TEHRAN - Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the Israeli regime supports the Iran-U.S. ceasefire, but it does not include Lebanon.

His remarks contradict the statements by Iran and mediator Pakistan. They both insisted any ceasefire would include an end to the regime’s aggression in Lebanon and Iran’s allies. 

Amid the regime’s ongoing and indiscriminate aggression, Zionist officials claimed to have struck 100 targets in Lebanon on Wednesday and have previously vowed to occupy all Lebanese territory south of the Litani River. 

Hezbollah meanwhile put out the following statement addressed to the Lebanese people: “Today, we stand on the threshold of a great and historic victory, one that will be achieved thanks to the sacrifices of the fighters, the blood of the martyrs, and your unmatched perseverance and endurance”.

It added, “The treacherous and brutal enemy, seeking to escape the image of its defeat, may resort to deceptive acts in an attempt to fabricate the illusion of an achievement it failed to secure on the battlefield.” 

Also on Wednesday, new evacuation orders were issued by the regime’s military to the residents of southern Lebanon. These orders are becoming increasingly similar to the regime’s genocidal war on Gaza. 
 
When comparing Lebanon and Gaza in favor of Lebanon, and considering the superiority of the Israeli regime’s military power in both situations, it is hard to imagine how this power can overcome the differences when applying a repeated plan in a different context.

Maneuvers by Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) in its continuous aggression in southern Lebanon, following a strategy of rapid movement with intense penetration south of the Litani River combines three military doctrines:
Maneuver warfare: This aims to disrupt Hezbollah’s military power by using rapid movement as an alternative to the doctrine of a decisive blow. It differs from gradual destruction tactics and relies on fast, multi-pronged advances, seeking weak points to strike while avoiding direct confrontation. 

This is accompanied by tactical withdrawals and repositioning without the need for permanent occupation, especially in the deep southern towns, except for certain areas that the regime has occupied since the 2024 ceasefire, which can be controlled due to their strategic depth in protecting the continuous movement of the occupation regime’s airborne forces, who cannot dig trenches or establish infrastructure, even temporarily.

The IOF had previously applied this model during its phases of aggression in the Gaza Strip, especially during the conquest of northern Gaza City after Eyal Zameer became Chief of Staff, following the resignation of Herzi Halevi. It now seems that this same combat doctrine is being followed in southern Lebanon, albeit with relative differences.

 Dynamic maneuver-based deployment 

This involves positioning at key intersections to prevent Hezbollah from organizing according to field plans suited to the region’s geography. It requires near-fixed positioning but allows for quick redeployment along relatively protected movement lines. The IOF followed such a combat pattern in Gaza before implementing the current ceasefire.

Attrition warfare

This aims to exhaust the Lebanese resistance gradually by inflicting continuous losses over time, even without a swift resolution. This is evident in the battles around the outskirts of Khiam, for instance. The IOF followed this approach in Gaza after Eyal Zameer became Chief of Staff, and it is now applying the same plan in its aggression south of the Litani River, with somewhat different tactical details.

The IOF had combined these military doctrines in Gaza, and is now repeating them in its assault south of the Litani River, but with relatively different tactical nuances. They recognize that Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, much like Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, is an unconventional force that does not rely on permanence. 
However, these plans overlook significant differences that could alter the outcome, even though the regime’s military planners are aware of these differences and may attempt to bridge the gap. Still, they will not achieve the same result, even though these strategies were not entirely successful in Gaza, where they allowed the IOF to penetrate deep into Gaza City under continuous fire.

One plan in two different realities

The IOF has been forced to adopt this plan in its southward push or attempts to spread out south of the Litani, combining rapid maneuvering with dynamic deployment, while attempting to exhaust Hezbollah through the coordination of combat units. This forced approach is driven by the following factors:

Nature of the regime’s military vehicles

The attack relies heavily on Merkava tanks, Eitan armored vehicles, and D9 and D10 bulldozers, without the capacity to bring in equipment suited for permanent positioning in trenches or camps. Other military vehicles, such as digging and construction vehicles or troop carriers, are vulnerable to Hezbollah attacks. The daily targeting of Merkava tanks, with approximately 150 of them destroyed or damaged, shows the risks involved with non-armored vehicles.

Political uncertainty

This is recognized by Eyal Zameer, who has raised multiple red flags to the political leadership, warning of the IOF’s internal collapse.

Reluctance to recruit more troops

Maintaining a fixed position in southern Lebanon requires two additional divisions for securing positions. While 400,000 reservists were called up, the response was minimal, and the exact number has not been disclosed. 

This is no longer an issue related to the Haredi community’s refusal to enlist, but rather a broader disinterest due to lack of motivation, the escalating war, and the increasing risk of facing Hezbollah on its home ground. The situation worsens with the ongoing mobilization of reserve soldiers for three consecutive years, many of whom have lost civilian jobs. The financial system within the IOF does not provide the same compensation to reservists as it does to regular soldiers.

Underestimating Hezbollah’s capabilities

The initial Zionist regime calculations were based on the false assumption that Hezbollah’s organizational and military infrastructure south of the Litani could be wiped out quickly. By the first week of fighting, this assumption had proven wrong, and with each passing day, these miscalculations are becoming more evident.

These factors pushed the IOF to combine various military doctrines, repeating its Gaza experience while possibly acknowledging the differences between the two realities but ignoring them. The belief in the Israeli regime’s strength persists due to several factors:

• Huge military superiority.

• Unprecedented U.S. support.

• The aftermath of the October 7 attack.

• Successful security strikes against Hezbollah.

• Shifts within the Lebanese government regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament.

• Unfavorable developments in Syria for Hezbollah.

• Israel’s control of Southern Syria, allowing infiltration into sensitive Lebanese areas.

• The U.S.-Israeli’s war on Iran.

Key differences between Gaza and Lebanon

These differences are critical in hindering the success of the Zionist regime’s military strategy, which may become more apparent over time, especially as the regime’s aggression against Iran falters with the Islamic Republic’s successful strikes that crippled the regime for 40 days before the ceasefire. The major differences between Gaza and Lebanon, within the framework of the regime’s current attack plans, are:

** The geography and siege of Gaza.  Gaza is a flat, exposed, and limited area compared to the more complex geography of southern Lebanon, which is more open to relatively stable Lebanese territories. Gaza is under an imposed siege, while Lebanon, though besieged, is not in the same situation, allowing Hezbollah more maneuverability, especially with its connections to Iran despite the geographic distance.

** Resistance capabilities. The Palestinian resistance is much weaker than Hezbollah, which has developed its capabilities in a relatively open environment, while Gaza’s resistance has been limited by ongoing wars.

Given the differences between Lebanon and Gaza, it is hard to imagine how the occupation regime can overcome these challenges with a repeated strategy in a different context. 

Even if the strategy is adaptable or open to escalation based on changes in the battlefield, the geography and the support from a sacrificial population may be enough to defeat overwhelming military power, no matter how much it blusters.