovereign territorial integrity, even under exceptional security concerns. The Court's reasoning, particularly in paragraph 2 of the opinion, notes that no claimed security necessity can justify fundamental breaches of the principle of non-intervention (International Court of Justice, 2004: para. 2). The ICJ has consistently asserted that “the principle of non-intervention is the cornerstone of the international legal order, from which no derogation is permitted” (ibid., 1986: para. 202). 

1.10 The Rio Declaration of the Group of 77 and China, adopted at its 2026 meeting, explicitly endorsed this principle, condemning “any support, including the provision of weaponry, to groups seeking to destabilise the legitimate governments of member states” (Group of 77, 2026: para. 8).

The documented records to be examined in detail in subsequent sections demonstrate blatant violations at each of these normative levels. The provision of arms to Kurdish opposition forces in Iran, which was publicly announced by Donald Trump, directly contradicts Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the jurisprudence of the Nicaragua case, and Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression. Furthermore, Pompeo’s overt support for Mossad agents operating on the streets of Tehran constitutes an affirmative admission of prohibited intervention. In addition, the systematic deployment of unilateral sanctions as an instrument of “maximum pressure”—designed to destabilise Iran's economy and political structure—represents a form of “economic coercion” explicitly condemned by General Assembly Resolution 2131.

The primary issue is not whether international law prohibits such conduct, as legal texts, judicial precedents, and customary practices are unequivocal on this matter. The fundamental question is whether the international community possesses the institutional will and the necessary legal mechanisms to enforce these prohibitions against regimes that choose to disregard them.

2. Documentation of the US and Israeli Regimes' Intervention in Iran’s Territorial Independence
Few principles in international law are as clear and absolute as the prohibition against arming insurgent forces against another sovereign state. Nonetheless, in early winter 2026, senior US regime’s officials—including the President and the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—issued statements which, far from being mere implicit threats, constitute explicit admissions of such conduct.

2.1 Explicit Admissions of Arms Shipments to the Iranian Opposition

On 5 April 2026, Trey Yingst, the Chief Foreign Correspondent for Fox News, reported on a telephone conversation with Donald Trump that fundamentally altered the evidentiary landscape of the intervention dispute in Iran.

Yingst reported: “President Trump told me that the United States sent weapons to Iranian protesters.” He continued: “He told me: 'We sent them a lot of weapons. We sent them to the Kurds'“ (Atkins, 2026). This admission was highly significant, not only for its substance but also for its temporal context. Only weeks prior, Trump had told reporters that he had instructed Kurdish groups to remain on the sidelines and refrain from intervening (ibid.). This contradiction did not escape observers: how could one order non-intervention whilst simultaneously acknowledging the dispatch of weaponry specifically designed to facilitate the opposite outcome?

The White House moved swiftly to contain the fallout. In a press briefing on 5 May 2026, the US regime’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, attempted to cast Trump's remarks as “rhetorical” rather than “operational”. Rubio argued that the President’s words merely reflected “a wish that the Iranian people had the ability to fight back” and that these remarks were “distinct and independent from the details of the operation” (Rudaw, 2026).

From a legal perspective, however, this distinction is entirely groundless, given that international law is concerned with deeds, not intentions. Regardless of whether the weapons were dispatched out of genuine sympathy for the protesters or based on calculated geopolitical interests, the physical transfer of arms itself constitutes a violation of the legal prohibitions against intervention.

Trump's subsequent statements further dismantled the fragile defensive wall that Rubio had sought to erect. On 11 May 2026, appearing at the White House, Trump declared that he was “highly disappointed” with Kurdish groups who, in his words, “take, take, take” but fail to provide sufficient military support to the Iranian opposition (Middle East Eye, 2026). The implicit premise of this grievance—the expectation that Kurdish forces should fight for American regime’s strategic objectives within Iranian territory—confirms the interventionist nature of this relationship.

From a legal standpoint, the statements of the US regime administration, irrespective of their objective veracity, in and of themselves satisfy the material element (actus reus) of prohibited intervention. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in the Nicaragua case, the mere “dispatch of armed bands” or “active participation therein”, regardless of whether those groups successfully receive or utilise the weapons, is tantamount to an act of aggression (ICJ, 1986: para. 228).

2.2 Admissions Regarding the Presence of “Mossad Agents on the Streets of Tehran” and Explicit Arms Transfers

On 2 January 2026, amid outbreaks of armed unrest on the streets of Tehran, the former CIA Director and former US regime Secretary of State wrote on the social media platform X: “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them” (Jerusalem Post, 2026). These remarks were subsequently reaffirmed in a television interview with the Israeli regime’s Channel 13. During the broadcast, when the presenter suggested that American promises of support for the Iranian rioters had never materialised, Pompeo replied dismissively: “I don't think so. The help arrived... a lot of help. We might not see all of it... we might not know of all of it, but America is actively working to help [them]” (Fox News, 2026).

The legal characterisation of Pompeo's statements warrants meticulous analysis. Article 5(2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) obligates member states to prevent the organisation or direction of “terrorist acts” by any person (UN, 1999: Art. 5(2)). Although the primary focus of this convention is financial, its underlying general principle—that states must not knowingly encourage terrorist activities on foreign soil—is widely recognised as a reflection of customary international law.

Pompeo’s public confirmation of Mossad agents operating amongst the protesters constitutes, at the very least, an incitement to conduct foreign intelligence operations against a sovereign state. At most, depending on what classified documents might reveal regarding operational coordination, it could amount to aiding and abetting violent acts against both security personnel and Iranian civilians.

2.3 Other Documented Instances of Intervention

Reports by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) have documented explicit statements by US officials on social media platforms that appear designed to “coordinate with rioters” and exploit “separatist groups” active in Iran's border regions (ISD, 2026). While the report exercised caution in making causal claims, it highlighted a “highly significant temporal correlation” between the official US regime messaging and the escalation of organised violence.

Critics argue that this documentation consists primarily of statements by US regime officials rather than empirical operational evidence. This critique, however, misconstrues the nature of “evidence” in international law. In the absence of discovered documents or intercepted communications—which are rarely obtained without bilateral intelligence cooperation—public admissions by state agents are deemed admissible evidence before international tribunals. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case admitted precisely this form of evidence, relying heavily on the published statements of US officials to establish the policies of the US regime (ICJ, 1986: para. 73).

3. Statistical Fabrication and the Unbridled Escalation of Casualty Figures

From the perspective of the Iranian authorities, the loss of even a single life is a grave matter—a deeply felt religious and national tragedy. This makes the martyrdom of nearly 2,500 individuals, alongside the deaths of over 600 assailants of public security and agents of the occupying American and Israeli regimes, an issue of immense gravity. Simultaneously, however, one must confront the systemic fabrication of data and the continuous proliferation of manufactured casualty figures. The trajectory of the claimed street fatalities during the unrest of December 2025–January 2026 (Dey 1404) defies any plausible demographic or logistical reality. On 13 January 2026, following the cessation of the unrest, Western news agencies, citing “anonymous sources”, reported that “approximately 3,000 people had been killed” (New York Times, 2026). Within ten days, this figure had more than doubled, with certain media outlets invoking “unofficial estimates” to project toll figures ranging between 6,000 and 10,000 (see, for example, BBC, 2026). By late January, a cohort of US regime officials, none of whom possessed direct contact with or access to Iran, publicly cited figures of 15,000 to 20,000, attributing these metrics to “satellite imagery analysis” that was never made public (see Ganot, 2026 as an example).

February witnessed even more astronomical leaps. Social media accounts affiliated with exiled opposition groups began circulating claims of 27,000 deaths (Euronews, 2026; New York Post, 2026), which rapidly climbed to 30,000 (The Times, 2026), 36,500 (Iran International, 2026), and subsequently 35,000 (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2026). By March, think tanks closely aligned with the US regime foreign policy establishment were publishing reports alleging 40,000 casualties (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2026). This progressive escalation of statistics was advanced entirely without supporting evidence. No lists of names, hospital records, coordinates of alleged mass graves, or any other data capable of meeting the barest evidentiary threshold for a local coroner's inquest have ever been produced. 

In contrast, the official Iranian figures published on 13 February 2026 (24 Bahman 1404) by the Legal Medicine Organisation document 3,117 confirmed deaths. The identity of every deceased individual has been verified by name and national identification number, and this comprehensive list has been made public (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2026). The chasm between the verified figure of 3,117 and the fabricated claim of 40,000 deaths—representing an almost thirteen-fold discrepancy—cannot be explained away by mere reporting deficiencies or clerical lags.

An examination of the sheer logistical implications of 40,000 deaths further exposes the fraudulent nature of these statistics. Managing 40,000 fatalities would require approximately thirty-three full cycles of processing and burial, with each cycle taking several days to execute. Yet, despite enjoying freedom of movement across vast areas of the capital after the first week of unrest, international journalists reported no sightings of mass graves, nor any indication that mortuary capacities had been overwhelmed. To believe that a state could kill 40,000 people without resorting to heavy weaponry or conducting mass, industrial-scale detentions requires an assumption of almost superhuman logistical execution. It can be confidently argued that the purpose behind these escalating numbers was never statistical accuracy; rather, it was to construct a legal-political narrative designed to obscure the gaze of eyewitnesses to the Israeli regime's genocide and American aggression. This represents a stark exercise in hypocrisy and instrumentalisation. The very same governments that demanded rigorous proof from Iran for its figure of 3,117—only to dismiss that evidence out of hand—refuse to offer even a shred of documentation for their own vastly more sensationalist claims.

4. The Authentic Narrative of the Street Events and the Legal Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Any state confronted with severe civil unrest finds itself at a critical juncture between transparency and ambiguity, tasked with either accounting for every lost life or allowing the truth to dissolve into the fog of crisis. What distinguishes the response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the events of January 2026 is the meticulous and unprecedented nature of its disclosure. While Western diplomatic channels and media networks amplified casualty figures that proliferated like rumours in a vacuum, Tehran took the step of publishing names, national identification numbers, and a tripartite classification of the deceased, encompassing all casualties across the spectrum of the conflict.

The unrest that swept through Iran in the opening weeks of the winter of 2025–2026 began with peaceful assemblies organized by trade unions on 28 December 2025. In their origin, these demonstrations were expressions of legitimate economic grievances—a phenomenon familiar to any nation grappling with the severe impact of unilateral sanctions, inflation, and the broader disruptions of global economic coercion.

The critical turning point occurred on 8 January 2026. On this day, armed insurgents and terrorist elements systematically infiltrated the gathering sites and opened fire on both security forces and civilians. The strategic objective of this intervention was unmistakable: to drag peaceful demonstrations into a cycle of violence, bloodshed, and systemic chaos. This distinction is of paramount legal significance. Prior to this date, the protests fell within the constitutionally protected domain of public dissent; thereafter, they were transformed into active combat zones in which armed actors, acting under the direction of the US and Israeli regimes, sought to maximize casualties on all sides.

Iranian state authorities have documented this shift, noting the interception of audio transmissions from these hostile elements containing explicit directives to fire indiscriminately at protesters, police, and bystanders alike. Notably, a significant proportion of the deceased were shot from behind. Given that the Iranian government repeatedly offered to share this forensic evidence with international bodies, these occurrences present a classic pattern of asymmetric proxy warfare, wherein armed infiltrators directed by foreign intelligence services deliberately blur the line between peaceful demonstrator and combatant to provoke a state response—which is subsequently instrumentalized as a mechanism for external political pressure.

On 30 January 2026, the President of Iran took the exceptional step of publishing the detailed identities of 2,986 citizens who had lost their lives during the unrest, out of an officially confirmed total of 3,117 casualties (Asr Iran, 2026). The minor discrepancy of 131 cases was addressed with absolute transparency: certain bodies remained unidentified at the time of publication, while others carried national identification codes that did not align with the national civil registry (Office of the President, 2026). The government pledged to release a supplementary register as soon as forensic verification was complete and, within 48 hours, established an online portal enabling families to submit queries or corrections (ibid.). The published database included the first name, surname, father’s name, and the final six digits of the national identification number of each deceased individual (IRNA, 2026).

Such a level of specificity and institutional accountability is virtually without parallel in the modern history of state responses to armed domestic crises. This disclosure effectively disrupted the conventional methodology of Western media reporting—which historically relies on unverifiable, anonymous assertions attributed to “informed sources”—by introducing a transparent, auditable dataset open to international scrutiny and independent verification.

An analytical breakdown of the 3,117 confirmed fatalities reveals a reality far more complex than the binary narrative projected by Western commentators. Approximately 45 per cent (over 1,400 individuals) were members of national security and law enforcement agencies—including the police, the Basij, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—who were killed in direct confrontations with armed insurgents. A further 30 per cent consisted of innocent civilians caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted by armed elements sponsored by the US and Israeli regimes. The remaining 25 per cent were armed insurgents classified under the legal category of mohareb (those who take up arms against the state) who were killed during active combat with security forces (Fararu, 2026). Consequently, the single largest category of casualties comprised state agents—men and women who died defending public order against armed aggression. Their inclusion in the official register, and the state’s open acknowledgment of their deaths, represents an exceptional standard of administrative transparency.

In February 2026, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, issued a decree carrying profound legal and moral implications. Under this directive, all non-combatants who lost their lives in the events—including security personnel, state officials, and innocent civilians—were officially designated as martyrs (shahid). The sole exception applied to individuals whose active participation in armed insurrection against the state (mohareb) was legally proven (Tabnak, 2026). This directive was executed by the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, which subsequently confirmed that 2,427 of the deceased had been formally registered under this status, granting their families comprehensive state support and legal recognition (ibid.).

Conclusion: The Imperative to Condemn Flagrant Violations and Reclaim Infringed Rights

The explicit admissions by the senior US regime officials regarding the transfer of weaponry to insurgents in Iran, the verified presence of Mossad operatives in Tehran, the systemic backing of hostile actors, and the subsequent fabrication of casualty statistics escalating to forty thousand are actions that cannot be dismissed, reinterpreted, or explained away. These constitute public confessions of unlawful conduct uttered by the perpetrators themselves.

International law is unequivocal on these matters. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law (Resolution 2625) collectively establish a peremptory norm (jus cogens): the arming of insurgent groups, the instigation of hostile foreign intelligence operations, and any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state are strictly prohibited and constitute a grave violation of international peace. This is a non-derogable principle of the international legal order.

Confronted with these robust norms, the US and Israeli regimes have engaged in a three-tiered pattern of flagrant violations:

- The first tier comprises the direct supply of armaments to armed insurgents within Iranian territory, substantiated by Donald Trump’s public admissions and the failed rhetorical damage control attempted by his Secretary of State.

- The second tier involves the active conduct of hostile intelligence and subversion operations within the capital of a sovereign state by Israeli regime intelligence services.

- The third tier consists of the systematic fabrication of casualty statistics—a form of discourse and psychological warfare designed to construct a false juridical narrative, which itself represents an abuse of international monitoring mechanisms and warrants independent legal accountability.

While reserving its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains that the US and Israeli regimes bear full state responsibility for the material and moral damages resulting from their arming of hostile factions and their incitement of street violence.

The international community cannot remain silent in the face of such clear transgressions. Condemning these interventions and establishing mechanisms for full reparation is the only way to restore credibility to the international legal order.

Although structural limitations within current global institutions may obstruct certain conventional pathways for enforcing compliance, other legal avenues remain viable. The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (subject to appropriate referral mechanisms), the UN General Assembly (under the “Uniting for Peace” framework), and national courts operating under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction all represent potential fora for holding the perpetrators of these actions accountable. The Islamic Republic of Iran must pursue these avenues systematically, forging coalitions with other sovereign nations that have similarly fallen victim to Western interventionist practices.

References
Aitken, P. (2026, April 5). Trump says Kurds kept guns meant for Iran protesters—Report. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-says-kurds-kept-guns-iran-protesters-11785509. 
Asr Iran. (2026) ‘Joz’iyyat-e Hoviyyati-ye 2,986 Jan-Bakhteh-ye Havades-e Akhir 'Elam Shod’ [Identification details of 2,986 victims of the recent events released], Asr Iran, 1 February. Available at: [Link to source].
BBC. (2026, Feb. 9). Revealing names and faces of the victims of Iran's protest crackdown. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62v248xkl5o. 
Euronews. (2026, January 27). Iran protests death toll could surpass more than 30,000, reports claim. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/27/iran-protests-death-toll-could-surpass-more-than-30000-reports-claim. 
Fararu. (2026) ‘Bayanayeh-ye Bonyad-e Shahid / Amar-e Shohaday-e Havades-e Akhir 'Elam Shod’ [Statement of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs: Figures for the martyrs of the recent events released], Fararu, 21 January. Available at: [Link to source].
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2026). Iran‘s January 2026 crackdown: A preliminary assessment of casualties (FDD Report No. 2026-03). Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/07/tehran-is-repositioning-its-terror-proxies-for-a-domestic-crackdown/. 
Fox News. (2026, Jan. 15). Pompeo says Iranian regime has arrived at 'natural terminus': 'Let's not waste this historic opportunity'. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pompeo-says-iranian-regime-arrived-natural-terminus-lets-not-waste-historic-opportunity.print. 
Ganot, S. (2026, Jan. 15). Airlines Reroute, Embassies Pull Back, and Iran’s Uprising Tests Washington’s Red Lines. The Medialine. https://themedialine.org/mideast-daily-news/airlines-reroute-embassies-pull-back-and-irans-uprising-tests-washingtons-red-lines/. 
Group of 77. (2026). Rio Declaration of the Group of 77 and China: Paragraph 8 on prohibition of support for destabilisation. United Nations. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/td522_en.pdf. 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue. (2026). Axis of amplification: Regime media, proxies and Western supporters respond to Iranian protests (ISD Report No. 2026-04). Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/axis-of-amplification-regime-media-proxies-and-western-supporters-respond-to-iranian-protests/. 
International Court of Justice. (1986). Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Judgment of 27 June 1986. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70.
International Court of Justice. (1986). Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Judgment of 27 June 1986.
International Court of Justice. (2004). Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory. Advisory opinion of 9 July 2004. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131.
International Law Commission. (2001). Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. United Nations. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf.
Iran International. (2026, Jan. 25). Over 36,500 killed in Iran's deadliest massacre, documents reveal. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601255198. 
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). (2026) ‘Ettela’iyeh-ye Daftar-e Ra’is-e Jomhur Darbareh-ye Havades-e Dey-Mah-e 1404; Hameh-ye Qorbanian-e Havades-e Akhir Farzandan-e Iran Budand / Fehreste-e Jan-Bakhtegan’ [Statement of the President’s Office on the events of January 2026; All victims of the recent events were children of Iran / List of the deceased], IRNA, 1 February. Available at: [Link to source].
Middle East Eye. (2026, Apr. 6). Iranian Kurds deny receiving US weapons to arm Iran's protesters. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-kurds-deny-receiving-us-weapons-arm-iran-protesters. 
New York Post. (2026, January 22). Horrific new photos show brutality of Iran’s protest crackdown. New York Post. https://nypost.com/2026/01/22/world-news/horrific-new-photos-show-brutality-of-irans-protest-crackdown.
Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2026) ‘Ettela’iyeh-ye Daftar-e Ra’is-e Jomhur Darbareh-ye Havades-e Dey-Mah-e 1404’ [Statement of the President’s Office on the events of January 2026], President.ir, 1 February. Available at: https://president.ir/fa/163429. 
Pompeo, M. [@mikepompeo]. (2026, January 2). Happy New Year to every Iranian on the streets of Tehran – and to every Mossad operative walking alongside them [Tweet]. X (formerly Twitter).
Rudaw. (2026, May 5). Trump remarks on arming Kurds reflect support for Iranians, not weapons transfer confirmation: Rubio. Rudaw. https://www.rudaw.net/english/world/050520261. 
Tabnak. (2026) ‘Rahbar-e Enqelab: Mas’oulin ‘Edeh-ye az Farib-Khordegan ra Shahid ‘Elam Kardand; Khub Kardand’ [Leader of the Revolution: The authorities have declared a group of those deceived as martyrs; they did well], Tabnak, 17 February. Available at: [Link to source].
The Jerusalem Post. (2026 Jan. 3). 'Happy New Year to Iranians and Mossad agents beside them,' Mike Pompeo says in social media post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-882149. 
The New York Times. (2026. Jan 13). ‘Shoot to Kill’: Accounts of Brutal Crackdown Emerge From Iran. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-protester-deaths.html. 
The Telegraph. (2026, Apr. 5). Trump sent guns to Iranian protesters through Kurdish militias. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/04/05/trump-sent-guns-iranian-protesters-through-kurdish-militias/. 
Times. (2026, Jan. 25). Iran Protest Death Toll Could Top 30,000, According to Local Health Officials. https://web.archive.org/web/20260125144242/https://time.com/7357635/more-than-30000-killed-in-iran-say-senior-officials/. 
United Nations General Assembly. (1965). Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states (Resolution 2131 (XX)). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/203513.
United Nations General Assembly. (1970). Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states (Resolution 2625 (XXV)). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202170.
United Nations General Assembly. (1974). Definition of aggression (Resolution 3314 (XXIX)). https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/739/16/pdf/nr073916.pdf. 
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter.
United Nations. (1961). Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
United Nations. (1975). Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. https://www.un.org/disarmament/enmod-convention.
United Nations. (1997). International convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-9&chapter=18.

By Dr. Saied Reza Ameli is Professor of the Department of Communications and Global Studies at University of Tehran, and Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran